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Abstract
I consider the role of automatic psychological and neural processes in dierent settings. First,
how does advertising aect consumer perceptions of a product? I assert that one of the major
mechanisms used in marketing is the creation of implicit associations among concepts. A neural-
network framework is adapted to model how these associations evolve and interact. Use of this
formal model allows us to consider some of the indirect eects of advertising, particularly \spillover"
and \dilution" eects where the advertisements for one product can help or harm ther perceptions of
another. Second, I use fMRI to consider neural activation patterns during strategic thinking. Two
studies reveal the possible importance of various neural areas to belief formation, strategic deception,
and suspicion. The rst study focuses on the neural correlates of belief formation, particularly the
dierence between equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium decisions. We nd both neural activations and
behavioral evidence that subjects have relatively shallow belief processes, often apparently assigning
too much agency to themselves, when they are out of equilibrium. The second study focuses on a
bargaining interaction where a \buyer" has incentive to deceive a \seller" in order to get a low price
for a hypothetical product. We nd neural correlates to strategic deception in the dorsal striatum
and to suspicion of deception in the ACC.
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1Chapter 1
Evaluation and associations: a
network model of advertising and
consumer choice
1.1 Introduction
The existence of advertising is one of the major open problems in economics. It presents diculties in
traditional economic models because advertisements are meant to change the decisions of consumers.
The only way this should be possible in a model with stable preferences is if (a) advertisements
change the information available to the consumer, or (b) consumption of the advertisement acts as
a complement to the product. However, uninformative advertising is commonplace. It has been
suggested that uninformative ads may be a form of \money-burning" (59; 55): rms conspicuously
spend money to signal that its products are of high quality and will attract repeat consumers, i.e.,
only companies with high quality products can aord to advertise. But if this were the case, we
would expect that (a) all uninformative advertising must be expensive and (b) all such advertising
would prominently display its cost; however, neither of these implications hold. The complementary
view seems more plausible, but in order to understand the wider eects of advertising, it would be
useful to understand the mechanisms underlying these complementarities.
The empirical results from the marketing literature yield very few consistent results. For example,
a successful brand extension1 may help or harm sales for the brand's other products (27; 56; 18;
49; 40). Conversely, using a brand extension as opposed to creating a new brand may or may
not increase the probability that a product will succeed. Such contradictory ndings indicate the
existence of important underlying variables that determine the existence and direction of the eects
of advertising.
One proposed candidate for these underlying variables is the set of attribute-specic associations
1A brand extension is a new product that is introduced under an established brand name
2generated by a given brand or product (49; 38). In this paper I take the view that advertising aects
the associations among possible product attributes and that these associations in turn mediate how
we perceive any given product. The seemingly contradictory eects of common marketing strategies
such as brand extensions can be understood better by considering how (a) these associations evolve
in response to advertising and (b) how these associations interact to aect a consumer's perception
of any given product thereby aecting the consumer's willingness to pay for the product. I use a
neurally inspired network model address these questions. This model is largely based on one simple
principle | the strength of the association between two attributes is proportional to the observed
correlation of those attributes in the experience of the consumer where this experience includes
advertisements.
Marketing professionals take for granted the assumption that perception, distinguished from fact
or rational beliefs in the economic sense, are the most important factor in marketing. This view is
nicely summarized in a quote by Greg Stine:
Every day, buyers like you and I make judgments about quality. But how much of our
assessment is due to the actual quality of the item? Not much, I'm afraid. It's not
all about quality, but the perception of quality that really counts. { Greg Stine, CEO
Polaris Branding Solutions (71)
This raises the question: when do perceptions really diverge from rational beliefs? People choose
one option over another for a variety of reasons. Sometimes these reasons are easily identied and
quantied. One car may have a larger trunk or a faster engine than another. However, just as
often decisions are made based on more abstract and dicult-to-quantify factors - like \luxury" or
\fashion." These factors often depend heavily on the associations people have between concepts.
The eects of these associations can take a variety of forms. For example, certain products, or even
simply attributes of products, can become associated with social traits, celebrities, or emotionally
loaded concepts. These associations can in turn aect a decision-maker's evaluation of a product. A
prominent example is the phenomenon of celebrity endorsements: rms hope to improve consumer
perceptions of their product by associating it with a well-known personality.
On the other hand, consumers' associations can cause cognitive dissonance often leading to more
negative evaluations of products. This can often cause problems for rms when they attempt to enter
new markets. A rm well known for producing mini-vans might have a dicult time expanding to
selling motorcycles because the associations with these products are in conict. This can occur even
though they may exist useful supply-side scale economies allowing the rm to produce motorcycles
very eciently.
There are some dicult-to-quantify characteristics that are almost universally seen as good | for
example, attractiveness | but depend on culturally determined, and often varying quantiable phys-
3ical characteristics. Advertisements gure prominently in determining which physicial characteristics
are associated with these abstract characteristics. For example, in any given year, advertisers will
help determine what makes a skirt fashionable, including its length, fabric and pattern. In essence,
advertisements create complementarities among sets of physical attributes, allowing the combination
to be \attractive," or \fashionable." I call these sorts of attributes \social characteristics" in this
paper.
The importance of associations for evaluating goods is apparent in the marketing literature.
In fact, Kevin Keller denes \brand image" as the \perceptions about a brand as reected by
the brand associations held in consumer memory." (38) Using this denition, in order for brand
image to translate into brand equity, i.e., increase the sales of a particular product, the brand's
associations must increase the utility of the product for some portion of the population. Similarly,
the existence of industry-wide advertising campaigns (\Got Milk?") indicate that rms believe that
creating positive associations with an entire product category will increase sales for that industry
generally. The eectiveness of both brand specic and industry-wide advertising can be explained
by saying that the advertisements provide information about the quality of a brand (Hondas are
well-made cars) and the usefulness of a product (milk is healthy). But, when these advertisements
pertain to social characteristics they go beyond sending information and actually help determine the
observable traits that constitute the social characteristics.
However, as noted above, implicit associations can behave in surprising ways leading to the
contradictory results from the marketing literature. A major focus of this paper is to outline a
framework that can predict this behavior. I will consider two general classes of eects. The rst,
which I will call \spillover" eects, refers to the positive eects an advertisement on products other
than the advertised product. These include the industry-wide positive eects of a single rm's
advertising campaign, the benets of the association with a parent brand for a brand extension,
the reciprocal benets to the parent brand from association with a successful extension, and the
benets of rm associations with other rms. The second class, which I will call \dilution" eects,
refers to the negative externalities of advertising. These include the possibility of decreasing brand
equity due to a failed or incongruous brand extension, as well as the two forms of legally actionable
trademark dilution: The rst is called \tarnishing" in legal parlance, and refers to any advertising
that introduces negative associations with a famous trademark; the second is called \blurring", and
refers to advertising that weakens the existing association of a famous mark.
The legal standard in trademark law is that the mark must have \acquired secondary meaning"
in order to be protected under the law. The law also states that rms may not trademark any
\functional" (i.e., utility bearing) part of a product. These laws can apply broadly, not only to a
brand logo or name, but to distinctive packaging or design features such as color (referred to as
\trade dress"). This raises the questions: how do these marks acquire meaning and exactly how are
4are they aected by advertisements for both the brand owning the trademark and other brands?
In some ways trademarks act like patents, they protect a rm's investment in its brand image the
same way a patent protects the rm's investment in research and development. In order to address
how this investment can be harmed through dilution or infringement we need a model of exactly
how the mark acquires or loses secondary meaning.
In this paper I will introduce a neural-network framework that not only models these associations
and how they interact, but how these associations evolve over time in response to the personal
and cultural experiences of an individual. The structure of these neural-networks are based on
existing models in computational neuroscience and cognitive psychology that are meant to reect
the way the human mind actually processes information. The interconnected nature of the network
structure allows us to make predictions about how an advertisement that is meant to create a specic
association will aect the other associations in the network, producing the externalities mentioned
above.
Finally, by modeling the underlying mechanisms of how associations are formed and how they
interact I can generate predictions on the rm level about both advertising levels and dierent
advertising strategies.
1.2 Motivation and Background
Until relatively recently, economists have viewed utility as purely a function of observed measurable
characteristics, treating the mind as a black-box. The viewpoint that economics is purely concerned
with choices parallels in some ways the behaviorist school of psychology, which similarly focuses
purely on behavior and pays no attention to the underlying cognitive processes.
The reduction of the choice problem to a simple optimization has been incredibly useful for
making predictions not only about individual decisions but also about larger systems like markets.
It is especially useful because it allows economists to use well-dened mathematical principles. Utility
maximization has the additional property of being extremely exible. Economists have been able to
describe a number of behavioral phenomena by introducing parameters into the utility function to
account for social preferences including fairness and jealousy (22; 63), discrepancies in inter-temporal
choice (44), and reference dependence (35).
However, there are cases where the underlying cognitive process, such as memory and attention,
are not only relevant, but also essential to understanding the decision-making process. For example,
our limited attention may not constrain our overall choice set, but will constrain the choices that
are salient at any given moment. These constraints are illustrated by the popular example of the
American tourist crossing a street in London. The American crossing the street mistakenly looks
left instead of right not because looking right is not feasible, but because the experiences of the
5American make looking left more automated and salient. Our experiences, both explicit memories
of specic events and implicit associations among concepts, aect the way we perceive things, from
people to consumer products. And since we are constantly experiencing the world these memories
and associations are always changing.
Consider the following examples:
 In 2003 the lead singer of the Dixie Chicks, a popular country music trio, made a controversial
statement denouncing President George W. Bush: \Just so you know, we're ashamed the Pres-
ident of the United States is from Texas." As a country group, much of their core audience were
in favor of the President and had a very negative reaction to the remark. They were so angered
by the remark that some fans publicly threw out Dixie Chicks CD's and concert tickets (20).
While the music itself had not changed, the perception of the group as \unpatriotic" caused
a drastic preference reversal for these fans. Borrowing the language of trademark dilution,
this remark \tarnished" the Dixie Chicks image by associating them with anti-president and
anti-war views.
However, for listeners who were already opposed to Bush, the same statement had a positive
eect on their view of the group. One fan wrote on a message board:
Hell, I'm ashamed [Bush is] American and I am doubly ashamed that the people of
this country were stupid enough to elect him for a second term. I will support the
Dixie Chicks in any way possible including attending their concert here in Dallas.
YOU GO NATALIE!!!! (21)
This fan actually states an extra willingness to purchase products from the group because of
their statement. For these fans, the criticism of Bush implied the same associations, but for
them these associations were positive.
\Consuming" (hearing) the statement acted as a complement to consumption of the groups
CD's and concert by changing the groups image. Depending on the personal preferences of
listeners it could be highly negative or highly positive. We assert that this change in image is
the result of shifting associations. Even though this statement was not an advertisement, it
changed perceptions and choices in the same ways that ads do.
 In 1993, Heinz began selling an \All-Natural Cleaning Vinegar." The company already suc-
cessfully sold a line of edible vinegar that consumers often used as a cleaning solution. The
new product had twice as much acid and was more eective than its edible counterpart. The
new product failed despite the facts that (a) Heinz had a well-established reputation for mak-
ing vinegar, (b) Heinz kitchen vinegar was often used as a cleaning solution, and (c) the new
product was specically designed for cleaning and would have been more eective for the
6task. BusinessWeek explained the failure, saying that the product failed \in part because the
packaging was too similar to the original Heinz vinegar; consumers didn't like buying nearly
identical bottles of very dierent products, despite the clear labeling" (33).
As in the rst example, we can model this outcome by saying that the kitchen variety of
vinegar, or just the advertisements for it, were negative complements to the new product. But
in this instance arguments could be made a priori that it should be a positive complement for
most consumers. The negative eect was the result of a set of interacting associations: Heinz
with food, cleaners with poisons, vinegar with cleaners, vinegar with food. The net result of
these associations is unclear without some more well-dened framework in which to consider
them.
The introduction of new products is big business. Brand extension, the use of an existing
brand name with a new product, is an extremely common method for introducing products to
the market. Companies stand to lose large amounts of money for each failed extension. The
frequent failure of brand extensions imply that the interactions of existing brand associations
are complicated and may be poorly understood even by experts in the eld, such as business
executives and advertising professionals. These complexities suggest that it would be be useful
to have a better model of how their existing products may aect extensions and vice versa.
These two examples illustrate the dierent eects that associations can have on evaluation.
The Dixie Chicks example deals with the simple negative association of a good with the highly
controversial gure of George W. Bush, while the vinegar example illustrates a concrete example of
how conicting associations negatively aected the sales of a product.
In both examples, events in the consumer's life pose positive or negative externalities for the
consumption of a good. But in both cases we need a more detailed model to predict the nature of
the externality. To do this, revealed preference alone may not suce. In its purest form, revealed
preference can only make predictions about existing goods. Without imposing some extra structure,
revealed preference on its own has little to say about new products.
1.2.1 Hedonic pricing with \perceived attributes"
One way to impose such structure is to represent possible products in such a way that they are easy
to relate to each other. Hedonic pricing models are a common way to decompose the utility of various
goods into the utilities of their attributes (46; 66; 50). Most of this research has focused on goods with
many objectively measurable characteristics. For example, a house can be described as a combination
of its size, location, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, etc. The decomposition of a product
into its component characteristics allows the set of possible products to all be represented in a
common space: for example, when characteristics can be given well-dened cardinal values, products
7would be represented as vectors in Rn, where n is the number of attributes under consideration.
Given this representation we can dene a utility function u : Rn ! R rather than treating each
possible product as a distinct atomic unit. The new utility function, dened over a more general
space, in turn allows us to predict the utility of novel combinations of attributes.
I apply this same basic structure with the caveat that the attributes of the product are a function
of both its objective characteristics and the associations in the mind of the consumer. In the rst
example above, the objective characteristics of the music recordings remain the same, but the remark
changes the consumers' associations with those recordings, thus changing their subjective evaluation.
Similarly in the second example, the objective measures of the product, i.e., cleaning ability, should
make it preferred as a cleaning product to the existing kitchen vinegar; however, the association of
the cleaning product with a food product caused dissonance in consumers' minds, and they would
not buy it.
For any particular product there are two important questions: What characteristics do decision
makers perceive as associated with the product, and how are these perceptions guided by their
experience (in this paper, advertisements)? I address this issue by introducing the concept of the
\perceived characteristics" of a product as distinct from the initial, quantiable, characteristics of
the product. I assume here that consumers derive their utility for a product from the characteristics
they perceive rather than the objectively assessed characteristics they initially see. Sometimes
perceptions will be close to objective facts and standard hedonic pricing models are appropriate and
eective. In cases where this is not true, we need to formulate a model of how the characteristics
presented to a decision maker are related to their perceptions via associations.
In this paper, I add one layer of cognitive processing that transforms the initial characteristics of a
product into its perceived characteristics. I am primarily interested in how experiences modulate the
implicit associations of an individual, and how these in turn aect a decision maker's perception of
abstract and dicult-to-quantify characteristics. I use a neural-network model of pattern recognition
which makes perceived characteristics a function of the initial objective characteristics and the
experiences of the consumer (see Figure 1.1).
I build on the basic construction of hedonic pricing models by assuming that decision makers
have utility over bundles of characteristics, dening characteristics very broadly. While anything
generally classied as a product attribute is a characteristic, so are features such as the product type
itself, and the \brand" of a product.
In my network model each characteristic will be represented by a node in the network while
the associations between characteristics will be represented by the connections between these nodes.
Unlike the standard hedonic pricing model where characteristics are independent from each other,
this network structure will model the way characteristics interact to change the decision maker's
eventual perception of a product. In the Heinz cleaning vinegar example above, the consumers'
8Figure 1.1: A) Standard hedonic pricing models use a function to take sets of attributes directly to utilities.
B) In this model I add an extra level of processing. First the initial set of characteristics is transformed to
a \perceived" set of characteristics based on the experiences of the consumer. Then I use a utility function
to take the perceived attributes to utilities.
experiences with the edible version of Heinz vinegar and with cleaning products created associations
between Heinz and food, and cleaning products and poison, respectively. These associations then
changed the way consumers perceived the new product, Heinz Cleaning Vinegar. Similarly, in the
Dixie Chicks example, the singer's remark cause fans to associate Dixie Chicks music with anti-Bush
sentiment and more importantly, a host of other implied political beliefs changing the music's utility
for listeners.
Combining the assertions that (a) a decision maker's experiences determine his associations
among characteristics and (b) these associations interact to aect the way he perceives the charac-
teristics of goods implies that the experiences of the decision maker will constrain the set of possible
perceived bundles of characteristics. Notice that the rst of these assertions deals with dynamic prop-
erties of cognition: experiences change associations. While the second deals with static properties:
existing associations modulate perceptions. The contribution of this model is to:
 Specify these constraints on the perceived bundles of characteristics.
 Specify a tractable, formal way to represent the decision maker's experiences.
 Describe how these experiences will aect the perception of the decision maker.
 Derive optimal rm behavior given the eect of advertisements on consumer perceptions.
I will use the network model mentioned above to formalize these processes. It is important to note
that while this is a neurally inspired network model, and it follows some very basic neural facts, it
9is not meant to be a literal interpretation of what is going on in the brain. Such a model would
quickly become intractable. In this paper I try to include just enough neural detail to capture some
of the major characteristics of perception while still using a relatively low-dimensional abstract
representation of what we think is going on in the mind. In addition, this simplied model of
cognition allows us to describe a consumer's experiences using a single symmetric matrix: the
connection weights of the network summarize the associations built up over a consumer's lifetime.
Furthermore, there is a straightforward way to derive these weights from a given set of experiences
for the purposes of prediction.
This model draws on research in economics, marketing, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.
To understand where this model is coming from I rst look at how economics has treated the problem
of advertising historically. I then outline some of the relevant areas of research from the marketing
side, including empirical phenomena. Finally I review the roots of the model in cognitive psychology
and computational neuroscience.
1.2.2 Economic Models of Advertising
Economic models of advertising fall into three basic categories: informative, persuasive, and com-
plementary (4). Each of these types propose dierent mechanisms through which advertising works
and have diering positive and normative consequences. In addition to these three basic categories
I will describe two more recent papers that attribute advertising eects to bounded rationality.
Informative models all assume that any changes in demand caused by advertising are rational
in the sense that the advertisement conveys useful information either directly or as a signal of
quality. Some models assert that only rms with products of high quality can be condent of repeat
purchases. Therefore, rms that advertise are conspicuously spending money, showing that they are
condent of high future prots as a result of the quality of the product. According to these and
other informative models, advertising serves the positive role of informing consumers and enabling
competition. For example, when competing stores use advertisements to inform consumers of their
prices it reduces the search costs of the consumer, allowing them to more easily purchase a good at
the lowest existing price.
Persuasive models, on the other hand, take the view that while advertising does shift the demand
curve for a product outward. In their view the creation of brand loyalty distorts preferences and
creates barriers to entry (it makes it more expensive for new rms to enter the market and compete
with established brands). Unlike the informative models, these models predict that advertising
actually impedes competition.
Finally, complementary models, largely following a model set forth by Becker and Murphy, treat
advertisements themselves as \goods" or \bads." This means that the advertisements themselves
enter the decision maker's utility function: the decision maker consumes advertisements the way
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they consume anything else. While the marginal utility of the advertisements themselves may be
positive or negative, the power of these models comes from the eect consumption of advertisements
has on the marginal utility of the advertised good.2 In these models advertisements shift the demand
curve for a product by entering directly into the utility function. While they may not contribute
directly to a consumer's utility, they can eectively change the marginal utility of the product. These
models have the benet of using a stable underlying utility function while still allowing advertising
to be persuasive.3
1.2.2.1 Informative models
As the name suggests, informative models focus on the role of advertising as a means to convey
information. Advertisements rst and foremost inform consumers as to the existence of the product
and its basic features. But informative models have also held that advertising is in itself a signal
of quality. Nelson writes about the function of advertising as \money-burning," a costly signal for
producers to show that they are ecient, otherwise they would not have the money to advertise
(59).
One particularly useful distinction Nelson makes is that between \search" products and \ex-
perience" products. Search products are products that can be evaluated before purchase, whereas
experience products must actually be used before a consumer can evaluate them. Since search prod-
ucts can be evaluated before purchase, the signaling power of advertising less important. However,
since consumers need to actually use an experience good in order to evaluate its quality, advertising
signals are far more relevant to these goods.
While the function of advertising to inform customers of a product's existence is indisputable, the
other \money-burning" function of advertising, where ads are simply a costly signal, is problematic.
There is an entire industry based around manipulating the content of ads. This money-burning
account does not allow for dierences in skill at creating advertisements. According to this view
an ad shown during the Super Bowl would be more eective than any large scale viral marketing
campaign4 regardless of content. These models also imply that rms should actually report the costs
of expensive ads, which is almost never done.
1.2.2.2 Persuasive models
Persuasive models of advertising focus on the anti-competitive eects of advertising. In these models
advertising creates brand-loyalty and creates a barrier to entry for new rms. At the heart of most
2The marginal utility of a discrete good y0 in some consumption bundle Y is the dierence u(Y )   u(Y   y0).
When goods are continuous it is the partial derivative of the utility function @u(Y )
@y0
.
3For a more detailed review of this literature, see Bagwell 2005 (4), on which much of this subsection is based.
4A viral marketing campaign is one where consumers themselves do the advertising. These campaigns consumers
are encouraged to pass along advertisements in the form of amusing video clips, images or a variety of other forms.
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of these models is the assumption that advertising somehow changes or distorts a consumer's utility
function. Unlike the informative models, persuasive models implicitly assume that the uninformative
content of an advertisement is important. In 1933, Joan Robinson stated that \the customer will be
inuenced by advertisement, which plays upon his mind with studied skill, and makes him prefer the
goods of one producer to those of another because they are brought to his notice in a more pleasing
and forceful manner" (65). Her reference to the \studied skill" of the advertiser implies that there
are hidden mechanisms exploited by advertisers to persuade consumers to buy one product over the
other, even if those mechanisms are not well understood on a formal level.
In addition, in these models advertising tends to act as a barrier to entry to a market (5;
36). Advertising allows a manufacturer to dierentiate his product from his competitors so that
the products of a new entrant are seen as distinct from the established brand. This perceived
distinctiveness is crucial to eliciting brand loyalty from consumers; if all brands are the same, there
is no reason to prefer one to the other.
Another dierence between informative and persuasive models are the eects of the frequency
of advertising.5 Comanor and Wilson assert that advertisements \reinforce the experience that
consumers have with established products" (17). This implicitly assumes that there are cognitive
processes that are somehow eected by repeated exposure. The model laid out in section 1.3 can
account for the eects of repeated exposure to a pattern. These eects are captured by the con-
nection strengths of the neural network. The more frequently two characteristics are associated in
the consumer's experience the stronger the connection between the nodes corresponding to those
characteristics.
The two major problems with persuasive models are that they do not outline any formal mecha-
nisms through which advertising can shift consumer demand, and they make the normative assump-
tion that any such shifts are distortions.
1.2.2.3 Complementary models
The approach in this paper is closest to the complementary approach to advertising. In comple-
mentary models advertisements enter directly into the utility function. While Kaldor rst proposed
that advertisements be treated as goods in 1950 (36), it was not until recently that Becker and Mur-
phy used this approach to explore the complementary eects of advertisements on consumption (8).
Specically, they asserted that advertisements could change the marginal utility of an advertised
good, thereby increasing demand. However, since the important eect is on the marginal utility, the
advertisement itself may be have positive or negative utility, i.e., it may be either a good or a bad.
5Frequency eects may be captured indirectly in Nelson's money burning model since more frequent ads imply
greater advertising expenditure to rst time users. But the persuasive view, and the model laid out in this paper,
assert that frequency will have an eect even if advertising is free. For example, the more often you look at a single
print ad, the more the pattern shown in the ad is reinforced even though it has only been paid for once.
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This approach has two major benets over the informative and persuasive views. First, these
analyses assume a stable underlying utility function, so welfare can be measured with respect to a
stable function. This avoids the problems created by persuasive models where utility is changed thus
rendering the choice of which utility function to use for welfare analysis unclear. Second, it allows
for a great deal of exibility as to why advertising might aect demand, encompassing aspects of
both the informative and persuasive views.
One major advance made by this model is that it allowed economists to start considering the
eect of advertising on the social value of products, such as prestige. Further, it doesn't assume that
this utility is \false" or a distortion. However, as asserted in the introduction, the very exibility of
this model may be a problem in that it does not impose enough structure on the eects of advertising
to make specic predictions.
1.2.2.4 Bounded rationality
Another way to explain the eects of advertising is to assume that they cause consumers to make
systematic \mistakes" in how they update their beliefs about a product. Shapiro recently developed
a model of advertising that is based on the assumption that consumers will not always remember the
source of a positive memory about a product. In this model, advertisements are persuasive because
consumers will sometimes mistake a positive advertisement for a positive consumption experience
(68). The consumer uses these mistaken experiences to update his beliefs about the quality of the
product. Unlike the persuasive models outlined above, the variable aected by advertising is not
brand loyalty, but the consumer's beliefs about the quality of the product.
Another similar model by Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer relies on what they call
\coarse thinking" (58). They assume that consumers divide situations into coarse categories so that
a situation where a particular type of advertising message, in their example a celebrity spokesperson,
is informative (the show they star in or the sport they play) is pooled with the situation of buying
the advertised product. Because of this pooling, the celebrity spokesperson is considered useful
information for updating beliefs about the quality of the product. Here the authors assume that
rationality is limited by the number of categories consumers have at their disposal rather than by
their memory. Like the model described in this paper, they assert that associations are a key factor
for persuasion by determining how categorization will take place. However, in their analysis they
take categories as exogenous rather than describing exactly how associations might be involved in
the process.
These models bear the most resemblance to persuasive models since advertising eects are in
essence \mistakes." However, the eects are the result of a rational process, Bayesian updating, with
awed or limited information.
13
To sum up, all these models assert that advertisements help rms to dierentiate their products
and increase consumer beliefs about the quality of their products. Informative models would hold
that this dierentiation is rational, while persuasive models view this dierentiation as a mistake.
Complementary models on the other hand, show that product dierentiation is brought about by
the specic eects of advertisements on the marginal utility of a good. Finally, bounded rationality
models assert that an increase in the perceived quality of a product is the result of misapplied
rational processes. A common thread among the rst three approaches is the focus on product
dierentiation. In fact, Bain showed empirically that product dierentiation was the single most
important factor for rm protability (5).
The model set forth in this paper also asserts that advertisements can create brand dierentia-
tion. However, this model allows for the opposite to occur. For example, we will show that under
certain circumstances small producers will be able to free-ride on the advertising of larger rms.
This model also shows that dierentiation on irrelevant (non-utility bearing) attributes can support
dierentiation on important attributes. Another major dierence is that rather than depending on
a single catch-all variable, quality, the model is built on top of the multivariate hedonic pricing
structure. Most importantly this model sets forth a concrete mechanism whereby advertising can
bring about these eects, allowing us to discuss what distinguishes successful advertising campaigns
from unsuccessful campaigns.
1.2.3 Marketing
The importance of associations in the marketing literature is captured by the concept of brand image.
Associative memory features prominently in the marketing literature (38; 49; 57). Brand equity is
thought to rely not only on the general evaluation of brand quality, but also on attribute specic
beliefs about the brand (49). In fact, network models have been used extensively to understand how
brand image is aected by a variety of factors, especially brand extensions.
1.2.3.1 Brand and Trademark Dilution
Brand and trademark dilution can be thought of as \weakening a famous brand's propensity to bring
to mind relevant associations" (57). While the marketing literature draws a distinction between
trademark dilution, the result of advertisements from another rm, and brand dilution, the result
of advertisements from the original rm, both phenomena arise from the same root: weakening
associations with a brand.
Many early studies on brand dilutions focused on the eect of a brand extension failure on
the general evaluation of a brand (39), and found no eect. However, work that focuses instead
on how extensions may eect specic attribute beliefs about a brand (49), show experimentally
that extensions that are incongruent with the parent brand on a particular attribute will dilute
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consumer beliefs about that attribute. These beliefs may, in turn, eect general product evaluation
and brand extension success. From this perspective, the success or failure of the brand extension is
less important that its congruence with the parent brand.
Keller and Sood assert that brand dilution as a result of extension failure \requires a strong
experience with a brand extension { one deemed both diagnostic of and inconsistent with the parent
brand experience" (40). In this paper we focus on one of these three factors, the consistency of the
extension.6
Morrin and Jacoby found experimentally that trademark dilution as measured by product recog-
nition increased when the diluted brand was less familiar, and when the diluting ads were for a
dissimilar product category. However, the second-user (purveyor of the diluting ads) beneted more
in terms of recall when products were similar. In these cases, the second-user seemed to be able to
free-ride o of the associations generated by the rst-user, while this is an example of dilution for
the rst-user, it also counts as an example of spillover for the second-user.
1.2.3.2 Spillover
Spillovers occur whenever the positive associations of one attribute rub o on several products.
The best examples of these are once again brand extensions. In a successful brand extension, a
rm leverages the positive associations with the parent brand the improve the evaluation of the
extension. However, spillovers also result from alliances between brands and from trivial or zero-
utility attributes (spillovers from trivial attributes are discussed in the next subsection).
As noted above there are studies showing that brand extensions can potentially harm brand
equity, yet it remains an extremely popular strategy for introducing new products. Under the right
conditions brand extensions can both benet from a parent brand and actually increase the parent
brand's equity. Morrin showed in a series of experiments that brand extensions can enhance both
the recall and recognition of parent brands using congruent brand extensions (eg., Motrin Sinus Pain
Formula as extension to Motrin Pain Reliever, Jergens soap as and extension to Jergens lotion) (56).
She also shows that this reciprocal eect is correlated with the \t" between a parent brand and a
brand extension.
Other studies also indicate that once again, one of the most important factors for brand extension
success in this sense appears to be the the \t" between the parent brand and its extensions (1; 11).
Brand extensions that share more attributes with the parent brand are more likely to be favorably
evaluated. Implicitly these studies show that successful brand extensions are able to gain from a
consumer's existing associations with the parent brand, i.e., advertising for the parent brand in
6Since we are only considering a one-period model in this paper, \strength" of experience will correspond to the
multiplicity of advertisements seen for the extension. In a multi-period model, experiences will essentially be weighted
by their relevance, e.g., consumption experiences will count more than seeing advertisements. Keller and Sood's point
about diagnosticity should also fall under the heading of relevance, but the current model is not well-suited to address
when an inconsistent extension will be diagnostic.
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the past indirectly benets the brand extension. Most of the literature focuses on how a generally
favorable rating of the parent brand can be transfered to an extensions, but in this paper we take
the view that all such spillovers are the result of the transfer of specic attribute association.
The importance of \t" for the success of brand extensions seems to decrease when the parent
brand is already associated with a wide variety of products, e.g. Disney (37; 18). Parent brands with
many extensions are likely to be associated with abstract attributes such as quality or luxury. If
these attributes are kept consistent, variation among other, concrete attributes appear to make very
little dierence since the association with the abstract but utility-bearing attribute is continually
reinforced.
In addition to spillovers within a brand, from parent brand to extension and vice-versa, there
are instances where advertising for one brand will benet the market for an entire product category.
For example, Seldon found empirically that while advertising in the cigarette industry was partially
predatory (one rm gains at the expense of another), any given rm's advertising also increased
overall demand for cigarettes (67).
Finally, Simonin and Ruth show that brand alliances or co-branded products (for example, a
Dell computer with \Intel Inside") will have positive spillover eects for the brands involved. These
eects are once again modulated by the consistency of attribute between the two brands and the
two product categories. The co-branded products are positively aected by the \brand t" and
\product t" of allied brands. Positive evaluations of the co-branded products then spillover into
more positive evaluations of the individual brands involved.
The common thread in both the dilution and spillover literature is consistency. Consistent
associations create spillover eects, while inconsistent associations generate dilution.
1.2.3.3 Trivial Attributes
Trivial attributes are characteristics of a product that have no direct eect on utility. The marketing
literature on trivial attributes focuses on attributes that \[appear] valuable but, on closer exami-
nation, is irrelevant to creating the implied benet." (15) However, studies have shown that even
when these attributes are revealed to be trivial, they have a signicant impact on brand evaluation
(12; 15). This eect appears to come from two distinct mechanisms. First, even obviously trivial
attributes, such as the color of a soda can (Coke's signature red for example), serve to dierentiate
a brand and help facilitate positive brand associations. This is particularly useful when considering
trademark and trade-dress issues. Second, trivial attributes that appear valuable usually do so be-
cause they are already associated with positive relevant attributes, for example, silk and pearls are
associated with luster and shine, so they sometimes appear as ingredients in hair products. This
second mechanism, is just another form or spillover.
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In this paper we consider trivial attributes more broadly to include zero-utility attributes7 of all
kinds. We focus specically on highly salient physical, but irrelevant, attributes such as color and
shape. As noted above, these are the types of attributes that can be legally protected via trademark
and are there for useful for building brand-specic associations.
However, associations alone cannot explain all the evidence concerning trivial attributes. Brown
and Carpenter show that when a trivial attribute is common, its absence will dierentiate a product
and serve as a reason for purchase. On the other hand, when the attribute is rare, its presence
serves as a reason for purchase. (13) In this study it appears that the trivial attribute's presence or
absence is only important as a means to attract attention to products that are dierent. Unlike the
other studies, here the attribute's associations are irrelevant.
1.2.3.4 Network models from marketing
The model developed in this paper is not the rst use of an associative network to understand ad-
vertising. Over a decade ago, Keller proposed the use of spreading activation networks (described in
more detail in the next subsection) as a conceptual framework to understand brand image and equity
(38). These networks dier signicantly from the networks developed in section 1.3 of this paper,
but share two important qualities: nodes in the network represent concepts, and the connections
between them represent how these concepts are associated.
Network models of brand extension and dilution currently assume that there is a limited amount
of \activation energy" available to retrieve concepts from memory. The introduction of extensions
therefore dilutes the amount of activation energy available to concepts associated with the brand's
original product. These models have also been applied to trademark dilution by other rm's (57). In
these models, another rm using a similar mark a signicantly dierent product class (for example
\Hyatt Legal Services") introduces another node representing the brand name, activation energy is
then split between these two nodes, diluting the strength of the rst user (Hyatt Hotels).
In the model discussed in the paper we instead focus on the eects of brand extensions, and
other rms using a similar mark, on the strength of the association between the mark and specic
characteristics including the product class and favorable product attributes. Another important
dierence is that while most of the papers think of each brand as having its own network, in our
model brand associations are all stored in a single network, allowing us to explore spillover and
dilution eect between brands as well as within them.
7More formally, a trivial attribute is any attribute such that any two good that are identical on all perceived
attributes other than the trivial attribute are prefect substitutes
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1.2.4 Psychology and Neuroscience
The contribution of this model to the existing literature is the use of a formal model of associative
memory to transform exogenously given information and internally generated perceptions of prod-
ucts. Formalizing this transformation requires that we specify a process through which experiences
and information interact to create perception. To do this we build on intuitions gained from the cog-
nitive psychology literature and modeling techniques borrowed from the computational neuroscience
literature.
1.2.4.1 Cognitive Psychology and Priming
Any model where experience aects perception must include some concept of memory. However,
there are many dierent kinds of memory to consider, we can roughly divide these dierent types
of memory into three broad classes: episodic memory, implicit and semantic memory, and aective
memory. The kind of memory we most often think of is \episodic memory." Episodic memory
is our memory for specic events: a person's memory of their rst day of school years ago or a
conversation with a friend a few days ago would both fall into this category. However, for the
purposes of this paper we are more concerned with semantic and implicit memory. These two types
of memory encapsulate any memory that does not require conscious recollection of when or how
the information is acquired. For example, people know their own name, but they don't necessarily
remember learning their name. Semantic memory specically includes our memory for concepts
and their relationships. These memories are more robust than episodic memory. They survive even
when episodic memories are lost because of Alzheimer's disease or severe brain damage (48; 28). A
nal relevant type of memory is aective memory, which describes our emotional associations with
various objects or concepts.
The model proposed in this paper takes the view that semantic memory is the most important
for understanding perception. Implicit in this view is the assumption that semantic memory inu-
ences aective memory as opposed to the converse. While some earlier papers assert that aective
processing precedes the semantic processing of stimuli (6), more recent studies indicate that aec-
tive processing is highly context sensitive (41). This context sensitivity indicates that the semantic
content of a situation is modulating its aective processing. If subjects were making a fast aec-
tive assessment before processing the semantic content, this would not occur. Indeed, it has been
shown that in some situations semantic processing precedes aective processing (72). Since the
aective judgments about a stimulus depend on its semantic content as perceived by the decision
maker, we focus on semantic processing and consider aective judgments of a good as consequences
of the stimulus's perceived semantic content. Referring back to Figure 1.1, this model collapses
aective processing into the function taking perceived characteristics to utility in the second stage
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of processing.
The model exploits the associative nature of semantic knowledge: the idea that concepts will
potentiate related concepts and interfere with negatively related concepts. Cognitive evidence for
this comes largely from the priming literature. In these studies psychologists examine the eect
of some stimulus or \prime" on the processing of another target stimulus. Subjects are asked to
perform some simple task, such as reading a word, after being exposed to a priming stimulus. When
the priming stimulus is related either semantically or aectively to the subject of the subsequent
task, people are able to perform the task more quickly. The most common hypothesis to explain
this phenomenon is that the priming stimulus somehow \activates" certain pathways in the brain,
decreasing response time. Psychologists have been able to show these priming eects across many
dierent conditions. For example, subjects are faster at reading target words after being primed
by words (7), music (42) or pictures (72) that are semantically related to the target words. The
generality of these results suggest that these associations occur at a very basic level of cognitive
processing.
The associative nature of semantic memory was rst modeled by Quillian in the 1960s (61; 62).
He proposed that semantic memory could be modeled as a network of nodes, each representing a
concept. Concepts were related to each other by dierent sorts of links. Links could be any of ve
dierent kinds of links representing dierent possible relationships between concepts. When one or
more of the nodes were activated, the activation would spread along these links to related nodes.
These types of networks are often referred to as semantic networks since the nodes are are semantic
(they refer to concepts) and the connections describe semantic relationships. Quillian's model was
the original \spreading-activation" model of semantic memory. The model was originally conceived
to allow computers to simulate language comprehension in humans, but Collins and Loftus adapted
it as a more general cognitive theory of semantic memory (16). Since that time, spreading activation
in semantic networks has become one of the leading theories to describe priming eects.
Although these semantic networks were developed to explain and model priming eects, they can
also be used to model the more general eects of associative memory. In the Dixie Chicks example,
the groups statements caused fans to associate them with liberal political views. This association
had either negative or positive emotional connotations depending on the consumer. This association
in turn changed the consumers' utilities for Dixie Chicks music.
However, Quillian's spreading activation networks are only one of may ways to formalize the
these associations. Spreading activation models have some drawbacks for the purposes of modeling
evaluation. First, these theories do not formally specify exactly how the connections among concepts
are determined. Second, in most of these theories activation can only start at one node at a time.
This makes it dicult to model how dissonant concepts interact, which is one of the main goals
of this paper, as illustrated by the Heinz vinegar example. The problem in that example was that
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people had conicting association with the product, and spreading activation models are poorly
equipped to model how such a conict my be cognitively resolved. Finally, these models can become
very complicated. Links between concepts can have many types and have varying strengths, yet, as
noted above, there are no formal specications as to how these links are determined.
The model in this paper retains some aspects of Quillian's semantic networks: nodes still rep-
resent concepts, specically characteristics, and connections still reect semantic associations. But
the dynamics of the network are based on Hopeld networks, described in the next subsection.
These dynamics are more suited to modeling the way semantic associations interact than spreading-
activation models. Modeling these interactions is important for understanding situations like the
Heinz Vinegar example, where conicting associations come into play.
1.2.4.2 Hopeld Networks
The semantic networks described in the previous subsection were developed to better understand
language comprehension and semantic priming. Coming from a dierent direction, Hopeld (30)
proposed a neural-network model of pattern recognition in 1979. Like Quillian's spreading-activation
model, these structures were originally formulated so that they could be implemented by computers.
However, unlike Quillian, Hopeld-networks were designed to learn and store patterns. In these
networks, the patterns in question are patterns of activation for the network: a vector of elements
describing the state of each node in the network. Hopeld networks are able to store specic patterns
of activation in the following sense: given a corrupted version of a stored pattern the network is able
to recognize and restore the original.
Hopeld networks also dier signicantly from Quillian's spreading activation model in their
basic structure. In the spreading activation model, stimulating one node will spread activation
slowly through the network, but until the node is stimulated the network is essentially neutral. In
contrast, any given node in a Hopeld-network is always sending input to its connected nodes.
In these networks, nodes could be in one of two states, 1 or  1 and these nodes will aect
connected nodes in both states. The state of each node is dynamic: the input it receives from
connected nodes can change its state. For example, if a node is currently in the  1 state but is
receiving a great deal of positive input from other nodes, its state will ip, going to 1.
Denition 1.2.1 A node is stable if the input received does not change its state, the entire network
is stable if each individual node is stable. The patterns of activation that make the network stable
are the stable states of the network.
Hopeld's key insight was that these networks will always converge to a stable state. Convergence
can be shown using a Lyapunov function to describe the \energy" of a network. This energy function
is strictly decreasing under the dynamics of the network, so the minima of the function correspond
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to stable states of the network. The network \remembers" a pattern of activation if it is a stable
state. The only parameters in these networks are the connection strengths between the nodes, so
these connections contain the information about all the patterns remembered by the network.
The way these networks are trained is particularly interesting because it corresponds roughly
to the way synapse strength is modulated in the brain. The network is given a set of patterns P ,
its training set, and the connection strength between two neurons is proportional to the number of
patterns in which they are both in the same state. This is similar to Hebb's law, which states that
neurons that re together become more strongly connected (29). Conversely, it has been found that
the inhibitory connections between neurons grow stronger when their ring is negatively correlated
(60). Although much of the work on these sorts of network structures have focused on how to modify
connections between nodes making them better and more ecient at recognizing set target patterns,
this paper focuses largely on how a given rule for generating connection weights aects the stable
states of the network.
After training, the network should remember all the patterns in the training set, but not exclu-
sively. The stable-states of the network will often contain new patterns that were not in its training
set. For example, as you will see, if p 2 S is a stable state of the network so is  p, even if  p was
not in the training set.
Recall that one of the goals of the model is to create a plausible theory of how competing
associations interact when we evaluate a good. Using a Hebbian rule to determine connection
strengths not only reects neural processing, it means that the connections between nodes actually
reect their degree of association. Conicting information can be modeled in these networks as
creating unstable nodes. Applying the Hopeld framework to the vinegar example, note that the
connection between the node representing food and the one representing cleaners should be highly
negative, reecting their negative association with each other. However, both nodes are activated
by \Heinz All-Natural Cleaning Vinegar." The convergence properties of Hopeld networks imply
that the network will change to resolve this conict in a denitive way.
The major problem with applying this model directly to economic problems is that it requires
complete information. Since the nodes are always in an active state (1 or  1), it is impossible to
describe patterns where one or more of the nodes is neutral. If we think of nodes as the character-
istics of a good, we must have information about every possible characteristic. Furthermore, every
characteristic is relevant since each node is always sending input to its connected nodes. It is easy
to envision situations where characteristics are either unknown, or irrelevant to the good in ques-
tion. The network model described in this paper addresses this problem by modifying the standard
Hopeld-network to allow for missing information while retaining its convergence properties.
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1.3 Network model for determining \perceived characteris-
tics"
In this section, we introduce a formal, abstract framework to model the way experiences aect
perceived characteristics. First, we specify a way to encode both goods and experiences in the same
space, allowing us to easily relate experiences to goods. We then formalize the way that experiences
change the associations among characteristics. Finally, we describe how these associations determine
the perceived characteristics of a good. Table 1.1 briey summarizes the notation and terms used
in this section.
Notation Description
S f 1; 0; 1gD: Characteristic space. Both goods and experiences are
encoded in this space. This space also describes the possible states
of the networks dened in this section.
D Number of possible characteristics, also the number of nodes in the
network
n Number of goods in the choice set.
X 2 S Initial characteristics | perceived characteristics are derived from
this vector.
V 2 S A state of the network
P A set of elements drawn with replacement from S representing the
experiences of the decision maker. In this paper this will be the set
of all advertisements seen by the consumer.
E The space of all possible nite sets P dened as above
A(P;X) : E  S ! S The function taking initial characteristic vector X and experience
set P to the perceived characteristics, V .
wij The connection weight between two nodes i and j. These weights
are derived from the experience set P .
wii The connection weight of a node to itself. This is exogenously
given.
W A matrix containing all the connection weights
 2 RD+ The vector of activation thresholds for the nodes of the network
I The vector of inputs to each node. When the network is in state
V , I =W  V .
T i : S ! S A transition function of the network that updates the ith node of
the network. There are D such functions, one corresponding to
each characteristic. These functions are dened by the the weight
matrix W and the activation thresholds .
Table 1.1: Notation Table for Section 1.3
1.3.1 Encoding goods and experiences
As discussed above, the hedonic pricing literature already describes a good way to encode multiple
goods in the same space. Here we expand on this idea by encoding decision-maker's experiences in
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characteristic space as well. This type of encoding will lose the detail of an experience, but since
this model is primarily concerned with the associations among characteristics rather than the eects
of episodic memory, the simplication is appropriate. Both goods and experiences are viewed as
vectors describing their component characteristics.
We start with a simple decomposition of goods into discrete characteristics. There is a space
S = f 1; 0; 1gD where D is the number of possible characteristics. Vectors V in this space are
interpreted as follows:
Vi =
8>>><
>>:
1 V has characteristic i
 1 V does not have i
0 i is not salient to V
:
We will refer to objects in this space as \patterns," and both experiences and products are repre-
sented by these patterns. Suppose that a decision maker is evaluating a pizza and ith dimension
represents the characteristic \hot." \Hot" is always salient to pizzas so if V is the decision maker's
representation of a pizza, Vi will always be non-zero. If the pizza is fresh out of the oven, Vi = 1
since the pizza is, in fact, hot. However, if the pizza is cold or even merely room temperature then
Vi =  1 since the pizza is not hot and that information is salient to the decision maker. If, on the
other hand, the decision maker were evaluating a painting, Vi should always be 0 except in extreme
circumstances | for example if the painting were on re. From here on subscripts will denote indices
and superscripts will denote distinct elements of S.
Any good or experience is encoded in this way. Possible characteristics in S might be something
like:
(Domino's, Pizza Hut, hot, cheese, pepperoni, peppers, mushrooms, onions).
In this space a \hot Domino's pizza with onions" will be encoded as (1; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1). Notice that
the salience of certain characteristics allows for some wiggle room in how any good or experience
is encoded. For example, if the decision maker's favorite topping is pepperoni, the presence or
absence of pepperoni will always be salient to him. In this case the pizza will instead be encoded as
(1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1).
1.3.2 \Perceived characteristics" and experiences
Let E be the space of all possible sets of experiences. That is, E is the space of all nite random
samples drawn from S with replacement. An element P 2 E will be a set of patterns p 2 S and
any decision maker will have some specic set of experiences described by an element P 2 E. It is
important to note that any patterns \seen" multiple times by the consumer will also appear multiple
times in P . For example, if you consumed the same kind of pizza ve times, the pattern describing
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the pizza will occur ve times in P .8
The patterns in the consumer's experience set P aect the way the consumer processes informa-
tion when they make purchasing decisions. Specically, there is some function
A : E  S ! S
taking an experience set P 2 E and some initial pattern X i 2 S to another pattern A(P;X i) 2 S.
We can now reformulate the decision problem. A decision maker with options described by initial
information X i will choose to maximize his dollar utility given the perceived attributes of each good
i based on the initial information vectors, X i. Formally the decision maker chooses
argmaxx2Rnfu(x; (A(P;X
1); : : : ; A(P;Xn)))  q0  xg;
where q is the vector of prices for the goods.
1.3.3 Constructing A(P; X i) using neural-networks
The function A(P;X) is constructed using a neural-network model of pattern recognition where there
are D nodes, each representing a possible characteristic of a product. These networks are extremely
similar to Hopeld networks and share many of their properties. The major modication made in
order to apply the networks to economic problems is the addition of an extra possible state for each
node of the network: the 0, inactive state. It turns out that the networks retain their convergence
properties with this modication so that they will still resolve conicting associations, but it is now
possible to represent characteristics as unknown or irrelevant.
The experiences of the consumer are represented by the connections between the nodes. These
connection weights are numbers in [ 1; 1] that represent the degree to which two characteristics
are related in the experience of the consumer. For example, for many people the characteristics
\red" and \hot" are very related. The hot water knob on sinks is usually labeled in red, as metal is
heated it glows red, so people will often have many experiences associating these two characteristics.
This association will be reected by the weight between them, wred;hot, which will be positive and
relatively close to 1. On the other hand, most people would consider \blue" and \hot" to be
negatively related and the weight wblue;hot should be negative and relatively close to -1.
More formally,
i 6= j; wij =
P
p2P pipj
jP j
:
Recall that elements p 2 P are drawn from S, and let pi refer to the value of the pattern p on
8This is important because repetition of patterns will have a signicant eect on how information is processed in
the model. The more often you see one pattern relative to another, the greater eect it will have on your evaluations.
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characteristic i. This formula means that the more often nodes i and j are in the same state, the
higher the weight wij . To see this, x P so that jP j = n. Now add a new pattern, p
 such that
pi = pj 6= 0) pipj = 1. Adding the new pattern will change the weight:
wij =
P
p2P pipj
n
 !|{z}
add p
wij =
P
p2P pipj + 1
n+ 1
X
p2P
pipj  n )
(n+ 1)
P
p2P pipj
n(n+ 1)

n
P
p2P pipj + n
n(n+ 1)
)
wij  w

ij
Returning to the example above, any time the decision maker sees \hot" and \red" in conjunction,
it will be encoded as a pattern p 2 P where phot = pred = 1. The presence of this pattern in the
experience set P will contribute to a higher value of wred;hot. Conversely, for any p 2 P such that
the nodes are in opposite states, pi =  pj 6= 0) pipj =  1, the pattern will contribute negatively
to the weight wij .
As in the spreading-activation and Hopeld network models discussed in section 1.2.4, the state
of each node evolves as a function of the input it receives from other nodes. If node i is in state vi
it generates an input of wij  vi to node j. This input is aggregated with input from other nodes to
create the total input to node j. The total input in turn aects the state of node j.
So far we have only dened the relationship between nodes. Each node also has two other
parameters that describe qualities of the characteristic itself. First, there is the weight from a node
to itself, wii  0, its self-connection. The self-connection can be thought of as how \persistent" the
characteristic is since once the node is in a non-zero state, Vi 6= 0, this is the magnitude of the input
the node sends itself. Since wii  0 this input will always have the same sign as Vi, i.e., the input
will be congruent with the current state of the node. Second, each node has an activation threshold
i. As the name suggests, the higher this threshold, the more input is required to put the node
in a non-zero state. In practice this means that the higher the threshold, the harder it will be to
associate the characteristic with any other set of characteristics. Both the node's self-connection wii
and activation threshold i are exogenous.
Now that we have dened wij for all pairs of nodes i and j with respect to the experience set
P , we can represent the weights of the network as a matrix W (P ) where the diagonal elements
are the exogenously dened self-connections and the o-diagonal terms are the experience dened
connections between nodes. Since wij = wji when using the formula above, the matrix will be
symmetric. After the weights have been xed the network is completely characterized by the DD
matrix W (P ) and the vector of activation thresholds .
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Recall that any node of the network can be in one of three states, f1; 0; 1g. The state of the
network is simply the vector containing the state of each node. So the elements V 2 S describe the
possible states of the network. We can use the matrix W (P ) and the state of the network V 2 S to
dene the inputs to each node. Specically, when the network is in state V , I =W (P )  V in RD is
the vector describing the inputs to all of the nodes of the network.
Intuitively, we can link the input to node i, Ii, to the amount of information consonant or
dissonant to the characteristic i. This is because each salient (i.e., non-zero) node of the network
in state V send its own input to node i. Think about our \red" and \hot" example again. If
Vred = 1, the red node sends the positive input wred;hot to the hot node, which will tend to activate
it. However, suppose that the blue node is also active, Vblue = 1. This will send negative input
wblue;hot to the hot node, tending to deactivate it. The actual eect on the hot node depends on (a)
the relative magnitudes of wred;hot and wblue;hot and (b) the input received from other nodes in the
network.
More generally, we can break the input Ii into the individual summands wijVj . When the jth
node is positively associated with the ith node, wij > 0, then the term wijVj will have the same sign
as Vj . This means that if Vj = 1, the jth node will send positive input to the ith node, helping to
\activate" the ith node (change its state to 1). Conversely, if Vj =  1 the jth nodes send negative
input to the ith node and tend to change its state to  1. The total input, Ii simply aggregates these
eects.
We can now use the input vector I to describe the dynamics of these networks. The inputs to
each node will change their state; however, in this model we do not change the states of all the nodes
at once. Instead we update the states of nodes one at a time based on the updated node's input Ii.
We describe this updating process using transition functions. Since there are D nodes, we dene D
transition functions T i : S ! S, one for each node. Each T i depends on the input to the relevant
node, Ii, and that node's activation threshold i:
T ii (V ) =
8>>><
>>>:
 1; Ii =
P
j wijVj <  i
0;  i  Ii  i
1; i < Ii
T ij (V ) = Vj ; j 6= i:
To use these networks we need to consider time on a macro as well as micro level. On the macro-
level we consider how experiences build our associations. Formally, in this model, this means looking
at what patterns make up the set P and constructing the weight matrix W . P can be built up over
months or years. For example, in the pizza example, P would consist of all the experiences you
have had with both Domino's and Pizza Hut including consumption experiences, advertisements,
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and word of mouth descriptions.
However, when we are actually making a decision, A(P;X) acts almost instantaneously, giving
us our perceived characteristics, V = A(P;X), of the good. We model this by taking P and xing
the weights of the network so we can consider time on the micro-level. In each micro-time period
here we choose some i  D and apply T i to the network.9 If a node i is stable under its updating
function T i then T ii (V ) = Vi and the node is said to be stable. We repeat this procedure until we
reach a pattern V 2 S so that T i(V ) = V for all i | in other words, a pattern where all the nodes
are individually stable. Patterns that satisfy this condition are called stable patterns.
Claim 1.3.1 A network with transition functions T i, as described above, will converge to a stable
pattern in nite time.
We show convergence by dening an energy function over all possible states of the network.
E(V ) =  
X
i
wiiVi(t) 
1
2
X
i6=j
wijVi(t)Vj(t) +
X
i
Vi(t)Vi(t)i
The energy of the network is a measure of how unstable the network is. It takes into account whether
the input to a node Ii is congruent with its state Vi. To see this, examine the terms  wijViVj . These
will be positive whenever wij does not have the same sign as ViVj . For example, suppose i and j are
usually positively (negatively) related yielding a positive (negative) weight wij . If these nodes are
in opposite (the same) state, the term  wijViVj will be positive, so the incongruence of the states
of these nodes with their connection weight increases the energy of the network. Returning to the
\red," \hot" example yet again, if Vred = 1 and Vhot =  1 the term  wijViVj > 0. That is to say,
these nodes contribute positively to the energy of the network and are a source of instability in the
network. These incongruities may exist in a stable state of the network only if there are stabilizing
inputs to both i and j coming from other nodes. The other terms in this energy function correct for
the inuence of the self-connection and activation thresholds of the nodes.
In fact we can show that the energy of the network strictly decreases under all of the transition
functions T i unless the node i is itself stable (implying that T i(V ) = V ). We can use this fact to
show that the network must always converge to a stable state and that stable states of the network
correspond to the local minima of the network's energy function (see Appendix A, for details).
The convergence property of these networks divides the space of possible states into \basins of
attraction" around each stable pattern. Think of a surface with lots of divots. When you drop a
ball anywhere on the surface, it will come to rest at a low point. Notice that the order in which we
update the nodes of the network is random, so although it is assured that the network will converge,
9This sort of updating rule is referred to in the neural-network literature as an asynchronous updating rule, since
nodes are updated one at a time. Networks with synchronous updating rules, i.e., all nodes are updated simultaneously,
do not necessarily converge to a single stable state and are biologically less plausible than those with asynchronous
rules.
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there are cases where it could converge to any one of a number of dierent stable states. We dene
the \basin of attraction" of a stable state as the set of network states that will converge to the stable
state with certainty. Any state of the network that falls outside of these basins might possibly go
to any one of at least two dierent stable states. We say that states that might converge to one of
a number of stables states are on the \edge" between the basins of attraction for those states.
When we start inside a basin of attraction, the order in which we update the nodes of the network
does not eect the nal stable state. However, when we are on the edge between basins, the pattern
the network converges to is path dependent, as illustrated in the next subsection. These stable
patterns serve as restrictions over what bundles of characteristics a decision maker will ever actually
evaluate given a xed experience set P . When the weights have been set, no matter what initial
information the consumer receives, they will process the information as one of these patterns. Notice
that, using the transition function above, the trivial state of the network, V = ~0 is always stable
regardless of the weight matrix W . So the trivial state will always be in the set of patterns that a
decision maker may evaluate.
We can now dene a (possibly stochastic) function T (W;X) which is the stable state resulting
from an initial state of X and a weight matrix W . The resulting stable state, T (W;X), will be
deterministic for any X within the basins of attraction and stochastic for patterns on the edges.
The initial information X of products will be within the basins of attraction for the cases examined
in this paper.10 So we use this function to dene the perceived characteristics of X :
A(P;X) = T (W (P ); X)
That is, the perceived characteristics of a good, given initial information X , are the characteristics
described by the stable state that the network converges to when it starts in state X , and the
network in question is dened by the experiences of the decision maker, the set P .
1.3.4 Example network
To gain a better understanding of these network dynamics, consider the dynamics of a simple three
node network as shown in Figure 1.2 and dened by
W =
0
BBB@
0 1  1
1 0  1
 1  1 0
1
CCCA &  =
0
BBB@
0
0
0
1
CCCA
That is, nodes have no self-connection, all activation thresholds are 0, and connection weights
10The path dependence of these networks for borderline initial states could be interesting for cases when the order
of characteristic considerations can be controlled. Specically, cases where information is fed sequentially to a decision
maker, as it is on a resume.
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are as labeled in Figure 1.2. When you start with X = (1; 1; 0), as shown on the left, the pattern
immediately stabilizes to T 3(X) = T (X) = (1; 1; 1). Since the rst and second nodes are highly
associated with each other, they are both stable. However, updating the third node leads to V =
(1; 1; 1), which is a stable state of the network. To see this, notice that, when the network is in
state V , the vector of inputs is:
I =W 
0
BBB@
1
1
 1
1
CCCA =
0
BBB@
2
2
 2
1
CCCA
The inputs to nodes 1 and 2 are both 2 > 0, so T 1(V ) = T 2(V ) = V , and the input to node three
is  2 < 0 so T 3(V ) = V . Since all the nodes are individually stable, the network is stable.
On the other hand, starting with V = (1; 0; 1) the outcome will depend on which node you update
rst. Nodes 1 and 3 are negatively related, but they are both active. This constitutes conicting,
dissonant information, and the dynamics of the network will resolve the pattern so that it agrees
with one of two pieces of information, V1 = 1 or V3 = 1.
11
The second node is stable in the initial conguration, but if we start by updating the rst node,
the network will converge to ( 1; 1; 1), and if we start by updating the third node, the network
converges to (1; 1; 1). In other words if we start with conicting information, the network will
stochastically go to a stable state that is consistent with part of the initial pattern. In this case,
the rst node, V1, is consistent with stable state (1; 1; 1), while the third node V3 is consistent
with stable state ( 1; 1; 1), and the network goes to one of these two stable states with equal
probability.
In this section we have laid out a very general formal framework for assigning perceived charac-
teristics to some initial set of characteristics X . So far there have been no constraints on either the
exogenous parameters (, the wiis) or the initial information X . In the next section we address what
these parameters should be and what we mean by initial information with respect to the specic
economic problem of advertising. We use the framework developed in this section to discuss the
purpose of advertisements: they serve to associate abstract or dicult-to-assess traits of a product
with physical, easy-to-asses traits of a product. For example, associating status with a particular
brand of shoe or car. In this setting the meaning of the initial vector X becomes clear. X is the
vector describing the easily assessed characteristics of a product while A(P;X) describes how these
initial characteristics are perceived, including the derived abstract characteristics discussed in the
introduction.
11For now we take this order of update to be random. However, as we will discuss in the extensions section,
this order might be determined by a number of factors including endogenous interest (self-guided consideration of a
particular attribute), or exogenous information (you may receive information sequentially instead of all at once, like
reading a list of product attributes in a catalog).
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Figure 1.2: The dynamics of a simple three-node network with no self-connection and activation thresholds
of 0. Connections are labeled with their corresponding weights. The color of each node denotes its state:
Red = 1, Yellow = 0, Blue = -1.
A) On the left the network starts at an initial state X = (1; 1; 0) that is within the basin of attraction for
the stable state (1; 1; 1) so there is only one possible outcome. Specically, the initial state is stable under
the two transition functions T 1 and T 2, while T 3 takes it to the stable state (1; 1; 1).
B) On the right the network starts at state (1; 0; 1) which is on the \edge" between the attractor basins for
(1; 1; 1) and ( 1; 1; 1). This initial state is stable under T 2, but T 1 and T 3 take it into the attractor
basins for ( 1; 1; 1) and (1; 1; 1), respectively. The value of T (W; (1; 0; 1)) is therefore stochastic, and
depends on the order in which the transition functions are applied.
Associative networks have been proposed as framework for understanding brand image in the
marketing literature (38; 57). But these have all followed the spreading-activation threshold. The
main dierences between the model developed in this paper and this framework are that (a) the
structure of the network is formalized, including an account of how connections between nodes are
formed, (b) concepts can only be either positively or negatively associated with each other, and (c)
in this model there is a natural stopping point for the spread of activation, namely a stable state of
the network.
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1.4 Consumer utility, advertisements, and the decision prob-
lem
In this section we relate the networks described in section 1.3 to advertisements and the hedonic
pricing model. We consider the simple one period model where consumers are exposed to a set of
advertisements, P , at the beginning of the period and then make their consumption decisions at the
end. We make the simplifying assumptions that P is composed entirely of advertisements.
First, we relate parameters and variables in the model such as the activation thresholds i,
and the experience set P , to concrete ideas about product attributes and advertising. We then
incorporate our network model into a hedonic pricing model. We dene what an advertisement is
and how rms change the experience set P . And nally, we consider the implications of this new
model with respect to ndings in the marketing literature.
1.4.1 Characteristic types
To apply this neural-network framework to advertising, we will place some more structure on the
space S by categorizing characteristics into three classes: search, experience, and social. The dier-
ences among these categories are then described with respect to the characteristic level parameters
of self-connection wii, and activation threshold i.
Following Nelson's distinction between search and experience goods, I dene \search character-
istics" as all those characteristics that are easily evaluated before consumption, and \experience
characteristics" as those requiring consumption of the good to assess (59). Finally, I add one more
category: \social characteristics." These are the more abstract features of a product that rely not
only on physically veriable traits, but social norms, personal experience, and context.
1.4.1.1 Search characteristics
All easily assessed characteristics of a product are included in the search group. These include
traits traditionally thought of as attributes, such as color or size, but also characteristics such as the
product type itself (is it a hat or a car?), and the product's brand (is it a Honda or a Toyota?).
Notice that all of these are tangible features of the product. They are both easily dened and
easily assessed. Because of this, the nodes corresponding to search characteristics in the network
will have high degrees of self-connection. The main property of these nodes is that once they are in
a non-zero state they are extremely dicult to change.
Mathematically, we express this by saying that the self-connection weight wii  0, but we also
require that wii  i. This states that once the node is in a non-zero state it will create self-
reinforcing input with absolute value wii. Since this input is in excess of the activation threshold,
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i, of the node, the node is capable of staying in either non-zero state without any other input.
Furthermore, since wii  i, the node with persist in a given non-zero state even in the face of a
large amount of input in the opposite direction. For example, if a node is in state 1, it would take a
large amount of negative input from other nodes to change its state to 0 or  1. This is an important
trait to have since we generally do not want the perception of a search attribute to change under
the dynamics of the network.12
1.4.1.2 Experience characteristics
Experience characteristics require the consumer to use the product to ascertain their value. One
example would be the eectiveness of a stain remover. Looking at the product in the store, you
cannot directly assess how well it will work; you can only observe the product's brand, packaging,
price, and sometimes its ingredients. A rst-time user has very little information about the actual
cleaning power of the product, but repeat users will learn to associate the search attributes of the
product, like its brand, with its cleaning power.
With respect to the neural-network model, experience attributes are characterized by low levels
of self-connection and moderate activation thresholds. This means that simply including a non-
zero value for an experience characteristic in a consumer's initial information will not be enough to
sustain it in its non-zero state. However, in the presence of supporting associated characteristics it
will be included in the nal pattern. Mathematically, we express this by saying i > wii.
1.4.1.3 Social characteristics
Unlike search and experience characteristics, social characteristics are not objectively measurable.
Instead, these characteristics are socially dened and subject to change over time. The quintessential
example of a social attribute is fashion. People consider a piece of clothing to be fashionable based
on both its search characteristics and some set of conditions taken as social convention.
These are the characteristics that are most sensitive to culture and time period. As time passes,
the physical trappings of fashion or wealth may change, but the core idea remains the same. Tradi-
tional models of advertising have trouble addressing these characteristics since they are abstract and
subjective concepts. But since these are exactly those attributes that are most sensitive to culture
and a consumer's experiences, they will be a focus of our model.
The most important feature of a social characteristic in this model is that it has absolutely no
self-connection. Unlike search attributes, these nodes can change state easily depending on the states
12There are, however, notable exceptions where contradictory sensory information will actually change a persons
perception of what we would generally think of as a completely objective trait. One famous example is the McGurk
eect: when people are given auditory input of a man saying \ba," but visual input of the man saying \ga," they
actually hear a sound like \da." This is particularly interesting, since knowing about the eect does not allow a person
to correct his perception (52).
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of associated nodes. For these characteristics wii = 0. Restrictions on the parameter values for each
node are summarized in Table 1.2.
Type Self Connection
(wii)
Activation
Threshold
(i)
Reason
Search wii  0 wii  i Search characteristics are very
persistent: if Vi 6= 0, T
i
i
(V ) = Vi
unless there is a large amount of
information to the contrary, i.e.,
jIij  0 and sign(Ii) 6= sign(Vi).
Experience Intermediate i > wii These require the activation of
associated characteristics to be-
come and remain active. So, jIi 
Viwiij > i.
Social None, wii = 0 Moderate to
high
The state of a social character-
istic is completely dependent on
input from other characteristics
since Ii depends only on input
from other nodes.
Table 1.2: The three categories of characteristics and their associated parameters, self-connection, the
weight of a node to itself, and activation threshold, the net input required to obtain a non-zero state. These
correspond intuitively to the \persistence" of a characteristic, its tendency to stay in some non-zero state once
there, and the \diculty" of a characteristic, how much information is required to make the characteristic
salient.
In a world where there are only search attributes and these search attributes are always salient
(i.e. non-zero), this model is equivalent to Lancaster's hedonic pricing model. Since search attributes
are highly self-connected they will tend to be invariant regardless of the states of other nodes in the
network, making the function A the identity function. In fact, that model has been most notably
applied to markets like the housing market, where all relevant aspects of a good are search attributes
(square feet, number of bedrooms, etc.) and in these models prices are always determined using all
of these search attributes.
However, it is rarely the case that consumers only care about the search attributes of a good.
We assert in this paper that advertisements help develop associations between the search attributes
of a product (especially the brand) and the experience and social attributes of a product. The
neural-network model laid out in section 1.3 can be used to describe how advertisements and other
experiences can actually aect a consumer's perception of a product and thereby aect the con-
sumer's evaluation of the product. This is especially true of the consumer's perception of the social
characteristics of a good. For example, teenagers in the inner-city think about athletic shoes as
status symbols in a way that most suburban teens do not. The goal of many advertisements is to
change the way consumers think about products, often shifting from a simple utilitarian evaluation
to one where the social value of the product is relevant.
33
Figure 1.3: The goal of marketing is to associate social value with tangible physical attributes, preferably
those associated with their own brand. Advertisements help to strengthen the links between the brand
identiers of a product and a set of desirable tangible and social characteristics. Because of the connectivity
of the network the tangible attributes associated with the brand reinforce the brand's connection to desired
social attributes.
1.4.2 Products and utility
Given the characteristics space S, there exist in potentia 3D possible products. In full generality,
decision makers have a utility function dened over all possible bundles of products in this space,
i.e., there exists some u : R3
D
! R. However, in any given market we only care about utility over
products that are actually oered. The function A(P;X) developed in section 1.3.3 will tell us which
products are actually oered.
We dene the set Xi 2 S as the vectors describing the salient search characteristics of each of
the oered products. We qualify that the search characteristics must be salient because for any
product there will be a number of search characteristics that the consumer will nd irrelevant. For
example, while the smell of an article of clothing is a search attribute, it usually will not be salient,
so it should not be included in X . However, for borderline search characteristics, like the texture of
clothing, a retailer may be able to exogenously draw attention to or away from it by manipulating
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X i 2 S Vector describing the salient search attributes of product i.
P Advertisements seen by the consumer.
V i = A(P;X i) Perceived characteristics of product i.
~V =
 
V 1   V n

A D  n matrix where column i is the vector describing the perceived
characteristics of product i.
u : R3
D
! R Utility function over bundles of all potential products.
u : Rn ! Rj~V Utility function over bundler of existing products as they are perceived.
~ = (1; : : : ; D) Characteristic utility coecients used in parametric utility function exam-
ple.
Table 1.3: Notation Table for Section 1.4.2
the lighting in the store.13 Salience may also be determined by an endogenous manipulation of
attention. If a customer goes into a store with a particular search characteristic in mind, it will be
salient regardless of the manipulations by a retailer.
Given X i, we let V i = A(P;X i) be the perceived attributes of these products, notice that these
are xed and independent of the other products oered. We apply A to each product separately and
then x the perceived attributes for tractability.14
Once the perceived characteristics of each product have been xed we can get a reduced form of
of the utility function: u : Rn ! Rj~V where n is the number of products in the market and ~V are
the n elements of S describing their perceived characteristics. This function is simply u^ taken on
the n-dimensional subspace corresponding to ~V . To see how this function might actually work we
will dene a parametric example:
1. Let ~V be the Dn matrix holding the perceived characteristics of each product in the columns.
2. Let ~ be a vector in RD. This is a vector of attribute utility coecients.
3. Dene the reduced form utility function as u(x) = M~ 0  g

~V  x

where M is money and
g(y) =
0
BBB@
y
1=3
i
...
y
1=3
D
1
CCCA. Notice that for functions of this form the overall utility function is simply
u(x) = u(x)j~VA where ~VA is the D
D matrix containing all potential products.
Notice that this function is separable w.r.t. product attributes rather than the products themselves.
The vector ~V  x 2 RD is the aggregate amount of each attribute. The coecients i denote the
strength of preference for each attribute. If i > 0, utility is increasing in the amount of attribute
13In some ways this is very similar to the problem of bringing an advertisement to the attention of a consumer.
Visual tricks like lighting, or even shelf placement, are relevant; so are harder-to-dene factors, like context or even
the order in which choices are evaluated. I talk about the latter in section 1.7.4.
14Allowing the attributes of dierent products in a bundle to interact with each other raises the question of what
really constitutes consumption. In order for these interactions to make sense the products must not only by purchased
at the same time, but consumed at the same time spatially and temporally. We discuss the possibilities of introducing
these interactions to understand product complementarities in section 1.7.4.
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i, i.e., the consumer \likes" attribute i. On the other hand, when i < 0 the consumer dislikes the
attribute (they like the salient lack of the attribute). We will continue using this type of utility
function to illustrate the eects of advertising for the rest of this section.
1.4.3 Trivial Attributes and Substitution
Products with similar attributes should be substitutes. In fact we assert that products that dier
only on inconsequential characteristics will be perfect substitutes. We dene an attribute as trivial
if products that dier only on those attributes are always perfect substitutes.
Denition 1.4.1 An attribute i is trivial if for any V , V
0
in S such that Vj = V
0
j for all j 6= i, the
product denoted by V and V
0
are substitutes with respect to u(x).
In our parametric utility function an attribute i is trivial if i = 0.
A trivial attribute has no direct impact on utility. If the available products V i were set ex-
ogenously, they would be, as their name implies, trivial. However, in this framework the V i are
endogenously generated based on the set of advertisements seen by the consumer P . Even though
the trivial attribute does not actually enter into the utility function, its value in X i can change V i
and thereby indirectly aect a product's utility.
We assume in this paper that rm and brand identiers are always trivial attributes. Under this
assumption, a brand's equity is completely a function of the strength of its association with utility
bearing attributes. Given the network structure from the previous section, we can now formally
address the aect of dierent types of advertisements on the connections between nodes and how
those in turn aect brand equity.
We now turn our attention to the the experience set P .
Denition 1.4.2 A pattern or set of patterns p is added to the experience set P0, P1 = P0 ] p
,
when you concatenate the set P with p. For example, if P0 = fx; y; z; x; z; xg and we add the pattern
x to P0 we get P1 = P0 ] x = fx; y; z; x; z; x; xg. Notice that even though x 2 P0, adding x still
changes the set by increasing the number of times it appears in the new experience set P1.
Denition 1.4.3 An advertisement is a pattern A 2 S that rms pay some cost, cA, to add to the
experience set P for some or all consumers.
We make the very strong assumption in this paper that rms are actually able to develop adver-
tisements that will be encoded perfectly. This means that A) consumers must pay attention to the
ads, and B) they must interpret them as intended. While these are both dicult to ensure, their
variability is beyond the scope of this paper.15
15Ways to make people pay attention to ads range from using bright colors in print ads to using humor. Psychology
and neuroscience studies of attention have thus far looked at phenomena like \pop-out" eects. In these situations,
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Now we can look at the consumer's decision problem once again. Recall that there is some utility
function, depending on ~V taking bundles of products to dollar utility. Let q 2 Rn be the vector of
prices for the goods in the market. The decision maker's problem is now simply to choose x 2 Rn
x = argmaxfu(xj~V )  x  qg
Example: Given our parametric utility function we can look at a numerical example of how this
might work. Consider a two product, two non-trivial attribute world with attribute coecients
1 = 1, 2 = :5. The rst non-trivial attribute is the product category Z, while the second is a
positive social characteristic Y . There are also two nodes in the network representing two dierent
brands. These are assumed to be trivial so F 1 = F 2 = 0. We can ignore the trivial nodes and
consider a utility function u : R9 ! R over all meaningful combinations of the non-trivial attributes
~V (we leave the values for the brand identiers in the third and fourth rows blank, all nine patterns
associated with the initial pair are perfect substitutes so we pool them into a single column).
~V  =
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x90
BBBBBB@
 1  1  1 0 0 0 1 1 1
 1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1
                 
                 
1
CCCCCCA
attribute 1
attribute 2
F 1
F 2
Given these we know that
u(x) = 1g((x7 + x8 + x9)  (x1 + x2 + x3)) + 2g((x3 + x6 + x9)  (x1 + x4 + x7))
= ((x7 + x8 + x9)  (x1 + x2 + x3))
1=3 + :5((x3 + x6 + x9)  (x1 + x4 + x7))
1=3
However, at most two of these products will actually exist. First consider the case where neither
rm advertises, i.e., neither rm is associated with the social attribute Y . This means that, ignoring
the trivial brand identiers, V 1 = V 2 = (1; 0) and u(x1; x2) = (x1 + x2)
1=3. Notice that since both
rms' products are identical except for the brand identiers, they are perfect substitutes, so the
consumer will have straight indierence curves.
Now consider the case where F 1 advertises the pattern (1; 1; 1; 0), so P = f(1; 1; 1; 0)g. Let Y 2
[1; 2), so the activation threshold for Y is between 1 and 2. Given the initial search characteristics
for F 1, (1; 0; 1; 0), the input to Y will now be above the threshold and A(P; (1; 0; 1; 0)) = (1; 1; 1; 0).
On the other hand A(P; (1; 0; 0; 1)) = (1; 0; 0; 1), i.e., rm 2's product is not associated with Y . The
elements that are very dierent from the background immediately draw people's attention. For example, an \O" will
stand out in a eld of \T"s since it contains curves, but an \L" might be hard to nd. These processes explain the
use of color in ads, but the eect of emotional responses like humor are more poorly understood.
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Figure 1.4: A) Network when neither rm advertises. Dotted lines represent connections with 0-weight. B)
Network when rm 1 advertises. Notice that the search characteristics F 1 and Z are sucient to activate
Y , but Z alone is not.
new utility function is u0(x1; x2) = (x1 + x2)
1=3 + x
1=3
1
. This will raise the absolute and marginal
utility of extra units of x1 and give us convex indierence curves. The networks for both cases and
the related indierence curves are shown in Figure 1.4. Indierence curves are shown in Figure 1.5.
Y is a social attribute, so it is culturally determined rather than objectively measurable. In this
one period model, the consumption of the advertisement is actually creating extra utility. This ts
with the complementary view of advertising discussed in section 1.2.2.16
1.5 Common eects at the consumer level
1.5.1 Dilution
Recall that the weight between nodes i and j is
wij =
P
p2P pipj
jP j
The possible sources of brand dilution discussed in section 1.2.3 all involved pairing a brand identier
B with an incongruent product. Incongruence simply means that the original brand diers from the
16In a multi-period model where the the experience set P includes consumption experiences as well as advertisements
the connection strengths will reect a mixture of informative experiences and advertisements.
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Figure 1.5: Indierence curves when neither rm advertises (left), and when rm 1 advertises (right).
other product on one or more attributes. We can quantify dilution on this level easily by considering
the marginal eect of an incongruous advertisement on the connection strength between the brand
name and the diering attribute. Without loss of generality, assume that the original brand, B is
always paired with some attribute Y . The new product advertising the brand name B with either
Y = 0 or Y =  1. Let P 0 be the set of advertisements for the original brand, and let a be an
advertisement for the new product. Assume that for all other patterns in the original experience
set, p 2 P , p 62 P 0, the state of the brand node is 0
wBY =
P
p2P]a pBpY
jP j + 1
 
P
p2P pBpY
jP j
=
jP 0j + aBaY
jP j + 1
 
jP 0j
jP j
Notice that this eect is larger when
1. aY =  1 instead of 0
2. The size of P 0 is small (when there hasn't been as much advertising for the original brand)
The second implication is consistent with Morrin and Jacoby's nding that trademark dilution
is more pronounced for less familiar (read less advertised) brands. Since the size of the eect on the
connection weight is inversely proportional to the number of advertisements for the original brand,
products with fewer advertisements are more vulnerable to trademark dilution.
But brand image is not simply a brand's association with one attribute, but an entire pattern
of attributes. Dilution will occur for every attribute of the original product that diers from the
new product. In addition, the association between the brand name and the attribute isn't the
only one being diluted, connections among the attributes themselves will also be diluted. Since
multiple connections are diluted, the aggregate eect of the new ad on the input to any given node
is proportional to the number of characteristics where the two products dier. This, possibly large,
decrease in input to the node may change the state of attribute Y in V B , the perceived characteristics
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of the original product.
Assuming that the state of Y in V B goes from 1 to 0, the change in marginal utility of product
i given some xed endowment will be:

@u
@xi
=  
Y
3
(xi + eY )
 2=3 < 0
where eY is the total amount of attribute Y from the initial endowment and Y > 0 is the attribute
utility coecient for Y .
This decrease in marginal utility is possible for every diluted positive association and is cumu-
lative. If several positive attributes, Y1; : : : ; Yk are no longer active in V
B the change in utility
is

@u
@xi
=  
kX
j=1
Yj
3
(xi + eYj )
 2=3
Since this decrease occurs at all levels of consumption, the consumer's demand for product i is
decreasing in the number of diluted positive attributes.17
These implications are supported by the ndings in marketing that trademark and brand dilution
is worse when the products sharing the brand or trademark are more dissimilar.
Notice that connections strengths are only diluted for the changed attributes. The connections
between any consistent set of attributes will be reinforced by ads for both the parent brand and the
extension. This is consistent with Dacin and Smith's nding that brands associated with a variety
of products, but consistent on quality, are less vulnerable to dilution. Here, every advertisement for
the brand reinforces connections between the brand identiers and quality, so the dilution of the
other connections is less relevant.
1.5.2 Spillover
In the context of this model, a spillover is simply the activation of a positive attribute due to
advertising for a dierent product. Every advertisement aects all of the network connections, so
advertisements associating a particular brand and product with a social attribute Y will strengthen
the relationship between the brand and Y , but it will also strengthen the association between the
product category itself. This product category spillover is consistent with Seldon's nding that
cigarette advertisements positively aected the demand curve for the entire industry as well as the
specic demand for the advertising brand.
Applying the model to brand extensions again, notice that the marginal eect of advertisements
for both the parent brand and the extensions is to increase the connection strength between the
brand name and positive shared attributes. Using the same notation used in the section on dilution
17Conversely, the consumer's demand for product i is increasing in the number of diluted negative attributes.
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notice that the marginal eect of a single advertisement for the extension on the association between
the brand and a positive social attribute Y is once again
wBY =
P
p2P]a pBpY
jP j + 1
 
P
p2P pBpY
jP j
=
jP 0j + aBaY
jP j + 1
 
jP 0j
jP j
Only in this case aBaY = 1 so the eect is positive. Notice that once again, this eect is
decreasing in the size of P 0, predicting that the reciprocal spillover eect from the extension to the
parent brand is decreasing in the size of P 0. This nding is consistent with studies that show that
reciprocal spillover is is stronger for less familiar brands. (56)
Using exactly the same math as above, we see that advertising that enforces the connection
between the brand and a positive attribute will weakly increase the marginal utility of both the
original and extended products at all consumption levels. In general, the model agrees with ndings
in the marketing literature that consistency between a brand and its extension will facilitate spillover
eects in both directions.
The model also helps to explain spillover eects from trivial attributes when their irrelevance to
the product is known. Supporting the model prediction that mere association is enough to aect
evaluation is Gilovich's nding that sportswriters' evaluations of college football players are aected
by irrelevant information such as the fact that the college player was from the same hometown as a
famous NFL player. (24) Here, the trivial attribute (hometown) establishes an indirect association
with the athletic success of the professional player, i.e., the association of the hometown with success
spills over to college player.
1.5.3 Trivial attributes, trademarks, and negative associations
As noted above, advertisements by a rm can create spillovers for other rms by increasing the
connection between a product itself and some positive social or experience attribute. This is exactly
what many generic products rely on. If you walk around a drugstore you'll notice that most of the
store-brand items are packaged to look as similar to name-brand products as possible to facilitate
free-riding o the associations of the search attributes of those brands.
There are legal remedies for this situation in the form of trademark and trade dress laws. Trade-
mark laws protect actual brand names and logos, while trade dress applies more generally to dis-
tinctive packaging and design features. Interestingly, the standard for anything to be a trademark
in the legal sense is that it must have \acquired secondary meaning"(Lanham Act 1946). In this
model, \acquiring secondary meaning" means that the mark is highly associated with some positive
social or experience attribute, i.e. wMi  0 for some positive non-search attribute i.
Trademark and trade dress cases focus on two phenomena. The rst is infringement, which ad-
dresses the free-riding issue: these laws attempt to prevent rms from beneting from the secondary
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meaning attached to competitor brands. The second is brand dilution.
We discussed the problem of brand dilution with respect to brand extension in the previous
section. In these cases rms dilute their own associations by creating incongruent brand extensions.
There are also cases where competing or unrelated rms are accused of brand dilution for using the
distinguishing physical elements of a famous brand for their products. According to the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (1995), dilution is dened as \the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."
Trademark dilution is often divided into two categories. The rst is \blurring," where a trademark
becomes (a) less-distinctly associated with the particular products advertising under the mark and
(b) associated with unrelated products. This dilution is no dierent that the brand dilution created
by a rm's own brand extension. The second is \tarnishing," where a trademark is associated with
negative characteristics.
A famous case of tarnishing was a case where Victoria's Secret sued a store called \Victor's Little
Secret" which sold adult toys. Victor's Little Secret was capitalizing on the existing associations
between Victoria's Secret and sexuality; however, Victoria's Secret claimed that the adult store
created new, undesirable associations with its trademark.
In this model, the secondary meaning of a search attribute, or set of search attributes, dening a
brand is simply the set of social and experience attributes in A(P;XB), where XB is a vector repre-
senting those search attributes. In addition a company is not allowed to trademark any \functional"
aspect of a product. In other words, characteristics protected under trademark or trade dress are
of no direct utility to the population by themselves: they must be trivial. However, their ability to
activate other intangible attributes allows them to add utility to a brand.
Considering trivial attributes as search characteristics in this network model allows for any
number of eects, but we will concentrate on the way these attributes can prevent free-riding.
The simple existence of extra search attributes would not prevent free-riding by itself. The key
to preventing free-riding is to provide a search attribute that is always salient. In other words,
its absence from a competitor's product must be noteworthy. For example attributes like color are
actually pre-attentive, meaning that they are processed without any sort of directed attention. These
are perfect for the purpose of distinguishing one brand from the rest, as are other visual features
such as shape. In fact the Supreme Court held that a rm could actually protect the color of their
product under trade dress law in Qualitex vs. Jacobson, 1995.18
Apple's iPod campaign provides a more familiar example of the importance of trade dress. The
iPod's trademark white ear-buds are a salient centerpiece of most iPod advertisements. The ads
even place the white ear buds against black backgrounds to draw extra attention to them. When
18In this case, Qualitex was a major producer of dry-cleaning pads. Qualitex pads were a distinctive green-gold
color that Jacobson, a competing rm, started using.
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the iPod started selling players with dierent colors they made sure to keep the white ear buds since
the iPod's distinctiveness is what makes it more desirable than any of the many other mp3 players
on the market.
Because of its pre-attentive nature, Al and Laura Ries includes the \Law of Color" as one of
their \The 22 Immutable Laws of Branding" (64). They address the importance of picking a color to
represent your brand that contrast with those of your competitors helping to create dierentiation.
Pepsi-Cola made a poor choice. It picked red and blue as the brand's colors. Red to
symbolize cola and blue to dierentiate the brand from Coca-Cola. For years Pepsi has
struggled with a less-than-ideal response to Coke's color strategy.
Be honest. In your mind's eye, doesn't the world seem to be awash in Coca-Cola signs?
An isn't it hard to picture many Pepsi-Cola signs? Pepsi is out there, but the lack of a
unique dierentiating color tends to make Pepsi invisible in a sea of Coca-Cola red.
Recently Pepsi-Cola has seen the light, or rather the color. It is doing what it should
have done more than 50 years ago. Make the brand's color the opposite of its major
competitor's color.
Pepsi-Cola is going blue.| Al and Laura Ries, \The 22 Immutable Laws of Branding"
In this case color is denitely a trivial attribute. While one can argue that consumers have a taste
for color in a portable music player, the color of your drink container will not directly eect your
utility from the drink. However, Ries asserts that color choice is one of the most important choices
these companies make. Why? Because color is a salient trait that absolutely everyone notices and
because of this it is one of the most important factor in creating brand dierentiation.
This is another place where this network model diers signicantly from traditional hedonic
pricing. Zero-utility attributes are truly trivial in the traditional model since they should have no
direct eect on consumer evaluations. However, using networks, we can explore how inherently
valueless attributes can still have signicant eects on consumer decisions.
All these examples suggest the importance of trivial attributes, especially attention-grabbing
physical characteristics, for product dierentiation. We address this problem by using a neural-
network that includes a node to represent the trivial attribute.
Consider the simple two rm network in Figure 1.6. Let F 2 be a generic brand free-riding on the
advertising of F 1. Until now we have ignored the possibility that a brand can actually be activated
by other characteristics such as the product type, but in the case of a generic this could actually be
a strategy by itself, especially if the generic wishes to benet from \hard" social characteristics with
high activation thresholds.19
19Famous examples of brands activated by the product type itself are Kleenex, Xerox, and Coke.
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Figure 1.6: The generic marketing strategy: use the associations of a \name"-brand to increase the decision
utility of their product. The generic product does not advertise itself at all, instead the input from the
product node Z to the name-brand node F 1 is sucient to activate F 1 which in turn activates the utility
bearing characteristic Y .
In this network, the product type Z actually activates the name-brand node F 1. Once F 1 is
active, the associated positive characteristic Y can be activated by input from both the product
type Z and the name-brand F 1. This way the generic product F 2 benets from the reected glow
generated by advertising for F 1. A real world example of this strategy is shown in Figure 1.7. The
generic cereal brand \Crisp Crunch" is not only the same kind of cereal as \Cap'n Crunch," having
the same ingredients, shape and texture, but goes further by using a cartoon picture of a captain (a
trivial attribute) to gain association with the name-brand cereal \Cap'n Crunch."
Then name-brand F1 can prevent this free-riding and retain its market-share by introducing a
highly salient trivial attribute T , such as a distinctive color, that it can legally protect. The crucial
point is that the trivial attribute T is in state  1 when a consumer assesses the competitor brand
F2. Because of this, it will actually inhibit the activation of the social attribute Y in A(P;X2). This
model implies that elements of trademarks and trade dress not only help a product by helping to
activate non-search characteristics, but actually can prevent free-riding by competitor rms.20 The
new network, with T included is shown in Figure 1.8.
While tarnishing a trademark creates interesting legal implications, advertising can create neg-
ative associations with other aspects of a product. An interesting, though not legally actionable
example of tarnishing, was a 2005 Dasani commercial where a bear disparages the virtues of natural
20Examining the cereal boxes above, even though \Crisp Crunch" uses a cartoon captain on their box, they are not
allowed to use the distinctive, trademarked, image of the \Cap'n Crunch" captain. The dierences between the two
captains may be enough to actually highlight the distinctiveness of the name-brand cereal depending on the consumer.
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Figure 1.7: Generic brand attempts to associate themselves with their name-brand competitors can be
extremely obvious. In this example \Crisp Crunch" actually uses a cartoon captain in uniform to elicit
associations with \Cap'n Crunch."
spring water.
The whole natural mountain spring thing is ne. But I was just in there, and you do
not want any of that. There are salmon in there. And do you know what they're doing?
Spawning, in the mountain stream. Way too natural for me. |Dasani Advertisement,
2005
This advertisement in many ways better illustrates tarnishing than the legal case above: the rm
employs a national advertising campaign to attack its competitors by associating their most salient
feature, natural | usually associated with purity | with its exact opposite { impurity. Applying
the neural network model, the advertisement places the node corresponding to purity in the  1
state while placing \natural" in the 1 state. This serves the purpose of quickly diluting the positive
association between \natural" and \pure" and possibly, given heavy exposure to the ads, create a
negative association between the two characteristics.
Another example of advertising that \tarnishes" the attributes of a competitor is the recent Jack
in the Box campaign indirectly attacking Angus burgers, oered by competing fast food chains Carl's
Jr, McDonald's, and Burger King. Even though the Angus burger are not protected by intellectual
property laws, the owners of Carl's Jr. are suing Jack in the Box.
CKE Restaurants Inc. sued Jack In The Box in U.S. District Court on Friday over an
ad in which executives laugh hysterically at the word \Angus" and another where the
chain's pingpong ball-headed mascot, Jack, is asked to point to a diagram of a cow and
show where Angus meat comes from.
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Figure 1.8: When a consumer evaluates Fs under this network structure, the salient absence of the trivial
attribute T inhibits the activation of Y .
\I'd rather not," the pointy-nosed Jack replies. (Associated Press, May 29, 2007) (14)
Like the Dasani commercial, this advertisement aims to change the positive consumer associations
with Angus beef by associating it with something negative. The major dierence is that, in this case,
rather than reversing an existing positive association, the new commercial simply seeks to associate
competitor products with a previously unrelated, negative attribute.
In summary, advertisements can serve to dierentiate a product from its competitors by creating
not only positive associations to desirable social and experience attributes, but also by using negative
associations. This is a particularly important role for the distinctive and salient but non-functional
aspects of a product that can be legally protected under trademark laws. These trivial attributes
allow rms to protect their advertising investment by not only uniquely identifying their brand as
opposed to others (a simple name does that) but by creating negative input to positive advertised
traits in their salient absence.
1.6 Implications for Firms
Given the implied eects of advertising on consumers' evaluations of products, what might be the
optimal advertising strategy for a rm in dierent situations? In this section we will consider two
common situations. First, what are the optimal advertising levels in a simple oligopoly with one
social attribute. And second, what is the optimal advertising strategy for a rm that wishes to sell
products that are dierentiated over a social attribute.
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As in the previous section we consider a one period model. At the beginning of the period
the rms simultaneously choose their advertising and price strategies. We then assume that all
consumers see all advertisements, so the set P is the same for each consumer. At the end of
the period consumers make their purchasing decisions and rms produce and sell the demanded
quantities (Bertrand oligopoly).
For the purposes of this paper we will constrain the set of allowable advertisements. First, rms
cannot refer to other rms' brands in their advertisements (no negative advertising).21 Second,
we will only consider advertisements that include a product category Z since the vast majority of
advertisements actually seen are for a specic brand and product category.22
1.6.1 Application to a market with a single good
Now we are ready to work out a simple example of this model. Assume that there is only one
product type Z and one possible, universally positive, social attribute Y . This means that there
is a \basic" version of the product, which would consist of Z alone, and a preferred version that
would have Z = 1 and Y = 1, which we will refer to as the high-Y good from here on. The space of
possible network states is S = (F 1; : : : ; Fn; Z; Y ), where the F is represent the rms in the market.
In this example, each rm has only one brand, so we can treat brands and rms as synonymous.
Given the assumptions above we can simplify the consumer's utility function substantially. There
are essentially only three possibly goods: high-Y , basic, and negative-Y .
u^ : R3 ! R
takes bundles of these goods to their dollar utility.
We consider the implications of this model in monopoly and oligopoly situations. The structure
of the oligopoly market changes radically depending on the value of the activation threshold for Y ,
Y . For low values of Y rms are able to free-ride on the advertising of their competitors. On the
other hand, for high values of Y , not only is free-riding impossible, but only a limited number of
rms will be able to sell the high-Y good. Heuristically this means that for less common, \harder"
Y attributes (like luxury) only a few brands will actually be able to participate in the high-Y market
of a good, regardless of advertising levels. We call the number of rms that may actually participate
in the high-Y market the capacity of the high-Y market and show that this capacity is decreasing
21Negative advertising could be introduced by simply allowing the brand nodes referring to competitor brands to
be in the  1 state. This would allow a rm to create a negative association between the competitor and themselves,
along with negative associations between the competitor and the favorable characteristics they attempt to associate
with themselves. In reality, negative advertising can occur but is impeded by the presence of trademark laws.
22The actual reason for including product categories in advertisements has more to do with brand recall than brand
evaluation. In the current model, recall of all competitors is assumed. In this case it is not obviously useful to
associate a brand with a particular product category. Indeed as shown in this section, it may allow competitors to
free-ride on the rm's advertisements. But in reality, brands generally must be associated with the product category
to be included in the consideration set. We discuss this aspect of advertising in the extensions section of this paper.
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the social characteristic's activation threshold Y .
We make the following simplifying assumptions:
1. Firms produce a good Z. We assume that consumers always consider all rms in the market.
Think of the situation where you are in a store with all the brands of a product in front of
you, so brand recall is not relevant.
2. Recall that advertisements are patterns, p 2 S, that rms pay to add to the set P . We make the
further simplifying assumption that P only contains advertisements. In addition, we assume
that every consumer sees every advertisement, so P is the same for all consumers. Let Ai be
the set of advertisements purchased by rm F i. This assumption states that for all consumers
P =
]
i
Ai:
3. The activation threshold for the social characteristic Y , Y , is constant over the population.
This along with (2) mean that perceptions are shared across consumers: A(P;X) is the same
for all consumers for any starting information X .
4. The only rm that is initially salient to the consumer is the rm being evaluated, i.e., X i
F j
= 0
for all j 6= i.
5. All rms have the same cost curve c(x), and there is a xed cost per advertisement, cA.
6. Y is universally positive for all consumers. Specically, the marginal utility for the high-Y good
is always greater than the utility for the basic good, and the marginal utility for a saliently
low -Y good is less than zero:
u1(x) > u2(x) & u3(x) < 0 8 x 2 R
3
+
This corresponds to the attribute utility vectors satisfying Y > Z > 0 for all consumers if
we use utility functions of the form described in section 1.4.2.
In this model, the initial information, X i, for each good will be the vector that is 1 at the indices
representing the manufacturing rm F i, and the product type Z, and 0 everywhere else. Notice
that the only tangible dierence between products from dierent rms is the rm identier itself,
and the only dierence relevant to utility must come from the consumer perceptions of Y .
Since the experience set P is the same for all consumers, perceptions will be the same across
consumers. Formally, for each i A(P;X i) is the same for every consumer.
Let V i = A(P;X i). The demand any given rm, F i, faces is given by a function
Di(~q; ~V )
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Symbol Description
Z Product type, e.g. running shoe, car, or hat
Y Universally positive social characteristic, e.g. sta-
tus
n Number of rms selling Z
F i Firm i (in this section rms and brands are syn-
onymous)
Ai Advertisements purchased by F i
Ni Number of advertisements purchased by F
i: Ni =
jAij
X i Search characteristics of the the product sold by
rm i. In this section X i is 1 at Z and the rm
index F i, and 0 everywhere else.
~q Vector of prices charged. qi is the price charged
by F i.
~V Perceived characteristics of the products for each
rm, V i = A(X i; P )
Di(~q; ~V ) The demand for goods produced by F
i given prices
~q and perceived characteristics ~(V ) for all rms
c(x) The cost function for production of Z. All rms
face the same cost curve.
cA The cost of one advertisement
Table 1.4: Notation Table for Section 1.6
where ~q are the prices charged by each rm in the market and ~V are the perceived characteristics
of each product in the market. These perceived attributes are in turn a function of the set of
advertisements purchased by each rm, so we can write ~V as a function of all the rms' advertising
campaigns.
~V = V (P ) = V
0
@]
j
Aj
1
A
A rm F i's problem is then to choose a price qi and advertising strategy, A
i to maximize the
prot function,
i(qi; A
i) = qi Di
0
@~q; V
0
@]
j
Aj
1
A
1
A  c(Di)  cA  jAij
given the other rms' prices and advertising strategies.
1.6.1.1 Monopoly
Assume that there is only one rm, F 1. This will lead to the three-node network shown in Figure
1.9, and the state space is S = (F 1; Z; Y ). Recall that since Z and F 1 are search characteristics,
they are both highly self-connected (see Table 1.2), so that once these nodes are activated they will
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stay activated. This means that there are only three possible A(P;X1):
A(P;X1) =
8>>><
>>>:
(1; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 0)
or (1; 1; 1)
Furthermore, in this example note that A(P;X1) is deterministic because the states of Z and F 1
are stable and, since Y is a social attribute, wY Y = 0 and the state of Y is completely dependent
on input from Z and F 1, i.e., the network will always be stable under transition functions T Z and
TF
1
, so A(P;X1) = T Y (X1).
Figure 1.9: The monopoly case with one product Z and one social attribute Y
Claim 1.6.1 F 1 will purchase exactly one advertisement A = (1; 1; 1) if and only if cA < q
h
mD(q
h; (1; 1; 1)) 
c(D(qhm; (1; 1; 1)))  q
l
mD(q
l
m; (1; 1; 0)) + c(D(q
l
m; (1; 1; 0))) and Y < 2, where q
h
m and q
l
m maximize
qD(q; (1; 1; 1))  c(D(q; (1; 1; 1))) and qD(q; (1; 1; 0))  c(D(q; (1; 1; 0))), respectively.
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Proof:
In a monopoly setting, the rm will never advertise (1; 1; 1) because u3(x) < 0 for all consumers,
and therefore D(q; (1; 1; 1)) = 0 for all q > 0. Since recall is ensured in the current example, they
will never advertise (1; 1; 0) either. This is because X1 = (1; 1; 0) and A(P; (1; 1; 0)) = (1; 1; 0) even
when P = ;.23 If the rm purchases no advertisements, wF 1Y = wZY = 0, they will face demand
curve D(q; (1; 1; 0)) and produce D(qlm; (1; 1; 0)).
If they do advertise, they only advertiseA = (1; 1; 1), which means that for all p 2 P , p = (1; 1; 1).
In the monopoly case they will only need to purchase one advertisement since
wZY =
P
p2P pZpY
jP j
=
jP j
jP j
= 1
as long as jP j  1, and the same is true for wF 1Y .
When the rm advertises, the matrix of weights is
W =
0
BBB@
wF 1F 1 1 1
1 wZZ 1
1 1 0
1
CCCA
so the inputs to each node when the network is in state X1 are
IT = (1; 1; 0) W = (wF 1F 1 + 1; wZZ + 1; 2):
F 1 and Z are search characteristics so (1; 1; 0) is stable under the transition functions T F
1
and TZ .
However, if Y < 2, then T
3(1; 1; 0) = (1; 1; 1), which is then stable under all T i, implying that
A(P;X1) = (1; 1; 1). The rm will face D(q; (1; 1; 1)) and produce D(qhm; (1; 1; 1)).
Therefore, the rm will either choose not to advertise at all, yielding a maximum prot of
qlmD(q
l
m; (1; 1; 0))  c(D(q
l
m; (1; 1; 0)));
or purchase exactly one advertisement a = (1; 1; 1), yielding a maximum prot of
qhmD(q
h
m; (1; 1; 1))  c(D(q
h
m; (1; 1; 1)))  cA:
This means that the rm will advertise if and only if the gains of facing the higher demand curve
outweigh the cost of one advertisement cA.
Finally if Y  2 there is no way for the network to produce enough input to surpass the
activation threshold for Y ; therefore, there is no incentive for the rm to advertise. This proves the
23Stability of the pattern (1; 1; 0) is ensured because F 1 and Z are both search attributes.
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claim. Q.E.D.
1.6.1.2 Oligopoly
What happens if we add other rms (F2; : : : Fn)? Now, instead of the three-node network from the
monopoly example, we have a (n+2)-node network with the state space described as (F1; : : : ; Fn; Z; Y ).
This network is illustrated in Figure 1.10.
Figure 1.10: (n + 2)-node network for the example. The top row of nodes serve as the rm identiers, Z is
the node representing the product type, and Y is a desirable social attribute that the rms can advertise.
The rst thing to realize is that whenever any rm advertises, they produce a positive externality.
Specically, they strengthen the weight wZY between the product type itself and the characteristic Y ,
leading to possible spillover eects for the entire market. This allows for an interesting phenomenon:
rms may be able to free-ride o the advertising of other rms to raise the utility of their products.
This phenomenon can actually be observed in fashion. For example, Von Dutch trucker hats gained
a degree of popularity when stars like Britney Spears started wearing them, however, trucker hats
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with other logos became popular as well (see Figure 1.11). The trendiness was associated with the
style of hat rather than the Von Dutch brand specically.24
Figure 1.11: The rise of the trucker hat: Celebrities started wearing trucker hats made by Von Dutch in
2004. On the left, Madonna, Benicio DelToro, Leonardo DiCaprio and Lindsay Lohan are all shown wearing
the brand. However, the trendiness of the product did not remain specic to the Von Dutch brand and other
manufacturers began producing trucker hats with a variety of logos for the hipster population, one example
is shown on the right. (Images were taken from www.newfaces.com and www.ilovejungle.co.uk respectively.)
Whether this free-riding can occur depends on the activation threshold for the social attribute
Y , which is Y = . The lower the threshold , the easier it is for activation to \spread" to the
attribute, i.e., the easier it is the create an association between the social attribute and any search
attribute.
First case:  < 1. As in the monopoly case, rms will never choose an advertisement with Y < 1, so
the only advertisements that will ever occur will have Z = Y = 1. From this we can see that if any
rm decides to advertise, the weight wZY = 1. This ensures that the input to Y , IY  1 whenever
Z = 1 and that A(P; (: : : ; 1; 0)) = (: : : ; 1; 1) regardless of the states of the rm nodes F i. In this
case product from all the rms are perfect substitutes, diering only in price.
Now this turns into a simple public-good situation. Let q = min(~q) be the minimum price
charged for the product. If any rm decides to advertise, we denote the total demand for the good
as Dh(q) = D(q; (: : : ; 1; 1)). Otherwise, we denote the total demand as Dl(q) = D(q; (: : : ; 1; 0)).
This raises the question, when will rms advertise at all?
Claim 1.6.2 If  < 1, in any pure strategy equilibrium at most one rm will advertise. If advertising
24Even though the \coolness" of the Von Dutch trucker hat spread to other brands, the Von Dutch brand did gain
signicant associations with young celebrities and all they entail. Von Dutch was able to use its association with these
celebrities to begin marketing other products under the same brand: t-shirts, jeans, etc.
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does occur only one advertisement will be purchased.
Proof:
Assume that this is not the case. That means that there exists some equilibrium where at least
two rms advertise. As in the monopoly case, the only advertisements purchased will be of the form
a = (: : : ; 1; 1). Since P consists entirely of advertisements, this implies that the weight between the
product type, Z, and the positive social characteristic, Y , is one: wZY = 1.
When wZY = 1, we know that the input to the social characteristic will be at least one, IZ  1,
when the network is in any state where the Z node is active, VZ = 1. Since  < 1 by assumption
and IZ  1, we have IZ >  ) T
Y
Y
(V ) = 1 for all V such that VZ = 1.
Consider one of the advertising rms: if it were to stop advertising the connection strength, wZY
would still be 1. So, even without its advertisements the rm would face the exact same demand
curve, but decrease its costs. This implies that advertising is not the rm's best response to the
strategies of its competitors, therefore the market is out of equilibrium giving us a a contradiction.
This proves that only one rm will advertise. The advertising level will be 1 for a similar reason:
for any higher level of advertising the rm could do better by dropping to jAij = 1. Q.E.D.
We do not consider mixed strategy equilibria in this case since, although they may exist in this
one-period model, they will not generally be reective of real world advertising situations.25
There are two necessary conditions for advertising to occur:
1. At the equilibrium price, rms must not have any incentive to price under all other rms to
monopolize the market.
2. The advertising rm must not have an incentive to stop advertising.
We can use these conditions to establish upper and lower bounds on the price in an advertising
equilibrium. First we dene four useful functions: the monopoly prot functions for the high and
low-Y goods, and the oligopoly prot functions for these goods.
h
m
(q) = qDh(q)  c (Dh(q))
lm(q) = qDl(q)  c (Dl(q))
h
o
(q) = q
Dh(q)
n
  c

Dh(q)
n

lo(q) = q
Dl(q)
n
  c

Dl(q)
n

25In a multi-period model even a mixed strategy in any given period will converge so that a consumer will have
seen about t   after t periods where  is the mean of the rm's one-period strategy. So for large t, mixed strategies
don't look terribly dierent from pure strategies. When generalizing to this sort of model the important factor will
be an advertising rate as opposed to an advertising level since the experience set, P , is always growing, and will never
consist solely of advertisements.
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We can rewrite the conditions for equilibrium with respect to these functions.
ho (q)  
h
m(q
); q = min(qhm; q)
ho (q)  cA  
l
m(q
); q = min(qlm; q)
ho (q)  cA  
l
o(q)
Claim 1.6.3 If the monopoly prot functions for the high-Y and low-Y goods, hm(q) and 
l
m(q)
are quasi-concave, advertising will only be possible in a pure strategy equilibria if the monopoly price
for the high-Y demand curve qhm is greater than q
 where q = inffqjq   c0

Dl(q)
n

> 0g.26 (See
Appendix A2 for Proof).
These bounds are unfortunately extremely loose, so they tell us very little about how equilibrium
prices should depend on the number of rms, or the cost of advertising. In fact, equilibrium prices
will depend heavily on the exact form of the demand and cost functions above. However, we can
derive much tighter bounds for a parametric example.
Claim 1.6.4 For demand and cost functions of the form:
h < l
Dh(q) = 1  hq
Dl(q) = 1  lq
c(x) = c  x2
any equilibrium price q where advertising occurs is bounded:
c+
q
c2 + cAn
2(n+c(h+l))
l h
n+ c(h + l)
 q 
c(n+ 1)
ch(n+ 1) + n
(See Appendix A2 for Proof).
Consider the comparative statics of these bounds. The upper bound is decreasing in the number
of rms n since the higher the price q, the more tempting it is to the advertising rm to monopolize
the market. The lower bound, on the other hand, is increasing in the price of advertising, cA, and
the number of rms n. As the number of rms grow the range of possible equilibrium prices shrinks
until, at high n and cA, the interval is empty. This shows that as the cost of the public-good (the
advertisement), and the number of rms increase, it becomes more and more dicult to nd an
26The lower bound ensures that even though this is a Bertrand oligopoly and rms are required to meet demand,
marginal cost will never exceed marginal benet in an advertising equilibrium. This is a result of the fact that if
this is the case it will often be optimal for the advertising rm to purposefully decrease demand by refraining from
advertising.
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equilibrium price.27
The prot functions, hm, 
l
m, 
h
o , and 
l
o are plotted for h = :05, l = :2, c = 1:5, and n = 2
in Figure 1.12. Notice that as long as either of the monopoly prot functions is above the oligopoly
function ho , the system cannot be in equilibrium. Similarly, 
h
o must be above the low-Y oligopoly
function, lo. The dark region of the 
h
o curve shows the set of prices where they will be advertising
in equilibrium when cA = 0. Increasing cA will simply transpose both high-Y curves down by cA
and lead to a smaller region of possible equilibrium prices, in particular the minimum equilibrium
price with advertising is increasing in cA and the maximum equilibrium price is decreasing in cA.
Figure 1.12: The four prot curves, hm, 
l
m, 
h
o , and 
l
o for the demands and costs specied above. Notice
that neither rm will ever have an incentive to raise prices above those of its competitor since then it would
face a demand of 0. However, there may be incentives to cut prices or to stop advertising. Cutting prices is
equivalent to switching to one of the monopoly curves and moving to the left, so in equilibrium the monopoly
curves must be below the oligopoly curve in use (could be either high- or low-Y ). Cutting advertising is
equivalent to switching from the high-oligopoly curve to either of the low-Y curves (monopoly or oligopoly).
So these must both fall below the high-oligopoly curve in equilibrium. Since all the curves in this example are
quasi-concave and we only consider prices below their maxima, these conditions are not only necessary but
sucient for equilibrium. Advertising equilibrium prices are highlighted in blue, non-advertising equilibrium
prices are highlighted in red.
Second Case: 1    2 In this case, the input wZY from Z to Y can never be strong enough to
activate Y by itself, so a rm must advertise in order to form an association with Y . This changes
the structure of the market radically. Any rm that wishes to associate its product with Y must
27These bounds only utilize the rst and third equilibrium conditions listed above. The second, ho (q) cA  
l
m(q),
may bind from above or below depending on the specic values of h, l, and c. Notice that 
h
o (q)   
l
m(q)   cA is
a convex quadratic function, so it will generally have two roots. Equilibrium prices must be either below the lower
root, or above the upper root of this quadratic. Increasing cA simply transposes the quadratic prot function for the
advertising rm down. So the lower root is decreasing in cA and the upper root is increasing in cA. This implies that
the bound generated by this condition will get stricter as cA whether it binds from above or from below.
56
advertise. As we will show, a limited number of rms will in fact be able to associate their product
with Y . And the advertising cost of associating its product with Y is increasing in the number of
other rms that choose to advertise.28
Once again, all advertisements will be of the form ( ; : : : ; ; 1; 1), so, likewise, wZY = 1 if any
rm advertises and 0 otherwise. Let F i advertise. We know that the rm's product will only be
associated with Y if its advertisements make up a signicant portion of total advertisements seen
by the consumers. Formally,
AY (P;X
i) = 1 , wF iY =
NiP
j Nj
> Y   1
where Nj is the number of ads purchased by F
j .
Claim 1.6.5 When the threshold for Y ,  > 1, there is an upper-bound of b 1
Y  1
c on the number
of rms that can be associated with Y .
Proof:
If any rm advertises the sum of the weights
X
i
wF iY =
X
i
NiP
j Nj
= 1;
and as stated above, F i will be associated with Y if and only if wF iY >    1. At most b
1
Y  1
c
rms can satisfy this condition at once. We call this the capacity of the high-Y market. Q.E.D.
In order to understand this case we need to re-specify the demand functions to account for the
fact that basic and high-Y products may coexist in the market. When  > 1, there are cases where
there will be rms with A(P;X i) = ( ; : : : ; ; 1; 1) and rms where A(P;X i) = ( ; : : : ; ; 1; 0). We
need to know the preferences of individual consumers for the basic (Y = 0) vs. high-Y (Y = 1)
version of the good at dierent prices in order to understand how the market splits between the two
goods. We say that rms selling the high-Y good are part of the high-Y market. Similarly, rms
selling the basic version of the good are part of the low-Y market.
Claim 1.6.6 In a pure strategy equilibrium there will be one price for the high-Y market, qh, and
one for the low-Y market, ql. When both types of products are sold, we will have ql < qh.
Proof:
The rm itself will not directly aect the consumers' utility by the assumption that F i is trivial.
So, for any given consumer all products produced by rms F i in the high-Y market are perfect
28The limited capacity feature of the high-Y market makes this game look somewhat like an entry-game from the
economic literature.
57
substitutes. Consumers will maximize u(x)  qix1 - qjx2, implying that consumers will all purchase
high-Y goods from the rm(s) charging the lowest price, qh. Any rm charging q > q

h will sell no
product and make negative prots  NicA. Therefore, in a pure strategy equilibrium, all rms that
enter the high-Y market will charge a single price qh. The argument for the low-Y market is the
same.
We said that Y is a universally positive social attribute, so for any consumer u1(x) > u2(x) for
all consumers and at all x. Therefore if qh  ql the demand for the low-Y product will be 0, proving
the claim. Q.E.D.
Without loss of generality, assume that rms (F1; : : : ; Fk) advertise and rms (Fk+1; : : : ; Fn) do
not.
Since we know that there will only be two prices qh and ql, we can dene two functions:
Dh(qh; ql) The demand for the high-Y good at prices qh and ql
Dl(qh; ql) The demand for the low-Y good at prices qh and ql.
We assume that @Di
@pi
< 0. In other words, demand is decreasing in own-price. We also dene the
following prot functions:
hm(q; ql) = qDh(q; ql)  c(Dh(q; ql))
lm(q; qh) = qDl(qh; q)  c(Dl(qh; q)):
hm(q; ql) describes the prots that would be achieved if a rm monopolizes the high-Y market at price
q when the price in the low-Y market is ql, while 
l
m(q; qh) does the same for a rm monopolizing
the low-Y market.
Assume that for all xed ql, 
h
m(q; ql) is quasi-concave in q and has some nite maximum q
h
m(ql).
Similarly assume that for all xed qh, 
l
m(q; qh) is quasi-concave and achieves its maximum at q
l
m(qh).
To simplify the notation Dh and Dl refer to the demands for some equilibrium prices qh and ql
unless noted otherwise.
Claim 1.6.7 In any pure strategy equilibrium, all rms that advertise will advertise at the same
level N .
Proof:
Assume that this is not true. Then there must exist two rms F i and F j with advertising levels
Ni > Nj . In equilibrium, F
j will only advertise if it successfully associates its product with Y .
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Therefore we know that
Nj
Ni +Nj +
P
k 6=i;j Nk
>    1:
A necessary and sucient condition for F i's product to be associated with Y is that
Ni
Ni +Nj +
P
k 6=i;j Nk
>    1:
This means that F i could decrease its advertising level to Ni = Nj and still face Dh since
Nj
2Nj +
P
k 6=i;j Nk
>
Nj
Ni +Nj +
P
k 6=i;j Nk
>    1:
So for all i  k, Ni = N as desired. Q.E.D.
Claims 1.6.5 and 1.6.6 narrow the relevant strategies considerably. An equilibrium will be com-
pletely described by four parameters:
1. k, the number of rms in the high-Y market
2. N , the number of advertisements purchased by rms in the high-Y market
3. qh, the price of the high-Y good
4. ql, the price of the low-Y good.
In a pure strategy equilibrium with non-empty high-Y and low-Y markets the following conditions
must be met:
1. The number of rms who advertise must be less than the capacity of the high-Y market.
k <
1
   1
2. Firms should not have an incentive to undercut the price of their competitors to monopolize
either the high or low-Y market.
qh
Dh
k
  c

Dh
k

> hm(qh); qh  q
h
m(ql)
ql
Dl
n   k
  c

Dl
n   k

> lm(ql); ql  q
l
m(qh)
3. Firms that advertise should not have an incentive to change the advertising level.
4. Firms that do not advertise should not want to enter the high-Y market. In other words, the
cost of entry should outweigh the benets of entry.
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5. Finally, rms that advertise should not want to exit the high-Y market.
The rst two conditions are fairly self-contained, so we will consider the implications of the third,
fourth, and fth conditions. The third condition places limits on the possible advertising levels given
a xed number of rms, k, in the market. Intuitively, advertising levels should be \minimal" in the
sense that rms should not be able to lower the advertising level and still take part in the high-Y
market. However, advertising levels must be high enough that it is too expensive for any rm to
raise advertising levels and monopolize the high-Y market. Together, these conditions give us upper
and lower bounds on the advertising level N .
Claim 1.6.8 In any equilibrium with non-empty low and high-Y markets, the advertising level for
rms in the high-Y market must fall within a specied range:
hm(q
h
m(ql); ql) 
qh
k
Dh + c
 
Dh
k

cA
l
1 k( 1)
 1
m  N  2  
1  k(   1)
(See Appendix A2 for Proof.)
Consider the comparative statics of this set of inequalities as k approaches the capacity of the
high-Y market, 1
 1 . The right-hand side is increasing quickly toward 1. The left-hand side is
also increasing in k as long as qh  c
0

Dh(qh;ql)
k

, the marginal cost faced by an advertising rm.29
When this is not true, the prot of the rm is actually decreasing in output, so no rm will ever
want to monopolize the high-Y market. Assuming that this is not the case, i.e., qh is high enough
that rms would want a larger market share, advertising levels are increasing in k.
That brings us to the fourth and fth conditions. How many rms should actually join the
high-Y market in equilibrium? Once again we look at the problem intuitively. If there are too few
rms, the benets to entry will be high (assuming a high enough price qh) and rms from the low-Y
market will have an incentive to enter the high-Y market. However, as noted above, advertising
costs are increasing in k. If too many rms enter the high-Y market those rms have an incentive
to stop advertising and participate in the low-Y market.
First, we dene functions specifying the benets of both simple entry to the high-Y market, and
entering and monopolizing the high-Y market:
be(k; qh; ql) =
qh
k + 1
Dh  
ql
n   k
Dl + c

Dl
n   k

  c

Dh
k + 1

bm(k; ql) = p
h
m(ql)Dh(q
h
m(ql); ql) 
ql
n   k
Dl + c

Dl
n   k

29In this section we assume that rms must produce to meet demand. However, in a more general setting where we
allow rms to choose their own output, the marginal cost of production c0(x) must be less than the marginal revenue
(the price of the good q).
60
We also dene cost functions for entering the high-Y market, and entering and monopolizing the
high-Y market
ce(k;N) =

k(   1)
2  
N

cA
cm(k;N) =

1  (   1)k
   1
N

cA
Using these, along with the bounds on the advertising level N shown above, we can derive conditions
on the number of rms in the high-Y market that don't depend on the specic value of N (for details
of these derivations see Appendix A.2):

k(   1)
1  k(   1)

cA > be(k; ql; qh)

2  
   1

cA > bm(k; ql):
Once again, we consider the comparative statics of these conditions. Consider the rst inequality:
The benet of entry is decreasing in k while qh > c
0

Dh
k+1

and ql > c
0

Dl
n k

, and the cost of entry is
always increasing in k. This means that this condition is more and more easily met as k approaches
the capacity of the market, i.e., as the high-Y market approaches capacity the benets to entry
decrease while the costs to entry increase, removing the incentive for rms in the low-Y market to
enter.
Finally, advertising rms should want to stay in the high-Y market. This requires that the
benets of staying outweigh the costs of staying. Using the functions dened above we can rewrite
this as
be(k   1; ql; qm) > ce(k   1; N)
be(k; ql; qm)  ce(k;N):
Since benets are decreasing and costs are increasing in k, this boils down to nding the crossing
point for these two functions.
We can now start to see the dynamics of this system. At low k, be is high and rms will enter.
This, in turn, will increase the incentive for rms in the high-Y market to attempt to monopolize the
high-Y market, which will drive the advertising levels, and cost of entry ce up. This will continue
until the costs outweigh the benets. If too many rms enter, the cost of staying in the market will
actually motivate rms in the high-Y market to exit and sell products in the low-Y market. This
cycle is illustrated in Figure 1.13.
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Figure 1.13: Flow diagram for oligopoly. If there are too many rms in the high-Y market, the benets to
staying decrease and rms have an incentive to leave. When there are too few rms, rms will enter, driving
up the advertising costs of joining or staying in the high-Y market. When these costs have just exceeded
the benets, the system is in equilibrium
The main points to take from this example are that because of the existence of social attributes, it
may be benecial for even monopolies to advertise. However, without the presence of distinguishing
attributes, monopolies are constrained to market either a high or low-Y good. In oligopolies when
Y has a low threshold, free-riding is a signicant problem that may prevent advertising even if it
would increase overall welfare. This is because the cost of creating utility from the social attribute is
xed (the cost of one advertisement), but no one rm will be able to reap the benets of associating
the product with Y . And nally, for Y with a high threshold, oligopolies look like an entry game
where the cost of entry is increasing in the number of rms in the high-Y market.
1.6.2 Product Dierentiation
In this section we use the model developed in sections 1.3 and 1.4 to explore sub-branding as a
means to create product dierentiation. In these cases a rm uses a parent brand along with an
extra sub-brand label to introduce a new product. This strategy is usually employed when rms
are introducing a new version of the same type of product already sold under the brand name.
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Prominent examples of this sort of extension are Diet Coke, or Miller Hi-Life.
For any given product type there is a distribution of preferences over possible characteristics.
This gives rms an incentive to oer a diverse set of products. However, the associative structure of
this model will constrain the degree to which they diversify under a given brand name. Diversifying
over search attributes is generally easy because they are readily apparent (i.e., they are in the initial
pattern X), and they are highly self connected (wii  0), so they will remain in their initial state
in pattern A(P;X) regardless of the content of P . However, this is not true of experience or social
attributes. We will once again focus on these attributes in the analysis in this section.
Diversication over social attributes will often be desirable even for universally positive char-
acteristics like the one considered in section 1.6.1. This stems from that fact that even though all
people might prefer the high-Y product to the basic product, the amount any given consumer would
be willing to pay for the high-Y good varies. This may allow rms to engage in price discrimination,
i.e., they can oer both a cheap, basic good and a more expensive, high-Y good. Consumers who
place more value on the characteristic Y will purchase the more expensive good, but the rm will
still be able to sell the basic product to consumers who value Y less. The benets of diversify-
ing over characteristics such as the quality of a good have been well studied both empirically and
theoretically (3; 51; 69). But, as we saw in previous section, achieving diversication over social
characteristics is non-trivial. We saw that a monopoly with only one brand had to choose between
selling a good with social attribute Y or without Y . Even though monopolistic price discrimination
might be desirable, the rm cannot practice discrimination without introducing a search attribute
to dierentiate between the two products.
The key purpose of advertising in this case is to create product dierentiation: the two products
oered by the rm must not be substitutes to the consumers. If this does not occur, the new product
will, at best, cannibalize consumers from the original rather than actually expanding the market.
Sub-branding is a common method used to create this sort of product dierentiation. However,
this is not the only way to expand the rm's market. Greg Stine, a marketing expert who criticizes
sub-branding as a strategy, said \The smarter, long-term plan however, is to apply the same branding
techniques used to create your successful brand and create a new, completely distinct new entity.
Many very successful companies do this very eectively and we don't notice (we just buy their stu)."
(70) The major Japanese car manufacturers used this strategy to enter the luxury car market: Lexus
for Toyota, Acura for Honda, and Innity for Nissan. In this section we compare these two methods
with regard to the costs of dierentiation.
We compare these methods under two dierent network structures: one where there are only four
nodes, corresponding to the parent brand F1, the new brand Fs, the product type Z, and the social
characteristic Y ; and one where there are ve nodes, the aforementioned four and a fth, shared
social or experience attribute R.
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For the remainder of the section we assume that the rms have a constant returns to scale
production function. This means that the cost of producing some quantity x of the good is a
constant multiple of x: c(x) = c  x. Therefore, for any price p > c0 = c, rms strictly prefer more
demand and thus product diversication will always be desirable. This reduces the rm's problem
to minimizing the costs of dierentiation.
1.6.2.1 Product dierentiation without a shared social or experience attribute
Consider the network in Figure 1.14 with nodes (F1; Fs; Z; Y ). The sub-branding strategy gives us
advertisements
A1 = (1; 0; 1; 0)
As = (1; 1; 1; 1):
Let N1 and Ns be the number of ads A1 and As purchased respectively. This gives us the weight
matrix
W =
0
BBBBBB@
wFF
Ns
N1+Ns
1 Ns
N1+Ns
Ns
N1+Ns
wFsFs
Ns
N1+Ns
Ns
N1+Ns
1 Ns
N1+Ns
wZZ
Ns
N1+Ns
Ns
N1+Ns
Ns
N1+Ns
Ns
N1+Ns
0
1
CCCCCCA
The requirements for product diversication in this network are also shown in Figure 1.14. The
input to the Y node must be below threshold when the network is in state (1; 0; 1; 0) and only the
parent brand is salient, but above threshold when the network is in state (1; 1; 1; 0) and the sub-
brand is salient and present. In addition, the sub-brand should not be too associated with the target
brand. Specically, it is important that the node representing the sub-brand is not activated by the
parent brand. Mathematically this means
2Ns
N1 +Ns
< Y <
3Ns
N1 +Ns
2Ns
N1 +Ns
< F s
We assume for this example that F s > 2 so the second condition is not binding.
30 We also assume
that Y < 2 so that the creating a new brand is a feasible strategy.
31 First, notice that the rst
condition requires N1 > 0, so unlike the oligopoly example described in section 1.6.1, there is an
incentive to actually advertise the low-Y product. Advertising the low-Y product purposefully
30However, activation of the sub-brand is a possible issue for companies. You do not want to create a sub-brand
that is so popular that it overshadows, and possibly steals market share, from the parent brand.
31For 2  Y < 3, N1 = 0 and Ns = 1. Creating a new brand is not feasible since the input to Y from Z and F
s
is at most 2.
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Figure 1.14: Weights and target dynamics for the sub-branding strategy. F 1 is the node representing the
parent brand while F s represents the sub-brand. The rm wishes to diversify over attribute Y , which means
that A(P; (1; 0; 1; 0)) = (1; 0; 1; 0), so the parent brand alone does not activate Y as shown in the top row,
and A(P; (1; 1; 1; 0)) = (1; 1; 1; 1), so the presence of the sub-brand will activate Y as shown in the bottom
row.
dilutes the parent brand's connection to Y . We can rewrite these inequalities as upper and lower
bounds on the ratio for N1 to Ns:
2  Y
Y
<
N1
Ns
<
3  Y
Y
When Y > 1:5, making the social attribute dicult to activate, the upper-bound is the limiting
factor, so N1 = 1 and Ns =
l
Y
3 Y
m
. This simply means that when Y is hard, the diculty in
advertising is actually establishing the high-Y version of the product and Ns  N1. Since in this
case we can only consider Y < 2, this means that for all Y > 1:5, N1 = 1 and Ns = 2.
Using similar logic, when Y < 1, the lower bound is the limiting factor and we generally get
Ns = 1 and N1 =
l
2 Y
Y
m
: The intuition behind this is that when Y is easy to activate, the diculty
for the rm is actually establishing the low-Y version of the product, so most advertising is aimed
at diluting the connection between the parent brand and Y .
On the other hand, if we create a new brand we do not have to work as hard to dierentiate the
basic product from the new one. Specically, the rm will not have to purposefully dilute any brand
associations. The network for the new-brand strategy is shown in Figure 1.15 with the connection
weights labeled.
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Figure 1.15: Weights and target dynamics for creating a new brand. Once again F 1 represents the parent
brand, however F s is now a completely new brand, meaning that the rm will not reference the parent brand
F
1 in advertisements for F s. The top row shows the desired network dynamics for the low-Y product and
the bottom row shows the desired network dynamics for the high-Y product.
Our new condition for product dierentiation is that the connection weights are such that the
input to Y from Z alone will not activate Y (since there will be no connection between F and Y ),
but the input from F s and Z to Y together will activate it. Mathematically, this comes to
Ns
Ns +N1
< Y <
2Ns
Ns +N1
:
Or, rewritten:
1  Y
Y
<
N1
Ns
<
2  Y
Y
First, notice that for all Y > 1, the advertising levels are N1 = 0, Ns = 1 since the input from
Z alone can never activate Y . However, when Y < 1 the rm must still advertise for both products
in order to dilute the connection between Z and Y , wZY . The advantage of this strategy is that the
lower bound for N1
Ns
is less strict than for the sub-branding strategy.
The total advertising levels required for product dierentiation under both strategies are graphed
in Figure 1.16. As you can see, inducing product dierentiation by creating a new brand is always
cheaper than using a sub-brand under these conditions.
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Figure 1.16: Required number of ads for the sub-branding strategy (green) and the new-brand strategy
(blue) when there is no shared non-search attribute.
1.6.2.2 Product dierentiation with one shared social or experience attribute
The justication frequently used by rms in order to sub-brand rather than create a new brand
is that association with the parent brand somehow increases its probability of purchase. This is
usually couched in terms of loyalty and reputation, but both of these terms really refer to the fact
that the parent brand is associated with a specic characteristic that the rm wishes to transfer to
the new product. At the same time, a sub-brand is created so that the rm can diversify over some
other characteristic. To better understand this strategy, we will look at the dynamics of a 5-node
network with characteristics (F 1; F s; Z;R; Y ): The rm wishes to diversify over Y while keeping an
association with R. Using a sub-branding strategy they will broadcast two dierent advertisements
A1 = (1; 0; 1; 1; 0)
As = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1)
The search characteristics for the two products will be X1 = (1; 0; 1; 0; 0) and Xs = (1; 1; 1; 0; 0).
Notice that these two patterns are extremely similar, so for many dierent weight matrices they will
be in the same basin of attraction for the network. This means that dierentiating the products will
be dicult.
Let N1 and Ns be the number of the parent and sub-brand advertisements purchased by the
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rm. The resulting network is shown in Figure 1.17.
Figure 1.17: Weights and target dynamics for the sub-branding strategy with a shared social attribute. The
top row shows the desired network dynamics for the low-Y product and the bottom row shows the desired
network dynamics for the high-Y product.
We assume that Fs > 4 so we still do not have to worry about X
1 activating Fs. The necessary
and sucient condition for product dierentiation over Y is that
3Ns
N1 +Ns
< Y <
4Ns
N1 +Ns
;
which just means that the connection weight between F s and Y , wF sY is just enough to take the
input to Y over the activation threshold Y . The necessary and sucient condition for both products
to be associated with R is
2 > R:
We assume that R < 2 so that the second condition is met immediately. We also assume that
Y < 3 so that dierentiation is possible using either a sub-branding strategy or by creating a new
brand.
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What is the minimal level of advertising necessary to achieve product dierentiation? We can
re-write the inequalities above as
3  Y
Y
<
N1
Ns
<
4  Y
Y
Notice that since Y < 3 the lower bound is greater than 0 so N1; Ns must both be greater than 1.
Using the conditions on N1
Ns
we nd that the advertising levels are generally as summarized in Table
1.4.32
Activation Threshold Ads for low-Y product Ads for high-Y product
 2 (1:5; 2) N1 = 1 Ns = 1
 < 1:5 N1 =

3 

+ 

Ns = 1
 2 (2; 3) N1 = 1 Ns =
l

4 
+ 
m
.
Table 1.5: Required advertising levels to induce product dierentiation using a sub-branding strategy
Now consider the alternative strategy, creating a new brand. The advertisements will now be
A1 = (1; 0; 1; 1; 0)
As = (0; 1; 1; 1; 1):
The network generated by these advertisements and the target network dynamics are shown in Figure
1.18. The new requirements for dierentiation over Y while maintaining both brands' association
with R are:
2Ns
N1 +Ns
< Y <
3Ns
N1 +Ns
2Ns +N1
N1 +Ns
> R
2N1 +Ns
N1 +Ns
> R:
The rst thing to notice is that for R  1:5, this strategy is not feasible since the capacity for
high-R brands will be 1. On the other hand, for R < 1 the latter two conditions will never bind
and we only need to worry about dierentiation over Y , given by the rst condition.
32There are a few exceptions where the prescribed advertising levels summarized here fall exactly on a boundary or
both conditions bind N1 and Ns away from 1.
69
Figure 1.18: Target dynamics for the new brand strategy with one shared social or experience attribute.
Once again, the top row shows desired dynamics for the parent brand while the bottom row shows desired
dynamics for the new brand.
We can once again rewrite the condition for dierentiation over Y as bounds on the ratio N1
Ns
2  Y
Y
<
N1
Ns
<
3  Y
Y
Figure 1.19 graphs the relative advertising levels required for both strategies with R < 1 and
Y 2 (0; 3). As you can see, developing a new brand is cheaper for all Y 62 (1:5; 2). This shows
that when the shared attribute R is relatively easy to activate, starting a new brand is still generally
cheaper than using a sub-brand.
For R 2 [1; 1:5) the conditions for association with R actually bind, so the conditions for
dierentiation while retaining association with R are stricter:
N1
Ns
2

2  Y
Y
;
3  Y
Y
\R   1
2  r
;
2  R
R   1

:
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Figure 1.19: Advertising levels for the new and sub-brand strategy when there is a shared attribute R and
R < 1
In this case creating a new brand may not always even be a feasible strategy. For example,
when 2R   2 > Y or 6  R < Y this intersection is empty. Even when the intersection exists,
the sub-branding strategy is always cheaper over these values. By creating a new brand the rm
is essentially competing with itself over the market for high-R products. In these cases using a
sub-branding strategy is justied, but notice that this will only be true when the desirable shared
characteristics is dicult to activate. The surface in Figure 1.20 shows the advertising costs for the
new brand strategy as we vary both R and Y . Required advertising levels are increasing in both
activation thresholds. The sections of the Y  R plane not covered by the surface are regions
where creating a new brand is not a feasible strategy.
These calculations show that under these conditions it is almost always cheaper in terms of
advertising costs to create a new brand than to use a sub-brand to diversify over a social attribute.
The major exception is when the rm wishes to associate both products with some non-search
attribute while diversifying over another. Even under these circumstances, it is generally only
cheaper to sub-brand if the shared attribute is \hard" in the sense of having a high threshold
R > 1.
It is important to note that if the shared attribute is a search attribute, there is no reason for
the rm to advertise this attribute with either brand, so the situation would be the same as in the
rst case we examined.
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Figure 1.20: Advertising levels for the new brand strategy over R 2 (1; 1:5) and Y 2 (0; 3). The z-axis
shows the number of ads required while the portion of the x y-plane not covered by the surface are regions
where product dierentiation using a new brand is not possible.
1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Limits
There are several open questions that we haven't discussed yet in this paper. The most important of
these is attention. We restrict the initial vector X i for a product to be the salient search attributes
of the product, but the salience of any characteristic will be inuenced by a host of environmental
factors, as well as endogenously guided by the consumer. In our example markets we avoid these
question by keeping the number of attributes low, but in practice any given attribute will have a
host of search attributes.
In addition to determining which attributes are salient, there are cases where the degree of
salience is relevant. For example, we showed that creating a new brand is often a better strategy
than sub-branding to create product dierentiation since it doesn't require the parent brand to
dilute its connection with the dierentiated attribute. However, Milberg, Park and McCarthy show
experimentally that sub-branding is actually more benecial than a direct extension where the rm
does not create a new brand label at all. (54) This might be because creating a new label actually
distracts from the parent brand name, attenuating the dilution eects of the extension. While the
parent brand name is still salient, it is somehow less salient.
The study by Brown and Carpenter is another example of how directors of attention can eect
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choice. Trivial attributes in their study provided a meaningless dierentiation of a product (either
the products without the trivial attribute when most products had it, or the product with the trivial
attribute when most did not) that none the less, directed attention at the dierentiated product and
increased the probability that it would be chosen. (13)
Another major issue is encoding. A consumer might encode an advertisement in any number
of ways depending on how his attention is directed and what his existing associations are. Just as
advertisements allow brands to compress information via associations, advertisements use symbols
that compress information. For example, the ever present beer commercial with women in bikinis
is not meant to associate beer with bikinis, but with the implied social characteristics of sexual
attractiveness. Similarly, celebrity endorsements are meant to associate a brand with the positive
social characteristics of the celebrity. The celebrity serves to represent a large number of attributes
eciently. While as noted above, the model in this paper is ill-suited to deal with the issues of
attention, it can actually be applied to information compression within advertisements.
In general, the model described in this paper is best suited to deal with social as opposed to
experience attributes. Since experience attributes are actually objective traits, we are able to assess
them using various methods of inference as well as via association. Though the Gilovich study
shows that experience attributes are still susceptible to the eects of association, associations are
almost certainly not the only determining factor for our beliefs about these attributes. This will
be especially true when subjects are specically motivated to report their beliefs about product
benets as opposed to simply choosing. Problems framed in this manner are more likely to engage
higher cognitive functions (\System II" in the language of Kahneman (34)). A study by Meyvis and
Janiszewki suggests that when subjects are asked to report beliefs about specic product benets
they actually use a form of hypothesis testing such that irrelevant information in the form of trivial
attributes actually lowers their beliefs. (53)
1.7.2 Parameter Estimation
The major contribution of this model is it proposes a concrete mechanism whereby the experiences of
the consumer, specically advertisements, aect his perceptions of products. However, the structure
of the model raises several important questions, especially when it comes to the application of the
model. How can we determine what the nodes of these networks should really be? Even once we do,
the activation thresholds and self-connections constitute a large number of free parameters. I propose
that while it is dicult to approach these problems from a purely theoretical standpoint, existing
data sets and data analysis techniques will be able to constrain both the size of these networks and
their free parameters.
In section 1.4 we address at least part of the problem by constraining the self-connection strengths
based on the characteristic type. By assuming that social attributes have no self-connection we
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immediately remove a large number of free parameters, and we signicantly limit the self-connections
for search and experience attributes as well. However, in order to make this framework applicable
to specic problems we need a concrete way to estimate the activation thresholds for characteristics.
The most direct way to measure activation thresholds would be to measure how much priming
is necessary to induce a subject's free recall of the attribute. Subjects could be primed with varying
numbers of moderately related concepts and asked to engage in a free recall task. The activation
threshold for the attribute will be proportional to the number of concepts necessary to invoke recall.
In order to avoid input \building" up, this sort of experiment would either have to be done between
subjects using a very homogeneous population, or with signicant breaks between free recall tasks.
Either way, the estimated activation threshold would be specic to consumers from similar cultural
and personal backgrounds.
Another, more indirect but perhaps easier, way to estimate the activation thresholds of dierent
characteristics is to assume that they are inversely proportional to how common they are. How
often do we actually see anything with a given characteristics? Characteristics like \nice" that we
see frequently would have relatively low activation thresholds, while characteristics like \luxury"
that we see relatively rarely would have high activation thresholds.33
In fact, studies have shown that the lexical frequency of a word, or a particular meaning of a
word, modulates the ease with which it is accessed (73). While these studies examine lexical rather
than semantic frequency,34 they suggest that we may be able to use semantic frequency as a proxy
for how easily the concept is accessed, which will be inversely proportional to its activation threshold.
It is also unclear how large these networks should be. How do we determine what the nodes of
the network should be? Ideally the network should be large enough to reasonably describe the space
of possible goods while remaining as small as possible to increase tractability. One way to approach
this problem is to consider existing techniques for language processing. Latent semantic analysis is
a specic technique using large bodies of text to index key concepts and analyze the relationships
among them. A major contribution of this approach is that it species a means to eectively reduce
the dimension of the semantic space considered. This dimension-reduction reduces the problems
introduced both by synonyms (multiple words describing the same semantic concept), and polysemy
(one word may refer to several dierent concepts). These methods might be used in the future to
isolate the core characteristics relevant to either a particular type of good or even a large set of
goods, limiting the size of the semantic network used to model the perceptions of these goods (47).
The nal set of parameters that must be estimated are the connection strengths themselves.
One psychological tool for estimating connection strengths is the implicit association test (26). In
33The cultural aspect of some of these characteristics, like luxury, will actually restrict the frequency with which
we see them. To some degree, rarity is a necessary component of luxury.
34Lexical frequency refers to the frequency with which we see a specic word, whereas semantic frequency refers to
the frequency with which we deal with a particular concept
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this paradigm, subjects are asked to classify one of two groups of stimuli, for example pictures of
light and dark skinned people or positive or negative words, and to respond with either a right- or
left-hand button press. When associated stimuli share a response, for example light skinned people
and positive emotional words both require a right hand button press, response times are faster than
when dissociated stimuli share a response. The dierence in response times is used to measure the
degree of association, or dissociation between concepts. When this dierence is large, the concepts
| in the example, light skin and positive emotions | are strongly connected, corresponding to a
high value for the connection weight. When there is little or no dierence the connection strength
will be close to zero. While these tests are best known for their use as tools to measure subjects'
implicit racial, ethnic, or gender bias, the basic paradigm could easily be used to measure the degree
of association between any two concepts for a given subject, or population of subjects.
1.7.3 Testable Implications
At the consumer level the model implies that advertising will increase the strength of association
between a brand and some social characteristics of a product. This in turn should make the consumer
attribute the social characteristics to the brand's products.
The IAT can be used to measure the eect of advertising on connection strengths. After a
burst of advertising and a delay, response times for and IAT session where a brand is paired with
an advertised social attribute should decrease. The magnitude of the decrease should be inversely
related to both the familiarity of the brand and the age of the subject since the marginal eect of
advertising depends on the change in the relative frequency of brand advertisements.
In addition, we can test the prediction that higher association strengths as measured by the
IAT will increase the likelihood that consumers will actually attribute a characteristics to a branded
product by measuring association strengths between a brand and a social characteristic, and then
after a substantial delay (on the order of days or weeks), either ask them to engage in a free recall
task listing the characteristics of a product from the target brand or directly elicit their beliefs about
the advertised characteristic. In the free recall condition, subjects with higher association strengths
should be more likely to list the target attribute. And in the belief elicitation condition, there should
be a positive correlation between association strength as measured by the IAT and beliefs about the
target attribute.
There are also testable implications at the rm level. First, we should observe that advertising
levels for \social products," i.e., products valued largely for their social implications such as clothing,
should be signicantly higher than those that Nelson would classify as \search goods."
Recall that in an oligopoly, when the activation threshold for a social attribute is low, the
connection between the product category and the social attribute may be sucient to activate the
social attribute. On the other hand, for high threshold characteristics, input from brand identiers
75
are necessary to activate the characteristic. This means that for \hard" social attributes, e.g. high
social status, advertising will be purely predatory, i.e., advertising levels should have little to no
eect on aggregate demand for the product category. This means that advertisements for luxury
cars denoting status should not aect the aggregate demand for sedans (i.e., luxury will not rub
o onto competitors). On the other hand, for low threshold attributes, e.g. \environmentally
friendly," will spillover to all similar products. So advertisements claiming that say Honda sedans
are better for the environment should have global eects on the demand for sedans. This latter
claim is supported by Seldon et. al's (67) result that advertisements for specic cigarette brands
do have positive eects on total demand for cigarettes since these advertisements essentially state
that \(brand name)'s cigarettes are cool," and cool appears to be a relatively low-threshold social
characteristic.
Since advertising for high-threshold attributes is purely predatory, advertising levels for goods
with these attributes will be increasing in the number of competing rms. We should only observe
\advertising wars" for goods with high-threshold social attributes.
The model implications relating to product dierentiation within a rm are somewhat harder to
test empirically since so many rms fail to eectively dierentiate their products. Failed product
dierentiation within the rm should lead to constant overall market share for the rm. For example,
if Coke fails to dierentiate its extension Diet Coke Plus from the original Diet Coke, demand for
the two products should be the same as previous demand for Diet Coke alone. The model predicts
that product dierentiation over higher threshold attributes actually requires fewer advertisements,
so we should observe that successful dierentiation occurs more often over high-threshold attributes.
1.7.4 Extensions
1.7.4.1 Experiences and The Multi-period Model
Extending the current model to multiple periods importantly involves the expansion of the set P
to include a variety of other types of experiences. I take the view that, with respect to associative
memories, advertisements and experiences only dier in the relative strength of their impact. In
this respect, the model is similar to Shapiro's since advertisements and experiences are essentially
pooled. However, in my model this pooling is not the result of a cognitive mistake, but a simple
function of how associations are generated in the mind.
This raises the question, how strongly should non-advertising experiences be weighted in com-
parison to advertisements? It is clear that a consumption experience should heavily outweigh any
single advertisement. But is it reasonable to think that advertising is able to attenuate the eects of
a bad consumption experience? In addition to direct consumption experiences, consumers may also
observe others consuming a product or hear about another person's consumption experience. How
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should these indirect consumption experiences be weighted in relation to both direct experiences
and advertisements?
The simplest way to reect the relative strength of one experience as opposed to another is to
literally count it multiple times. For example, we can assert that the pattern c, of attributes expe-
rienced by the consumer during consumption counts as if the consumer had seen m advertisements
with pattern c. So if a consumer with an initial experience set P consumes a product which he
encodes as having a pattern of attributes p, the new experience set is
P 0 = P ] fc; : : : ; cg
| {z }
m
We can similarly vary the weight of other experiences by manipulating the multiplicity, m, with
which they enter the experience set.
Given these new weights we can specify the model in the following way:
1. At the beginning of every period, consumers start with some initial experience set P t   1.
2. Consumers then go through a consumption and exposure stage where they consume the goods
purchased in period t   1 and view a set of advertisements. These consumption experiences
and advertisements are added to the experience set yielding P t.
3. Consumers are given a set of products to choose from with salient search characteristics X i.
They assign perceived characteristics to each product V i = A(P t; X i) independently as in the
one period model.
4. Given the perceived characteristics of each good, consumers choose the consumption bundle x
for the next period that maximizes expected future utility.35
One interesting thing to notice is that the experience set P t is increasing in t. This means that the
marginal eect of advertisements seen in period t on the network connections in period t is decreasing
in t. Since advertisements only aect consumption decisions through these network connection, the
decreasing marginal eect of advertising on connection strengths imply that advertisements seen
at time t have a greater eect on period-t consumption than ads seen at time t + 1 do on period
t + 1-consumption. Heuristically this means that advertisements will aect younger consumers'
consumption decisions more than older consumers' and agrees with the fact that advertisers tend to
target younger audiences.
Once we include consumption experiences into P , we must ask: how are social characteristics
experienced during consumption? Consumers will get objective feedback on the experience attributes
35It will be easier to initially assume that all goods are perishable and consumers are completely myopic and so
only maximize utility for the current period. This would allow us to consider the implications of evolving perceptions
without also dealing with issues of dynamic programming.
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of a product during consumption which will either reinforce or dilute a brand's connection to these
attributes. However, there will be no such objective feedback for social characteristics. One way to
deal with this question is to assume that if a social characteristic is activated during the evaluation
of the product it will also be activated during its consumption.
Finally, the multi-period model raises another interesting question. Are consumers aware of the
eects of advertisements? It has been suggested that if consumers are aware that certain stimuli
will change their eective utility function, it may be in their best interest to avoid these stimuli.
(45; 9) Given the opportunity, should consumers avoid or seek out certain advertisements, and if
they should, will they? Considering the problem from this angle potentially has implications for
the regulation of advertisements that are dicult to avoid, e.g., beer ads during the Super Bowl, or
billboards on a highway.
1.7.4.2 Identity and Social Networks
In this paper, I have focused on attributes that are generally seen as positive by everyone. However,
many social attributes are valued dierently by dierent consumers. Some of this has to do with
a consumer's ideal perception of himself, or his perception of himself as a member of some social
grouping, as in Akerlof and Kranton's model of identity (2). Sub-group identications can themselves
be viewed as social attributes associated with and dened by sets of other attributes. Consumers
identifying with these groups will have a high utility coecient for the attribute representing the
social grouping. So, for example, someone identifying themselves as \conservative" will tend to
consume products that are associated with conservatism. Some of these may have a rational basis,
like an American made car. But others simply gain from their association with conservatives and
conservative causes. Country music is a good example of a product that often has no political
content, but is still overwhelmingly consumed by conservatives. The political preferences of country
listeners is illustrated by the fan reactions to the Dixie Chicks in the example from section 1.2.
When the group made prominent liberal statements that were then covered repeatedly by the press,
consumers developed a negative association between their music and conservatism, making them far
less popular with the country music fan base.
Social networks, an emerging eld in economics that borrows from sociology, (25; 19; 32; 31; 43),
are a possible framework for understanding how certain product attributes become associated with
particular social groups. Consumers who are closely connected in a social network are likely to have
similar experience sets, and therefore, similar internal associative networks. Since these networks
are formed endogenously, we could hypothesize that consumers with similar preferences (basically
similar attribute utilities) will seek each other out | leading to the social groupings that individuals
eventually identify with. Since experiences such as observing a friend consuming a product will
aect a consumer's implicit associations, these network might explain trends where the conspicuous
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consumption decisions of a few members of some closely connected group of individual \spread" to
the rest.
1.7.4.3 Complements
While the network structure outlined in this paper allows for complementarities between characteris-
tics, our chosen utility function does not lead to complementarities between products. However, one
could imagine cases where the attributes of dierent products might interact with a consumer's as-
sociations in the same way they would for a single product. For instance, separate pieces of clothing
can interact to generate an image consistent with any number of dierent social groups.
The major hurdle for understanding complementarities between products in this framework is
to understand which products are actually likely to be consumed simultaneously. This becomes
particularly problematic when dealing with durable goods like clothing since they will be valued
dierently depending on the consumption context. When making a purchasing decision, consumers
must consider the benets from the good in every likely consumption context to assess its actual
utility.
1.7.4.4 Determining the Consideration Set
This paper demonstrates some of the applications of the model to how advertising can eect the
evaluation of a product, but advertising also serves the simple purpose of making a product a salient
choice to the consumer. In the above example we assume that both rms' products are always
salient and that assumption actually leads to very low overall levels of advertising because of the
incentive to free-ride. Adding brand-recall as a requirement for purchase places an upward pressure
on the advertising level.
In marketing the set of products actually consciously evaluated by the consumer is called the
\consideration set". The overall choice set for a consumer is almost always larger than the consider-
ation set. This set is generally going to be a function of the choice situation. In the simplest example
if a consumer is in a particular store, the salient products will be those that they can actually see.
For precisely this reason, shelf-space that is at eye-level is at a premium in stores.
We can use the same network used to evaluate products to determine the salient choice set for
a consumer. We model the context eects as a \stimulus" to the consumer, which is simply a state
of the network V 2 S. We say that a brand F i is recalled if it is active in A(P; V ).
Denition 1.7.1 A brand F i is recalled in response to a stimulus V if AF i(P; V ) = 1.
For a product to be successful it needs to actually be in the consumer's choice set as often as
possible. One way to do that would be to ensure decent shelf placement in all the relevant stores;
this is precisely the strategy chosen by store-brand generics. However, there are many product types,
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such as clothing, prepared food, or cars, where brand recall must occur before the consumer even
reaches the store. For these sorts of products it is important that a stimulus of the product class
itself cue the recall of the brand.
In the network model advertisements not only strengthen the connection between a brand name
and positive characteristics, but the connection between the brand and the type of product itself.
This in turn increases the probability that the brand will be recalled when they consider a product
type. For some brands, like Kleenex, Xerox, and Coca-Cola, this has happened to such a degree
that the brand-names are practically synonymous with the product type.
1.7.4.5 Order eects of choice
In this model the initial information X network is exogenous and, and the evaluation of a choice is
independent of the order of evaluation. However in many situations products are evaluated in rapid
succession so that the evaluation of one actually inuences the evaluation of the next.
In order to consider these sorts of eects we need to introduce the concept of external input to
a node. Instead of setting the state of the network to X , we can think of a vector of external inputs
IE . This way we can consider the eects of these inputs IE to some non-trivial state of the network,
such as A(X1; P ), the perceived characteristics of a previously evaluated good.
One possible eect of this would be the \persistence" of certain characteristics. This would be
a particularly important eect for the experience attributes of products. Recall that unlike social
attributes, we allow experience attributes to have some degree of self-connection (wii > 0). This
means that in cases where the search characteristics of a product would not be sucient to activate
some experience attribute Y themselves, they may be sucient to sustain this activation if Y had
already been activated by the previous option. This eect is similar to the free-riding observed in
section 1.6.1, except instead of free-riding o of another rm's advertising, the product can free-ride
directly o of another product's evaluation.
This inertial eect would be another mechanism that generic products could take advantage of.
As mentioned in section 1.5.3, store-brand generics often use similar packaging to their brand-name
counterparts, but they are also almost always placed in close proximity to these counterparts to
emphasize their similarities to each other.
1.7.4.6 Controlling the updating path
As noted in section 1.3, A(P;X) is not necessarily a deterministic function. For initial vectors that
are on the edge between attractor basins, the order in which characteristics are updated will aect
the nally perceived characteristics. In general it is convenient to think of this updating sequence
as random, however, there are cases where this sequence may be aected by external stimuli. This
is most apparent in situations where the information X is given to the decision-maker in some xed
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sequence. For example, when an employer is reading the resumes of potential employees, they scan
information in a specic exogenously determined order.
To model this, it is once again useful to think of the information as an external input to a par-
ticular node. When a consumer receives information about a particular characteristic, the network
updates the node corresponding to that characteristic | adding the external input IE
i
to the en-
dogenously generated input Ii
36 to generate a total input I t
i
. The node is then updated according
to this aggregate input.
One way to think about this is that each new piece of information is \checked" against what is
already known, as represented by the state of the network V . This means that information received
earlier will have precedence over new information. After all the information has been received,
the network will be in some state V that will converge independently as described in section 1.3.
However, since each new bit of information is checked against the previous pieces, V should not have
too many pieces of contradictory information, i.e., the network energy should be low and V is more
likely to be inside a basin of attraction.
This extension will be particularly relevant to discussing issues of stereotyping: for example,
the order in which the characteristics of a job applicant are presented may change the degree to
which implicit racial, ethnic, or gender biases will aect evaluations. For example, consider the
job applicant scenario. Bertrand and Mullainathan showed in a eld experiment that resumes with
stereotypically black names were less likely to get interviews than identical resumes with stereotyp-
ically white names (10). This disparity occurs despite any institutional pressures that may exist
to increase racial diversity at rms, suggesting that this is the result of implicit racial bias rather
the explicit discriminatory intent. This extension of the neural network model implies that placing
racial information at the end of a resume as opposed to the beginning might attenuate this bias.
1.7.5 Welfare Implications
In this model advertisements can be thought of as creating utility in some real way. We see this
reected in higher consumer demand for goods associated with a positive social attribute in section
1.6.1. This could be seen as a positive externality to advertising. However, there has been a great
deal of criticism of advertising for creating need, so much so that it is taken as given that advertising
has the capacity to create desire for what some would call trivial or unimportant goods.
Economists and philosophers have debated this question for some time. The most common
criticisms of capitalist societies stem from the assumption that the market, and society itself, creates
desire for what critics think of as meaningless commodities. Many of these criticisms have come from
various Marxist philosophers, but the value of increasing levels of consumption have been questioned
36Recall from section 1.3, the input vector I =W (P )  V , where W (P ) is the weight matrix of the network, and V
is the current state of the network.
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by economists as well.
Few economists in recent years can have escaped some uneasiness over the kinds of goods
which their value system is insisting they must maximize. They have wondered about the
urgency of numerous products of great frivolity. They have been uneasy about the lengths
to which it has been necessary to go with advertising and salesmanship to synthesize the
desire for such goods. 37 That uneasiness has reected the crucial weakness of the
literature on this point. (John Kenneth Galbraith The Auent Society, p. 116) (23)
Thus far, our exploration of the neural-network model has displayed how advertising can increase
demand for a product by associating it with a positive social attribute. But it is not obvious that
ads might have negative repercussions. An implicit assumption of those who criticize the advertising
industry is that while ads create need, they also somehow have the intertemporal eect of decreasing
the utility of a consumer's pre-advertising consumption bundle, i.e., advertising creates the constant
need to \keep up with the Jones's" on a massive scale.
An interesting property of these networks is that if a pattern V is stable, so is its opposite,  V ,
so that these advertisements may create negative externalities as well. If the salient presence of
some set of search attributes creates utility from a social attribute Y , such as status, their salient
absence can create negative utility. So if, for example, a particular brand, or a type of product, is
positively associated with some characteristic Y , its salient absence will create negative input to Y ;
therefore advertising has the potential for creating negative as well as positive utility.
These sorts of negative externalities are desirable to rms since they increase the marginal util-
ity of their product: not only do you gain utility from a social attribute, but you get rid of the
negative utility generated by its salient absence. However, these negative externalities are distinctly
undesirable to the rm's competitors and potentially to consumers. Products associated with Y will
generally be more expensive than those without, making them outside the price range of some set
of the population. However, if advertisement makes the lack of Y salient, the utility of the low-Y
products will actually decrease relative to their pre-advertising evaluations.
1.7.6 Conclusion
I have laid out an expansion of the hedonic pricing model where advertisements create complemen-
tarities among the search attributes of a good | in essence changing the attributes of the product
as seen by the consumer. This change allows us to model advertising's eect on the marginal utility
of a product while maintaining a stable underlying utility function like the complementary model
proposed by Becker and Murphy.
37Once again, we see a reference to advertisers manipulating the demand and perceptions from decades ago.
However, despite this early concern, there have been very few models that attempt to address the mechanisms of
advertising.
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Advertisements operate by modulating the associations among attributes, allowing the tangible
features of a product to imply abstract cultural attributes such as a piece of clothing being fashion-
able. Attributing such social characteristics to a product will often change a consumer's utility for
a product.
I use a network model, based on standard models from cognitive psychology and neuroscience,
to model how advertisements actually change the associations among attributes and how these
associations interact to aect the consumer's perception of the product.
Unlike Becker and Murphy's model, the complementarities we consider are between attributes,
such as a brand name and a social attribute, instead of between the products themselves. This allows
us to consider not only the eects of an advertisement on a consumer's evaluation of the advertised
product, but also how the changes in attribute complementarities may aect other products (the
externalities generated by an advertisement). We roughly divide these externalities into two classes,
spillovers and dilution. The interconnected nature of the network model means that the externalities
are almost impossible to avoid. If I rm wants to diversify its product over a social or experience
attribute, it is often forced to dilute the useful associations it built up in the past. On the other
hand, when a rm advertises it creates positive associations that may benet its competitors.
This framework is about fast, automated processing (System I in the language of Kahneman
(34)). The implicit associations among attributes that develop over a host of experiences will aect
the way we process the information we receive about a good. Since this is a System I model, it is
most appropriately applied to low-involvement situations or those where inference is either dicult
or impossible. This is why I have focused mostly on what I call social attributes. Since these are in
essence culturally agreed upon and impossible to assess objectively.
Even though this is a System I model, the associations among nodes contain information. They
keep a record of the correlations between attributes, which could be particularly useful when con-
sidering experience characteristics in a multi-period version of the model. So while I have talked
about these networks in relation to the complementary view of advertising, it has some relation to
informative models as well.
As with any model, there is an inherent tension between descriptive power and parsimony. This
model lacks the parsimony of Nelson's informative model of advertising where the only important
feature of advertising is its cost, or Shapiro's model where consumers misremember advertisements
as consumption experiences. But, it allows us to use a single framework to describe a host of phe-
nomena relating to advertising including product dierentiation, product blurring, the importance
of frequency and the role of trademarks. While there are a large number of free parameters in this
model, I have proposed a number of methods to estimate these parameters using data and existing
psychological methods.
Since I have used a set of tools new to the economic literature I have only looked at networks
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with very few product characteristics. However, even with this limited set of attributes, we see a
number of interesting phenomena related to the general categories of dilution and spillover. I hope
that these examples serve as a proof of principle that formal associative networks can be usefully
applied to economic problems.
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Appendix A
A.1 Convergence of networks to stable states
The classical Hopeld network is a binary network where each node has a single threshold i, rather
than two thresholds, as in this model. For these types of networks there is a simple quadratic energy
function
E(V ) =  
1
2
X
i;j
wijViVj +
X
i
xii
that is strictly decreasing under asynchronous updating.
These models assume that each node is salient to each pattern and that the network always has
\complete information," i.e., each node is at either 1 or  1. To apply these associative networks to
economics it was important to introduce the neutral 0 state for unknown or non-salient nodes. This
does several things, including introducing the zero state as a permanent and strong attractor of the
network. For the purposes of showing convergence, the new model introduces an extra threshold
which the energy function must now deal with. We dene a new energy function where the threshold
itself depends on the state of the network:
E(V ) =  
X
i
wiiVi(t) 
1
2
X
i6=j
wijVi(t)Vj(t) +
X
i
Vi(t)Vi(t)i
This essentially states that the relevant threshold for the energy function depends on the state of
the node. If Vi =  1, the relevant threshold is  i since passing this threshold will change the state
of the node. Conversely, if Vi = 1 the relevant threshold is i. When the state of the node is at 0
both thresholds are relevant, but if the state of the node were to change the only important fact is
the sign of the input, so calculating the energy with a 0 threshold is sucient.
Now we show that this energy is in fact decreasing under the transition function. If the node
remains unchanged, the energy is stable, so we will only consider cases where the updated node
changes.
Since we are updating nodes one at a time we can isolate the portion of the energy function
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pertaining to the ith node. We use the fact that W is symmetric to simplify the expression:
E =    Vi
0
@wiiVi +
X
j 6=i
wijVj   Vii
1
A =    Vi(Ii   Vii)
where Ii is the input to the ith node.
 Case 1: Vi(t) 6= 1, Vi(t + 1) =  Vi(t). In this case the bit actually ips. Without loss of
generality, let Vi(t) = 1. Since the bit ips we know that Ii(t) <  i. So  Vi(t)(Ii(t)  
iVi(t)) > 0. After the bit ips Ii(t + 1)   Ii(t) =  wii   wii < 0 so Ii(t + 1) <  i as well.
That means that  Vi(t+ 1)(Ii(t+ 1) + i) < 0 and E < 0 as desired.
 Case 2: Vi(t) 6= 0, Vi(t + 1) = 0. Once again assume without loss of generality that Vi(t) = 1.
Vi(t+1) = 0 so Ii(t) < i and  Vi(t)(Ii(t) iVi(t)) > 0. After the transition  Vi(t+1)(Ii(t+
1)   Vi(t + 1)i) = 0 so E < 0 again.
 Case 3: Vi(t) = 0, Vi(t + 1) 6= 0.
Vi(t)(Ii(t)   Vi(t)i) = 0:
Vi(t+ 1) 6= 0 so jIi(t)j > i and sign(Vi(t+ 1)) = sign(Ii(t)),
Ii(t + 1) = Ii(t) + wiisign(Ii(t)) ) jIi(t+ 1)j > i:
Taken together we get
 Vi(t + 1)(Ii(t + 1)   Vi(t + 1)i) < 0 ) E < 0
.
This shows that if Vi 6= T
i
i (Vi) E < 0. Since the state space is nite this ensures that the energy
of the network must reach a minimum, and that this minimum must be a stable state.
A.2 Conditions on advertising and entry in oligopoly | from
section 1.6.1
A.2.1 Conditions on price
Claim A.2.1 If the monopoly prot functions for the high-Y and low-Y goods, hm(q) and 
l
m(q)
are quasi-concave, advertising will only be possible in a pure strategy equilibria if the monopoly price
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for the high-Y demand curve, qhm is greater than q
 where q = inffqjq   c0

Dl(q)
n

> 0g.
Proof:
Mathematically condition (1) implies that
ho (q)  
h
m(q)
Basically, the increased cost of producing for the entire market must exceed the extra revenue from
sales. Otherwise, a rm would prot by slightly undercutting its competitors.
Weibull establishes that such prices will generally exist if the monopolistic prot function hm, is
quasi-concave (74),1 and achieves its maximum at some nite qhm > 0. He further shows that this
can only occur at q  qhm, establishing an upper bound on the equilibrium price, q < q
h
m.
We can derive the lower bound from condition (2), which is equivalent to:
ho (q) 
8<
:
lm(q
) + cA
lo(q) + cA
;
where q = min(q; qlm), and q
l
m is the monopoly price for the low-Y good. The rst part of this
condition states that the advertising rm has no incentive to deviate by dropping its advertisement
and monopolizing the market, while the second states that it has no incentive to deviate by dropping
its advertisement and sharing the market at price q.
Since costs are convex this second part of the second condition gives us a lower bound on q. To
see this, rst rearrange and note that cA > 0 to get:
q

Dh(q)
n
 
Dl(q)
n

> c

Dh(q)
n

  c

Dl(q)
n

:
Since c is convex and Dl(q)  Dh(q) for all q we can put a lower bound on the right side of this
inequality:
c

Dh(q)
n

  c

Dl(q)
n

> c0

Dl(q)
n

Dh(q)
n
 
Dl(q)
n

)
q > c0

Dl(q)
n

)
q   c0

Dl(q)
n

> 0
Taking the derivative of the function q   c0

Dl(q)
n

we see that it is strictly increasing, so we get a
lower bound on possible equilibrium prices q > inffxjx   c0

Dl(x)
n

> 0g = q.Q.E.D.
1A function is quasi-concave if all its upper contour sets (sets of the form fx : f(x) > g) are convex. This includes
any single-peaked or monotonic function.
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Claim A.2.2 For demand and cost functions of the form:
h < l
Dh(q) = 1  hq
Dl(q) = 1  lq
c(x) = c  x2
For any equilibrium where advertising occurs the range of prices q bounded:
c+
q
c2 + cAn
2(n+c(h+l))
l h
n+ c(h + l)
 q 
c(n+ 1)
ch(n+ 1) + n
Proof:
The rst condition is ho (q)  
h
m(q
0) This means that
ho (q)  
h
m(q)  0 )
(1  hq)
n  1
n

c  (1  hq)
n+ 1
n
  p

 0
ho (q)   
h
m(q) = 0 at q
 = 1
h
and q =
c(n+1)
ch(n+1)+n
. Notice that ho (q)   
h
m(q) is convex in q, so
this function will be weakly positive everywhere outside the interval (q; q
). Demand is 0 at prices
q > q, so we throw out prices above this interval and we know that any equilibrium price q, is less
than q:
q 
c(n+ 1)
ch(n+ 1) + n
:
Second, we need ho (q)  
l
o(q) + cA. So,
ho (q)  
l
o(q)  cA )
q2
n
(l   h) 
c
n2
[(1  hq)
2
  (1  lq)
2]  cA )
q(l   h)
n2
(n+ c(h + l)q   2c)  cA
Notice that ho (q) 
l
o(q) is convex in q, and decreasing at q = 0. This means that the upper solution
to ho (q)  
l
o(q)  cA = 0 forms the lower bound for q. Using the quadratic formula we get
q 
c+
q
c2 + cAn
2(n+c(h+l))
l h
n+ c(h + l)
:
Q.E.D.
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Claim A.2.3 In any equilibrium with non-empty low- and high-Y markets, the advertising level for
rms in the high-Y market must fall within a specied range:
hm(q
h
m(ql); ql) 
qh
k
Dh + c
 
Dh
k

cA
l
1 k( 1)
 1
m  N  2  
1  k(   1)
:
First, recall that the advertising level must be minimal. This just comes down to asking if a rm
can drop an advertisement and still be associated with Y . For this to be true we need N 1
kN 1 <  1
and k < 1
 1 . These inequalities reduce to
N(1  k(   1)) < 2   ) N <
2  
1  k(   1)
;
giving us an upper bound on the number of advertisements that is increasing in k.
On the other hand, if a rm unilaterally raises the advertising level they will either push out all
of the other advertising rms or none. The later case is clearly not optimal for the rm since the
extra advertising has no eect on revenue, but will increase costs. So we only need consider the rst
case where the rm raises the advertising level enough to monopolize the high-Y market. For N 0 to
be large enough ensure a monopoly over high-Y goods N 0 N > 1 ( 1)k
 1 N: This inequality implies
that the closer m is to the capacity 1
 1 of the high-Y market, the easier it is to push out the other
rms. Set N 0 at the smallest such integer. To ensure that monopolizing the high-Y market won't
be protable we must have:
hm(q
h
m(pl); pl) 

1  (   1)k
   1
N

cA  Dh
ph
k
  c

Dh
k

;
giving us a lower bound on the advertising level N .
Taken together with the condition above we can constrain the range of possible advertising levels
N :
hm(q
h
m(pl); pl) 
ph
k
Dh + c
 
Dh
k

cA
l
1 k( 1)
 1
m  N  2  
1  k(   1)
as desired. Q.E.D.
A.2.2 Conditions on k
First we calculate the costs of entry into the high-Y market. The rm can either simply purchase
enough ads to enter the high-Y market and split the high-Y market with the other rms, or it can
purchase enough ads to actually monopolize the high-Y market, pushing all competing rms out.
The lowest N 0 to simply enter the high-Y market is
l
k( 1)
2  N
m
. The lowest N 0 needed to gain a
monopoly over the high-Y market is
l
1 ( 1)k
 1 N
m
.
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So the cost ce(k;N) of entry to the high-Y market is
ce(k;N) =

k(   1)
2  
N

cA
and the cost cm(k;N) of gaining a monopoly over the high-Y market is
cm(k;N) =

1  (   1)k
   1
N

cA
The benets of entry and monopoly are
be(k; ph; pl) =
ph
k + 1
Dh  
pl
n   k
Dl + c

Dl
n   k

  c

Dh
k + 1

bm(k; pl) = p
h
m(pl)Dh(q
h
m(pl); pl) 
pl
n   k
Dl + c

Dl
n   k

So the no-entry condition reduces to
be(k; ph; pl)  ce(k;N)
bm(k; pl)  cm(k;N)
Notice that when k > 1
 1   1, i.e., when it is already at capacity, the entry option is irrelevant. A
rm must either choose to monopolize the high-Y market or stay in the low-Y market. Recall that
we know from the condition above that N  2 1 k( 1) , so we can get necessary conditions on k that
don't involve the advertising level N , specically

k(   1)
1  k(   1)

cA > be(k; pl; ph)

2  
   1

cA > bm(k; pl)
Chapter 2
Self-referential thinking and
equilibrium as states of mind in
games: fMRI evidence
with Colin F. Camerer
2.1 Introduction
Game theory has become a basic paradigm in economics and is spreading rapidly in political science,
biology, and anthropology. Because games occur at many levels of detail (from genes to nations),
game theory has some promise for unifying biological and social sciences [27].
The essence of game theory is the possibility of strategic thinking: Players in a game can form
beliefs about what other players are likely to do, based on the information players have about the
prospective moves and payos of others (which constitute the structure of the game). Strategic
thinking is central to game theory, but is also important in market-level phenomena like signaling,
commodity and asset market information aggregation, and macroeconomic models of policy setting.
Despite the rapid spread of game theory as an analytical tool at many social levels, very little
is known about how the human brain operates when thinking strategically in games. This paper
investigates some neural aspects of strategic thinking using fMRI imaging. Our eventual goal is to
build up a behavioral game theory that predicts how players choose and the neural processes that
occur as they play. The data can also aid neuro-scientic investigations of how people reason about
other people and in complex strategic tasks.
In our experiments, subjects' brain activity is imaged while they play eight 2-player matrix games
which are \dominance-solvable"1 { that is, iterated deletion of dominated strategies (explained
further below) leads to a unique equilibrium in which players' beliefs about what other players will
1In a dominance-solvable games, if players do not play dominated strategies, and guess that others will not,
iteratively, then the result is an equilibrium conguration of strategy choices by players, and beliefs about what others
will do, which are mutually consistent.
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do are accurate and players best respond to their beliefs. (In equilibrium, nobody is surprised about
what others actually do, or what others believe, because strategies and beliefs are synchronized,
presumably due to introspection, communication or learning.)
The subjects perform three tasks in random orders: They make choices of strategies (task C);
they guess what another player will choose (\beliefs", task B); and they guess what other players
think they will choose (\2nd-order beliefs", task 2B). Every player being scanned plays for money
with another subject who is outside of the scanner.
In a game-theoretic equilibrium, beliefs are correct, and choices are optimal given beliefs. One
way for the brain to reach equilibrium is for neural activity in the C, B, and 2B tasks to be similar,
since at equilibrium all three tasks \contain" the others, i.e. choice is a best response to belief, so
the choice task invokes a belief formation. Any dierence in activation across the three conditions
is suggestive that dierent processes are being used to form choices and beliefs. In fact, as we show
below, in experimental trials in which choices and beliefs are in equilibrium, there is little dierence
in activity in making a choice and expressing a belief; so this provides a purely neural denition
of equilibrium (as a "state of mind"). Dierences in activity across the three tasks might help
us understand why players are out of equilibrium, so these dierences are the foci of most of our
analyses.
The rst focus is the dierence between making a choice and expressing a belief (i.e., the compar-
ison between behavior and fMRI activation in the C and B conditions). If choices are best-responses
to beliefs, then the thinking processes underlying choice and belief formation should highly overlap;
choice and belief are like opposite sides of the same coin. (Put dierently, if you were going to build
brain circuitry to make choices and form beliefs, and wanted to economize on parts, then the two
circuits would use many shared components.)
In contrast, disequilibrium behavioral theories that assume limited strategic thinking allow play-
ers to choose without forming a belief, per se, so that C and B activity can dier more signicantly.
For example, Camerer, Ho and Chong [9, 8] present a theory of limited strategic thinking in a cog-
nitive hierarchy (building on earlier approaches [45, 54, 17, 35, 4]). In their theory some \0-step"
players just choose randomly, or use some algorithm which is thoughtful but generates random choice
{ in any case, they will spend more energy on choice than belief. \One-step" thinkers act as if they
are playing 0-step players, so they compute a choice but do not think deeply while forming a belief
(e.g., they do not need to look at the other player's payos at all since they do not use these to
rene their guess about what others will do). Two-step players think they are playing a mixture of
0- and 1-step players; they work harder at forming a belief, look at other players' payos, and use
their belief to pick an optimal choice. Models of this sort are precise (more statistically precise than
equilibrium theories) and t most experimental data sets from the rst period of a game (before
learning occurs) better than Nash equilibrium does [9]. These limited-thinking theories allow larger
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dierences in cognitive activity between the acts of choosing a strategy and expressing a belief about
another players' strategy than equilibrium theories do. A 1-step player, for example, will look at all
of her own payos and calculate the highest average payo when making a choice, but when guessing
what strategy another player with choose she can just guess randomly. Such a player will do more
thinking when choosing than when stating a belief. This possible dierence in processing motivates
our analysis of dierential brain activity during the C and B tasks.2
The second focus of the analysis is on the dierence in activity while forming beliefs in the B
task and 2nd-order beliefs in the 2B task. One way agents might form 2nd-order beliefs is to use
general circuitry for forming beliefs, but apply that circuitry as if they were the other player (put
themselves in the \other player's brain"). Another method is self-referential: Think about what they
would like to choose, and ask themselves if the other player will guess their choice or not. These
two possibilities suggest, respectively, that the B and 2B conditions will activate similar regions, or
that the C and 2B regions will activate similar regions.
Besides contributing to behavioral game theory [6], imaging the brain while subjects are playing
games can also contribute to basic social neuroscience [1]. Cognitive social neuroscientists are inter-
ested in spectrum disorders3 like autism, in which people lack a normal understanding of what other
people want and think. The phrase \theory of mind" (ToM) describes neural circuitry that enables
people to make guesses about what other people think and desire (sometimes called \mind-reading"
or \mentalizing" [51, 25, 52]).
Using game theory to inform designs and generate sharp predictions can also provide neuro-
scientists interested in ToM and related topics with some new tools which make clear behavioral
predictions and link tasks to a long history of careful theory about how rational thinking relates to
behavior.
In this spirit, our study extends ToM tasks to include simple matrix games. While there has
been extensive research into rst order beliefs: the simple consideration of another person's beliefs,
there has been very little investigation of 2nd-order beliefs, especially when they are self-referential
i.e., what goes on in a person's brain when they are trying to guess what another person thinks they
will do?
2An ideal test would compare activity of subjects who are capable of performing dierent thinking steps across
games of dierent complexity. For example, a low-step thinker should show similar activity in simple and complex
games (because they lack the skill to think deeply about complex games). A high-step thinker would stop at a low-level
choice in a simple game (where k and higher steps of thinking prescribe the same choice) but would do more thinking
in complex games. Unfortunately, we have not found a solid psychometric basis to \type-cast" players reliably into
steps of thinking; when we can do so, the comparison above will provide a useful test.
3A \spectrum" disorder is one which spans a wide range of decits (inabilities) and symptoms { it has relatively
continuous gradation. This suggests a wide range of neural circuits or developmental slowdowns contribute to the
disorder, rather than a single cognitive function.
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Figure 2.1: A three-step game used in the experiment, as presented in the scanner (game 3). C is
dominated. Deleting C makes AA dominated. Deleting AA and C makes A dominant. The unique
Nash equilibrium is therefore (A,BB). Only 31% and 61% (respectively) chose these strategies (see
Appendix). The Camerer-Ho CH model (see text) with  = 1:5 predicts 7% and 55%.
2.1.1 Why study choices, beliefs and 2nd order beliefs?
Figure 2.1 shows the exact display of a matrix game (our game 3) that row players saw in the
scanner, in the 2B task where they are asked what the column player thinks they will do.4 The row
and column players' payos are separated onto the left and right halves of the screen (in contrast to
the usual presentation).5 Row payos are in a submatrix on the left; column player payos are in a
submatrix on the right (which was, of course, explained to subjects).
The Figure 2.1 game can be solved (that is, a Nash equilibrium can be computed) by three steps
of iterated deletion of dominated strategies.6 The row players strategy C is dominated by strategy
B (i.e., regardless of what the column player does, B gives a higher payo than C); if the row player
prefers earning more she will never choose C. If the column player guesses that row will never play
4The placeholder letter x is placed in cells and rows which are inactive in an eort to create similar amounts of
visual activity across trials, since matrices had dierent numbers of entries.
5The split-matrix format was innovated by Costa-Gomes et al (2001), who used it to separate eye movements when
players look at their own payos or the payos of others, in order to judge what decision rules players were using (see
also Camerer et al, 1994 [10]). The matrices are more complex than many fMRI stimuli but we chose to use ane
transformations of the CGCB matrices to permit precise comparability of our choice data to theirs. Our current study
did not track eye movements but it would be simple to use this paradigm to link eye movement to fMRI activity, or
to other temporally-ne measures of neural activity.
6A strictly dominated strategy is one that has a lower payo than another strategy, for every possible move by
ones opponent; A weakly dominated strategy has weakly lower payos than another strategy against all strategies
and strictly lower payos against at least one of the opponents strategies. A dominant strategy is one that gives the
highest possible payo against all of the opponents strategies.
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C (the dominated strategy is \deleted", in game theory language { i.e., the column player thinks C
will never be played by an earnings-maximizing row player), then strategy BB becomes a dominant
strategy for the column player. If the row player guesses that the column player guesses she (the row
player) will never play C, and the row player infers that the column player will respond with BB,
then strategy A becomes dominant for the row player. Of course, this is a long chain of reasoning
which presumes many steps of mutual rationality.
Putting aside the fMRI evidence in our study, simply comparing choices, beliefs and iterated
beliefs as we do could be interesting in game theory for a couple of reasons. A common intuition is
that higher-order beliefs do not matter. But Weinstein and Yildiz show that in games which are not
dominance-solvable, outcomes depend sensitively on higher-order beliefs (if they are not restricted
through a common knowledge assumption a la Harsanyi) [55]. Empirically, their theorems imply
that knowing more about higher-order beliefs is necessary to guess what will happen in a game.
Goeree and Holt's theory of noisy introspection assumes that higher-order beliefs are character-
ized by higher levels of randomness or uncertainty. Increased uncertainty might appear as lower
levels of overall brain activity (or higher, if they are thinking harder) for 2nd-order beliefs com-
pared to beliefs and choices. Furthermore, increased uncertainty should be manifested by poorer
behavioral accuracy for higher-order beliefs [30].
Second-order beliefs also play a central role in games involving deception. By denition, a
successful deception requires a would-be deceiver to know she will make one choice A, but also
believe the other player thinks she will make a dierent choice, B. The capacity for deception
therefore requires a player to hold \false 2nd-order beliefs" in mind { that is, to plan choices which
are dierent from what (you think) others think you will do.7
Finally, second-order beliefs also play an important role in models of social preferences, when a
player's utility depends directly on whether they have lived up to the expectations of others [47].
Dufwenberg and Gneezy studied trust games in which players could pass up a sure amount x and
hope that a second player gave them a larger amount y from a larger sum available to divide [19].
They found that the amount the second player actually gave was modestly correlated (.44) with the
amount the second player thought the rst player expected (i.e., the second player's 2nd-order belief).
The second player apparently felt some obligation to give enough to match player 1's expectations.8
These kinds of emotions require 2nd-order beliefs as input.
Trying to discern what another person believes about you is also important in games with
7Whether or not a person can understand false beliefs is a key component of theory of mind and is also a test
used to diagnose autism. In a classic \Sally-Anne" task, a subject is told that Sally places a marble in her basket
and leaves the room. Anne then moves the marble from the basket to a box and also leaves the room. Sally re-enters
the room. The subject is then asked where Sally will look for her marble. Since the child believes that the marble is
in the box, she must be able to properly represent Sally's dierent belief { a false belief { to answer correctly, that
Sally will look in the basket. Most children switch from guessing that Sally will look for the marble in the box (a
self-referentially-grounded mistake) to guessing that she will be looking in the basket at around 4 years old. Autistic
children make this switch later or not at all. See Gallagher and Frith for more detail [25].
8However, about a third of the player 2's gave less than they thought other expected.
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asymmetric information, when players have private information that they know others know they
have, and in games where a \social image" might be important, when people care what others think
about them (in dictator and public goods games, among others).
2.1.2 Neuroeconomics, and what it is good for
This study is a contribution to \neuroeconomics", a rapidly-emerging synthesis which ground details
of basic economic processes in facts about neural circuitry [11, 12, 56, 28].
Neuroeconomics is an extension of behavioral economics, which uses evidence of limits on ratio-
nality, willpower and self-interest to reform economic theory; neural imaging is just a new type of
evidence. Neuroeconomics is also a new part of experimental economics, because it extends experi-
mental methods which emphasize paying subjects according to performance, and tying predictions to
theory, to include studies with animals, lesion patients (and \temporary lesions" created by TMS),
single-neuron recording, EEG and MEG, psychophysiological recording of heart rate, skin conduc-
tance, pupil dilation, tracking eye movements, and PET and fMRI imaging [43]. Neuroeconomics is
also part of cognitive neuroscience, since these studies extend the scope of what neuroscientists un-
derstand to include \higher-order cognition" and complex tasks involving social cognition, exchange,
strategic thinking, and market trading that have been the focus of microeconomics for a long time.
One reaction to the idea of neuroeconomics is that economic models do not need to include
neural detail to make good predictions, because they are agnostically silent about whether their
basic assumptions are actually satised, or simply lead to outcomes \as if" the assumptions were
true.9 As a result, one can take a conservative or radical view of how empirical studies like ours
should interact with conventional game theory.
The conservative view is that neural data are just a new type of evidence. Theories should get
extra credit if they are consistent with these data, but should not be penalized if they are silent
about neural underpinnings.
The radical view is that all theories, eventually, will commit to precisely how the brain (or some
institutional aggregation, as in a rm or nation-state's actions) carries out the computations that
are necessary to make the theory work. Theories that make accurate behavioral predictions and also
account for neural detail should be privileged over others which are neurally implausible.
Our view leans toward the radical. It cannot be bad to have theories which predict choices from
observable structural parameters and which also specify precise details of how the brain creates
those choices. (If we could snap our ngers and have such theories for free, we would.) So the
9The \as if" mantra in economics is familiar to cognitive scientists in the form of David Marr's inuential idea that
theories can work at three levels { \computational" (what an economist might call functional or as-if); \algorithmic" or
\representational" (what steps perform the computation); and \implementation" or hardware (see Glimcher, 2003 for
a particularly clear discussion [29]). Ironically, Marr's three-level idea licensed cognitive scientists to model behavior at
the highest level. We invoke it to encourage economists who operate exclusively at the highest level, to commit game
theory to an algorithmic view, to use evidence of brain activity to make guesses about algorithms and to therefore
discipline ideas about highest-level computation.
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only debatable question is whether the cognitive and neural data available now are good enough to
enable us to begin to use neural feasibility as a central way to judge the plausibility of as-if theories
of choice.
We think this is a reasonable time to begin using neural activation to judge plausibility of theories
because there are many theories of choice in decision theory and game theory, and relatively few data
to sharply separate those theories. Virtually all theories appeal vaguely to plausibility, intuition, or
anecdotal evidence, but these are not scientic standards. Without more empirical constraint, it is
hard to see how progress can be made when there are many theories. Neural data certainly provide
more empirical constraint.
Furthermore, in many domains current theories do not make good behavioral predictions. For
example, equilibrium game theories clearly explain many kinds of experimental data poorly [6].
Studying cognitive detail, including brain imaging, will inevitably be useful for developing new
concepts to make better predictions.10
An argument for the imminent value of neural data comes by historical analogy to recent studies
which track eye movements when subjects play games [10, 17, 15, 40, 39]. When payos are placed
on a computer screen, dierent algorithms for making choices can be tested as joint restrictions on
the choices implied by those algorithms, and whether players look at the payo numbers they need
to execute an algorithm.
Eye tracking has been used in three published studies to separate theories which make similar
behavioral predictions. Camerer et al [10] and Johnson et al. studied three-period bargaining games
in which empirical oers are somewhere between an equal split and the sub-game perfect self-interest
equilibrium (which requires subjects to \look ahead" to future payos if bargaining breaks down
in early periods; see Camerer, 2003, chapter 4 [6]) [40]. They found that in 10-20% of the games
subjects literally did not glance at the possible payo in a future period, so their oers could not
be generated by sub-game perfect equilibrium. Johnson and Camerer found that the failure to
look backward, at the possible payos of other players in previous nodes of a game, helped explain
deviations from \forward induction" [39], CGCB found that two dierent decision rules, with very
similar behavioral predictions about chosen strategies, appeared to be used about equally often,
when only choices were used to infer what rules were used. But when lookup information was used,
one rule was inferred to be much more likely. If CGCB had only used choices to infer rules, they
would have drawn the wrong conclusion about what rules people were using.
Those are three examples of how inferences from choices alone do not separate theories nearly
as well as inferences from both choices and cognitive data. Perhaps neural activity can have similar
10Furthermore, neuroeconomics will get done whether economists endorse it or not, by smart neuroscientists who
ambitiously explore higher-order cognition carefully but without the benet of decades of training about how delicate
theoretical nuances might matter and which can guide design. Engaging with the energetic neuroscientists is therefore
worthwhile for both sides.
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Figure 2.2: Neuroeconomics design: Designs relate stimuli (top) to latent variables or algorithms
(right) which generate interpretable activation (left). Experimental economics studies link stimuli
(top) and variables (right). Many neuroscience studies just report links between stimuli (top) and
activation (left). The neuroeconomics challenge is to make all 3 t.
power as attentional measures, as evidence accumulates and begins to make sense.
The hard part is creating designs that link neural measures to underlying latent variables. Our
work is guided by the \design triangle" illustrated in Figure 2.2. The triangle shows experimental
stimuli (on the top of the triangle) which produce measured output { brain activation, skin conduc-
tance, eye movements, and so on (lower left) { which can, ideally, be interpreted as expressions of
underlying variables or algorithms which are not directly observable (lower right). For the experi-
ments reported in this paper, the underlying constructs which are illuminated by brain activity are
hypotheses about the decision processes players are using to generate choices and beliefs.
Keep in mind that while brain pictures like those shown below highlight regions of activation, we
are generally interested not just in regions but in neural circuitry { that is, how various regions col-
laborate in making decisions. Understanding circuitry requires a variety of methods. fMRI methods
are visually impressive but place subjects in an unnatural (loud, claustrophobic) environment and
the signals are weak so many trials are needed to average across. Neuroscience benets from many
tools. For example, looking at tissue in primate brains helps establish links between dierent re-
gions (\connectivity"). Other methods include psychophysiological measurement (skin conductance,
pupil dilation, etc.), studies of patients with specialized brain damage, animal studies, and so forth.
Neuroscience is like detective work on dicult cases: There is rarely a single piece of evidence that
is denitive. Instead, the simplest theory that is consistent with the most dierent types of evidence
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is the one that gets provisionally accepted, and subject to further scrutiny. This paper should be
read in this spirit, as extremely tentative evidence which will eventually be combined with many
new studies to provide a clear picture.
2.2 Neural correlates of strategic thinking
2.2.1 Methods
Sixteen subjects were scanned,11 one at a time, in a 3T Siemens Trio scanner at Caltech (Broad
Imaging Center) as they performed C, B and 2B tasks across each of eight games. The games
and order of the three tasks were xed across subjects. Appendices show the games (which are
transformations of games in CGCB), the instructions, and give some methodological details.
In keeping with healthy experimental economics convention, both players were nancially re-
warded for one task and game that was chosen at random after they came out of the scanner. If a
choice task was chosen, then the choices of both players determined their payos ($.30 times exper-
imental points). If a belief or 2nd-order belief task was chosen for payment, a player earned $15 if
her belief B matched the other players choice, or $15 if her 2nd-order belief 2B matched the other
players belief.
Pairs of subjects were recruited on campus at Caltech through SSEL lab recruiting software.12
One subject performed the tasks in the scanner, as the row player, while the other performed them
in an adjacent room, as the column player.
We give only a quick sketch of fMRI technique here. Methods of measurement and analysis are
extremely complex and still evolving. The Appendix has more detail (or see, e.g., Huettel, Song and
McCarthy [38]).
Each subject rst has their brain \structurally scanned" (as in medical applications) to establish
a sharper picture of the details of brain anatomy for six minutes. Then each subject proceeds through
a series of screens (like Figure 2.1) one at a time, at their own pace (response times averaged 8-25
seconds; see the Appendix). They make choices and express beliefs by pressing buttons on a box
they hold in their hand. After each response is recorded, there is a random lag from 6-10 seconds
with a \xation cross" on a blank screen to hold their visual attention in the center of the screen
and allow blood ow to die down. The entire set of tasks took from 7 to 15 minutes.
The scanner records 32-34 \slices" of brain activity every 2 seconds (one TR). Each slice shows
blood ow in thousands of three-dimensional \voxels" which are 3 3 3 millimeters in size. Our
11To experimental social scientists, 16 seems like a small sample. But for most fMRI studies this is usually an
adequate sample to establish a result because adding more subjects does not alter the conclusions much.
12Since Caltech students are selected for remarkable analytical skill, they are hardly a random sample. Instead,
their behavior is likely to overstate the average amount of strategic thinking in a random population. This is useful,
however, in establishing dierential activation of regions for higher-order strategic thinking since the subjects are
likely to be capable of higher-order thinking in games that demand it.
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analysis is \event-related", which means we ask which voxels are unusually active when a particular
stimulus is on the screen. The analysis is a simple linear regression where dummy variables are \on"
when a stimulus is on the screen and \o" otherwise. This \boxcar" regression is convolved with
a particular function that is well-known to track the hemodynamic response of blood ow. The
regression coecients of activity in the BOLD (blood oxygen-dependent level) signal in each voxel
tell us which voxels are unusually active. Data from all subjects are then combined in a random
eects analysis. We report activity which is signicantly dierent from chance at a p-value<.001 (a
typical threshold for these studies), and for clusters of at least 5 adjacent voxels where activity is
signicant (with exceptions noted below).
2.2.2 Behavioral data
Before turning to brain activity, we rst describe some properties of the choices and expressed beliefs.
The Appendix shows the relative frequencies of subject choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed 2nd-
order beliefs, in each game.
Table 2.1 shows the percentages of trials, for games solvable in dierent numbers of steps of
deletion of dominated strategies, in which players made equilibrium choices. The table includes
the choice data from CGCB's original study using these games. First note that the percentages
of subjects making the equilibrium strategy choice in our study is similar for row and column
players, who are respectively, in and out of the scanner. (None of the row-column percentages are
signicantly dierent). However, equilibrium play in our games is less frequent than in CGCB's
experiment, signicantly so in the simplest games.13 Since the frequencies of equilibrium play by
the in-scanner row player and the out-of-the-scanner column player are similar, the lower percentage
of equilibrium play in our experiments is probably due to some factor other than scanning.14
Table 2.2 reports the frequency of trials in which C = br(B) (where br(B) denotes the best
response to belief B), B = br(2B), C = 2B, and in which all three of those conditions are met
simultaneously (our stringent working denition of an equilibrium trial hereafter). Equilibrium trials
are generally rare (23%). Comparing the match of beliefs and choices across categories, a natural
13Of course, eliciting choices, beliefs, and 2nd-order beliefs in consecutive trials might aect the process of choice,
perhaps promoting equilibration. But the close match of our observed C = br(B) rate to the Costa-Gomes and
Weizsacker rate, and the lower rate of equilibrium choices compared to CGCB's subjects (who only made choices)
suggests the opposite [17, 16]. Also keep in mind that our subjects report a single strategy as a belief, and are
rewarded if their guess is exactly right, which induces them to report the mode of their distribution. (For example, if
they think AA has a p chance and BB has a 1 p chance they should say AA if p > :5). Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker
elicited a probability distribution of probability across all possible choices. Their method is more informative but we
did not implement it in the scanner because it requires a more complex response which is dicult and time-consuming
using button presses.
14The dierence between our rate of conformity to equilibrium choice and CGCB's may be due to the fact that
beliefs are elicited, although one would think that procedure would increase depth of reasoning and hence conformity
to equilibrium. We think it is more likely to result from a small number players who appeared to act altruistically,
trying to make choices which maximize the total payo for both players (which often leads to dominance violatione.g.,
cooperation in prisoners dilemma games). Since this kind of altruism is surprisingly dicult to pin down carefully,
we continue to use all the data rather than to try to separate out the altruistically-minded trials.
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Type of Game row player
(in scanner)
column player
(no scanner)
row+column
mean
CGCB
mean
new data - CGCB
z-statistic
2  2, row has
a dominant deci-
sion
0:75 0:61 0:68 0:93  3:21
2  4, row has
a dominant deci-
sion
0:56 0:72 0:65 0:96  3:24
22, column has
a dominant deci-
sion
0:50 0:61 0:56 0:80  2:46
24, column has
a dominant deci-
sion
0:63 0:56 0:59 0:70  0:94
2  3, 2 rounds
of iterated dom-
inance
0:47 0:58 0:53 0:69  1:49
3  2, 3 rounds
of iterated dom-
inance
0:22 0:22 0:22 0:22  0:02
Table 2.1: Proportion of equilibrium play across games and player type
intuition is that as players reason further up the hierarchy from choices, to beliefs, to iterated beliefs,
their beliefs become less certain. Therefore, 2nd-order beliefs should be less consistent with beliefs
than beliefs are with choices, and 2nd-order beliefs and choices should be least consistent [30]. (In
terms of the Table 2.2 statistics, the three rightmost column gures should decline from left to
right.) That intuition is wrong for these data. The fractions of trials in which C = br(B), and
B = br(2B) are about the same. The number of subjects who make optimal choices given their
belief (C = br(B)) is only 66%. This number may seem low, but it is similar to statistics reported
by Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2004) (who also measured beliefs more precisely than we did).
More interestingly { and foreshadowing brain activity we will see later { the frequency with
which choices match 2nd-order beliefs (C = 2B) is actually higher, for all classes of games, than
the frequency with which B = br(2B) (75% versus 63% overall). This is a hint that the process of
generating a self-referential iterated belief might be similar to the process of generating a choice,
rather than simply iterating a process of forming beliefs to guess what another player believes about
oneself.
Given these results, and the success of parametric models of iterated strategic thinking [9], an
obvious analysis is to sort subjects or trials into 0, 1, 2 or more steps of thinking and compare
activity. But the current study was not optimally designed for this analysis, so analyses of this type
are not insightful.15
15Comparing trials sorted into low-steps of thinking (0 or 1) and high steps shows very little dierential activation
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Type of game equilibrium
(all 3 condi-
tions hold)
C =
br(B)
B =
br(2B)
C = 2B
row has domi-
nant decision
0:31 0:66 0:59 0:69
column has
dominant deci-
sion
0:44 0:75 0:75 0:88
2  3, 2 rounds
of iterated dom-
inance
0:13 0:63 0:66 0:69
3  2, 3 rounds
of iterated dom-
inance
0:06 0:59 0:53 0:75
Overall 0:23 0:66 0:63 0:75
Table 2.2: Frequencies of choice and belief matching for the row players
2.2.3 Dierential neural activity in choice (C) and belief (B) tasks
In cognitive and neural terms, 0- and 1-step players do not need to use the same neural circuitry to
make choices and to express beliefs. Thus, any dierence in neural activation in the two conditions
(C and B) is a clue that some players, on some trials, are making choices without forming beliefs of
the sort that require any deep processing about what other players will do, so that belief elicitation is
actually a completely dierent sort of neural activity than choice.16 Therefore, the rst comparison
we focus on is between row players choosing strategies and expressing beliefs about what column
players will do.
Figure 2.3 shows brain \sections" which reveal four signicantly higher activations in the choice
(C) condition compared to the belief (B) condition (i.e., the \C > B subtraction") which have 10 or
more adjacent voxels (k > 10).17 The dierentially active regions are the posterior cingulate cortex
of high relative to low in either choice or belief tasks, and substantial activation of low relative to high in cingulate
and some other regions. The a priori guess is that higher thinking steps produce more cingulate (conict) activation,
so we do not think the sorting into apparent 0- and 1-step trials is accurate enough to permit good inferences at
this stage. A design tailored for this sort of typecasting analysis could be used in future research. There are many
handicaps from the current design for linking inferred thinking steps to brain activity. One problem is that in many
games, choices of higher-step thinkers coincide. Another problem is that it is dicult to weed out altruistic choices,
so they are typically misclassied in terms of steps of thinking which adds noise. A cross-subject analysis (trying to
identify the typical number of thinking steps for each subject) did not work because individual subject classication
is noisy with only eight games (see also [14]). It is also likely that these highly skilled subjects did not vary enough
in their thinking steps to create enough variation in behavior to pick up weak behavior-activation links.
16An important caveat is that dierent tasks, and game complexities, will produce dierent patterns of eye move-
ment. Since we do not have a complete map of brain areas that participate in eye movements for the purpose of
decision (though see [29]), some of what we might see might be part of general circuitry for eye movement, informa-
tion acquisition, etc., rather than for strategic thinking per se. The best way to tackle this is to record eye tracking
simultaneously with fMRI and try to use both types of data to help construct a complete picture.
17A very large fth region not shown in Figure 2.3 is in R occipital cortex (9; 78; 9; k = 202; t = 6:77). When we
use a smaller k-voxel lter, k = 5 (used in Figure 2.3) there are four additional active regions besides the R occipital
and those shown in Figure 2.3 (see Appendix Table B.4) which are not especially interpretable in terms of strategic
thinking.
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(PCC),18 the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the transitional cortex between the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) and the agranular insula (which we call frontal insula, FI),19 and the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The sections each show dierential activity using a color scale to show
statistical signicance. A 3-dimensional coordinate system is used which locates the middle of the
brain at x = y = z = 0. The upper left section (1) is \sagittal", it xes a value of X =  3 (that
is 3 mm to the left of the zero point on the left-right dimension) The upper right section (2) is
\coronal" at Y = +48 (48 mm frontal or \anterior" of the Y=0 point). The lower left section (3) is
\transverse" (or \axial") at Z =  18, 18 mm below the zero line.
Figure 2.4 shows the time courses of raw BOLD signals on the y-axis (in normalized percentage
increases in activity) in the PCC region identied above (left, or superior, in the upper left section
Figure 2.3), for the C (thick line), B (thin line) and 2B (dotted line) tasks. These pictures show
how relative brain activity increases or decreases in a particular area over time, for dierent tasks.
The time courses also show standard error bars from pooling across trials; when the standard bars
from two lines do not overlap, that indicates statistically signicant patterns of activation. The 0
time on the x-axis is when the task stimulus is rst presented (i.e., the game matrix appears). The
x-axis is the number of scanning cycles (TR's). Each TR is 2 seconds, so a number 4 on the x-axis
is 8 seconds of clock time. Perhaps surprisingly, when the stimulus is presented the ACC actually
deactivates during these tasks (the signal falls). Since blood ow takes one or two TR cycles to show
up in imaging (about 3-5 seconds), the important part of the time sequence is in the middle of the
graph, between 3 TR's and 8 TR's (when most of the responses are made, since they typically take
8-10 seconds; see Appendix for details).
The important point is that during the belief task (thick line), PCC deactivation is lower than
in the 2B and B task { hence the dierential activation in C minus B shown in the previous Figure
2.3. Most importantly, note that the 2B task activity lies between the C and B activity. This is
a clue that guessing what someone thinks you will do (2B) is a mixture of a guessing process (B),
and choosing what you will do (C). This basic pattern { 2B is between C and B { also shows up in
time courses of activity for all the other areas highlighted in the brain sections in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.5 shows the location of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, in yellow) and orbitofrontal
18We use the following conventions to report locations and activity: The vector (-3, -9, 33, k = 5, positive in 14 of
16 subjects) means that the voxel with peak activation in the cluster has coordinates x =  3,y =  9, z = 33. The
coordinates x, y, and z respectively measure distance from the left to the right of the brain, from front (\anterior") to
back (\posterior"), and bottom (\inferior") to top (\superior"). The gure k = 5 means the cluster has 5 voxels of 3
cubic millimeters each. The number of subjects with positive regression coecients is an indication of the uniformity
of the activation across subjects. Appendix Table B.4 shows coordinates for all regions mentioned in this paper, and
some regions that are not discussed in the text.
19FI and ACC are the two regions of the brain known to contain spindle cells. Spindle cells are large elongated neu-
rons which are highly \arborized" (like a tree with many branches, they project very widely, and draw in information
and project information to many parts of the brain) that are particular to humans and higher primate kin, especially
bonobos and chimpanzees [2]. It is unlikely that any of these brain areas are solely responsible for our ability to reason
about others. In fact it seems that the pathologies where individual do not have these abilities, namely Autism and
Asperger syndrome, do not involve lesions of any specic areas of the brain, but rather more generalized developmental
problems including a decreased population of spindle cells (Allman, Caltech seminar), decreased connectivity to the
superior temporal sulcus [13], and defects in the circuitry of the amygdala [51].
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Figure 2.3: Areas of signicantly dierential activity in choice minus belief conditions, all trials, at
p < :001 (uncorrected). (1) Top area is posterior cingulate cortex, PCC ( 3; 12; 33; k = 24; t =
5:12; 14 of 16 subjects positive); right area is anterior cingulate cortex/genu ACC (6; 42; 0; k =
33; t = 4:62; 15 of 16 subjects positive). (2) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex DLPFC ( 27; 48; 9; k =
14; t = 4:74; 15 of 16 subjects positive). (3) transition cortex/FI ( 42; 12; 18; k = 31; t = 4:60; 14
of 16 subjects positive).
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Figure 2.4: Time course of activity in posterior cingulate (-3,-12, 33) in choice (C, thick line), belief
(B, thin line) and 2nd-order belief (2B, dotted line) tasks.
cortex (pink). The cingulate cortex is thought to be important in conict resolution and \executive
function" [44]. The ACC and PCC regions that are dierentially active in choosing rather than
forming beliefs have both been implicated in ToM and in other social reasoning processes. The PCC
is dierentially active in moral judgments that involve personal versus impersonal involvement and
many other kinds of processing that involve emotional and cognitive conict [32]. D. Tomlin (per-
sonal communication) has found relative activation in the very most anterior (front) and posterior
(back) cingulate regions that are shown in Figure 2.3 in repeated trust games with a very large sam-
ple (almost 100 pairs of players), after another player's decision is revealed.20 Since their subjects
are playing repeatedly, presentation of what another player actually does provides information on
how he may behave in the next trial, it is possible that this evidence is immediately used to start
making the players next decision.
The fact that all these regions are more active when people are making choices, compared to
expressing beliefs, suggests that a very simple neural equation of forming a belief and choosing is
20Tomlin et al reported a \self-other" map of the cingulate which includes the most anterior and posterior regions
we see in Figure 2.3. They studied brain activation during repeated partner trust games. When the other players
behavior was shown on a screen, the most anterior (front of the brain) region was active, independent of the player
role. When ones own behavior was shown, more middle cingulate regions were activated. The most posterior (back)
regions were activated when either screen was shown. The brain often \maps" external parts of the world (retinotopic
visual mapping) or body (somatosensory cortex). The cingulate map suggests a similar kind of \sociotopic" mapping
in the cingulate.
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Figure 2.5: A brain drawing showing anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, yellow) and orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC, pink). The front of the brain (anterior) is to the left. Reprinted with permission of
Ralph Adolphs.
leaving out some dierences in neural activity that are clues to how the processes may dier.
The FI region we identify is close to an area noted by Gallagher et al. (38, 24,-20) in inferior
frontal cortex [24]. Their study compared people playing a mixed-equilibrium (rock, paper, scissors)
game against human opponents versus computerized opponents. The identication of a region
dierentially activated by playing people, which is nearby to our region is a clue that this inferior
frontal/FI region might be part of some circuitry for making choices in games against other players.
Dierential activation in frontal insula (FI) is notable because this area is activated when people
are deciding how to bet in ambiguous situations relative to risky ones, in the sense of Ellsberg or
Knight [37]. This suggests choice in a game is treated like an ambiguous gamble while expressing a
belief is a risky (all-or-none) gamble. This interpretation is consistent with 0- and 1-step thinking,
in which evaluating strategies and likely payos occurs with a shallow consideration of what other
players will do, which seems more ambiguous than forming a belief.
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2.2.4 Equilibrium as a state of mind: Choice and belief in- and out-of-
equilibrium
The evidence and discussion above suggests that the processes of making a strategic choice and
forming a belief are not opposite sides of a neural coin. Interesting evidence about this neural-
equivalence hypothesis emerges when the trials are separated into those in which all choices and
beliefs are in equilibrium (i.e., C = br(B), B = br(2B) and C = 2B) and those which are out of
equilibrium (one or more of the previous three parenthetical conditions does not hold).
Figure 2.6 shows sections of dierential activity in the C and B tasks during equilibrium trials.
This is \your brain in equilibrium": There is only one area actively dierent (at p<.001) in the
entire brain. This suggests that equilibrium can be interpreted not only as a behavioral condition
in which choices are optimal and beliefs rational, but also can be interpreted neurally as a state
of mind : When choices, beliefs and 2nd-order beliefs all match up accurately, and are mutual best
responses, there is only a minimal dierence in activation between choice and belief, which means
the mechanisms performing those tasks are highly overlapping.21
Figure 2.6 does show one important dierential activation, however, in the ventral striatum, This
region is involved in encoding reward value of stimuli and predicting reward [50]. This area is also
dierentially activated when we compare choice to the 2nd-order belief task, t-statistic > 4 in several
overlapping voxels). This dierence could be due to the dierence in rewards in the choice and
belief tasks. Note that activation in FI is not signicantly dierent between the C and B tasks in
equilibrium (cf. Figure 2.3), which is a clue that perceived ambiguity from choosing is lower when
choices and beliefs are in equilibrium.
Figure 2.7 shows the C minus B dierential activation in trials when choices and beliefs are
out of equilibrium. Here we see some areas of activation similar to those in the overall C minus B
subtraction.22 The novel activity here is in the paracingulate frontal cortex region (Brodmann area
BA 8/9; Figure 2.7, upper left section). This region has appeared in mentalizing tasks in two studies.
One is the Gallagher et al. (2002) study of \rock, paper, scissors"; a paracingulate area just anterior
to the one in Figure 2.7 is dierentially active when subjects played human opponents compared to
computerized algorithms [24].23 McCabe et al. also found signicant dierential activations in the
21The dierence between in- and out-of-equilibrium C > B activity does not simply reect the complexity of the
games which enter the two samples, because separating the trials into easy (solvable by dominance for row or column)
and hard (solvable in 2-3 steps) does not yield a picture parallel to Figures 2.6-2.7. The dierence is also not due
to lower test power (there are fewer in-equilibrium than out-of-equilibrium trials) because the strategic areas active
in Figure 2.7 are not signicantly activated in the in-equilibrium C>B subtraction (paracingulate t=.36; dorsolateral
prefrontal, t=1.34).
22Note that the Figure 2.3 activations, which pool all trials, do not look like a mixture of the Figure 2.6 (in-
equilibrium trials) and Figure 2.7 (out-of-equilibrium trials) activities. However, the areas which are dierentially
active below the p<.001 threshold when all trials are pooled do tend to have activation in the in- and out-of-equilibrium
subsamples, but activation is more weakly signicant in the subsamples and vice versa. In the C > B subtraction
for out-of-equilibrium trials, the PCC is active at p<.01 and the ACC at p<.005. The dorsolateral prefrontal region
(see Figure 2.7) at (-30,30,6,k=14) which is active (p<.001) in the out-of-equilibrium trials is just inferior to the region
active in all trials (-27,48,9,k=14).
23In both conditions the subjects were actually playing against randomly chosen strategies (which is the Nash
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Figure 2.6: This is your brain in equilibrium: Area of signicant dierential activation in C > B for
in-equilibrium trials. The only signicant area at p<.001 (-3,21,-3; k=20, t=5.80) is ventral striatum.
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same area among subjects who were above the median in cooperativeness in a series of trust-like
games, when they played humans versus computers [42].
In our tasks, of course, choosing and expressing belief are both done with another opponent in
mind (in theory). Activation of the paracingulate region in our non-equilibrium C > B subtraction
and in Gallagher et al's and McCabe et al's human-computer dierence suggests that people are
reasoning more thoughtfully about their human opponent when choosing rather than believing.
This pattern is consistent with low-level strategic thinking in which players do not spend much time
thinking about what others will do in forming beliefs, when they are out of equilibrium. In those
cases, assuming your opponent will behave randomly is like treating your human opponent like a
computer randomizer.
The dierence we observe in brain activity in- and out-of-equilibrium is similar to Grether et al's
fMRI study of bidding in the incentive-compatible Vickrey second-price auction. After players were
taught they should bid their values (a dominant strategy), activity in the ACC was diminished [33].
2.2.5 Self-referential iterated strategic thinking: 2nd-order beliefs versus
beliefs
The second comparison we focus on is dierential activity in the brain when row players are asked
what they think the column players think they (the row players) will do{ their 2nd-oder beliefs {
compared to brain activity when they are just asked to state beliefs about what column players will
do.
Figure 2.8 shows dierential activity in the 2B condition, compared to B, in those trials where
players were out of equilibrium.24 The large (k=35 at p=.005) voxel area is the anterior insula (a
smaller subset of these voxels, k=3, are still signicant at p=.001).
The insula is the region in the brain responsible for monitoring body state and is an important
area for emotional processing (see Figure 2.9 for a picture of where the insula is). Parts of the insula
project to frontal cortex, amygdala, cingulate, and ventral striatum. The insula is hyperactive
among epileptics who feel emotional symptoms from seizures (fear, crying, uneasiness [20]), and in
normal subjects when they feel pain, disgust and social anxiety. Sanfey et al. found that the insula
was activated when subjects received low oers during the ultimatum game [49]. Eisenberger et. al.
found the area was activated when subjects were made to feel socially excluded from a computerized
game of catch [21]. Importantly for us, the insula is also active when players have a sense of self-
equilibrium for this game). The occasional practice of deception in economics experiments conducted by neuroscientists
raises a scientic question of whether it might be useful to agree on a no-deception standard in this emerging eld,
as has been the stubborn and useful norm in experimental economics to protect the public good of experimenter
credibility.
24This 2B > B subtraction for the in-equilibrium trials yields no signicant regions at p< .001. As noted earlier,
this shows that being in equilibrium can be interpreted as a state of mind in which forming beliefs and 2nd-order
beliefs are neurally similar activities
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Figure 2.7: This is your brain out-of-equilibrium: Areas of signicant dierential activation in C > B
for out-of-equilibrium trials. Largest area (15,36,33; k=39; t=5.93, 12 of 13 positive ) is paracingulate
cortex (BA 9), visible in all three sections. Posterior area in the sagittal section (left in upper left
section) is occipital cortex (12, -75, -6; k=19, t=4.84). Ventral area in the coronal section (leftmost
activity in the upper right section) is dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (-30,30,6,k=14,t=4.85).
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Figure 2.8: Dierential activity in iterated belief (2B) minus belief (B) conditions, out-of-equilibrium
trials only. Signicance level p<.005 (uncorrected). N=13 because some subjects did not have enough
non-Nash trials to include. Area visible in all three sections is left insula (-42,0,0, k=35, t=4.44, 12
of 13 positive). This area is still active but smaller in cluster size at lower p-values (k=9 at p=.002,
k=3 at p=.001). The other active region in the transverse slice (lower left) is inferior frontal gyrus
(45,33,0; k=13, t=4.85).
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Figure 2.9: A brain drawing showing insula cortex (in purple), as it would appear with the temporal
lobe peeled back at the Sylvian ssure. The front of the brain (anterior) points to the left. Drawing
reprinted with permission of Ralph Adolphs.
causality from driving a cursor around a screen (compared to watch equivalent cursor movement
created by others [22]), or recall autobiographical memories [23]. These studies suggest that insula
activation is part of a sense of \agency" or self-causation, a feeling to which bodily states surely
contribute. Our region overlaps with the area found by Farrer and Frith [22].
The insula activation in creating 2nd-order beliefs supports the hypothesis that 2nd-order belief
formation is not simply an iteration of belief formation applied to imagine how what other players
belief about you. Rather, it is a combination of belief-formation and choice-like processes. We call
this the self-referential strategic thinking hypothesis. The basic facts that C and 2B activations
tend to be very similar, C and 2B choices often match up (Table 2.2), and that activations in the
C and 2B tasks both tend to be dierent from B in similar ways,25 supports this hypothesis too.
2.2.6 Individual dierences: Brain areas that are correlated with strate-
gic IQ
All the analyses above pool across trials and subjects (assuming random eects). Another way to
approach the data is to treat each subject as a unit of analysis, and ask how activation is correlated
with behavioral dierences in skill, across subjects.
To do this we rst calculate a measure of \strategic IQ" for each subject. Remember that subjects
actually had a human opponent in these games. Since subjects did not receive any feedback until
25Dierential C>B activation in the same insula region observed in the 2B > B subtraction is marginally signicant
(t=2.78), and is positive for 10 out of the 13 subjects in the sample.
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they came out of the scanner (and one of each of the C, B, and 2B trials was chosen randomly for
actual payment), it makes sense to judge the expected payos from their choices, and the accuracy of
their beliefs, by comparing each row subject with the population average of all the column players.26
We use this method to calculate the expected earnings for each subject from their choices, and from
accuracy of their beliefs (i.e., how closely did their beliefs about column players' choices match what
the column players actually did?) and similarly for 2nd-order beliefs. Their earnings in each of the
three tasks are then standardized (subtracting the task-specic mean and dividing by the standard
deviation). Adding these three standardized earnings numbers across the C, B, and 2B tasks gives
each subject's strategic IQ relative to other subjects. (The three numbers are only weakly correlated,
about .20, across the three tasks, as is typical in psychometric studies.)
We then regressed activation during the choice task on these strategic IQ's. The idea is to see
which regions have activity that is correlated with strategic IQ.
We expected to nd that players with higher strategic IQ might have, for example, stronger
activation in ToM areas like cingulate cortex or the frontal pole BA 10. However, we found no
correlations with strategic IQ in areas most often linked to ToM. Positive and negative eects of
skill on activation in these areas might be canceling out. That is, players who are skilled at strategic
thinking might be more likely to think carefully about others, which activates mentalizing regions.
However, they may also do so more eortlessly or automatically, which means activity in those
regions could be lower (or their responses more rapid).27
However, choice-task activity in a k=13 voxel cluster in the precuneus and a k=11 voxel cluster
in the caudate (dorsal striatum), are positively correlated with SIQ (p<.001 and p<.05 respectively),
as shown in Figure 2.10. The precuneus neighbors the posterior cingulate (PCC) and is implicated
in \integration of emotion, imagery and memory" [32]. Perhaps high-SIQ players are better at
imagining what others will do, and this imaginative process in our simple matrix games uses all-
purpose circuitry that is generally used in creating empathy or doing emotional forecasting involving
others. The SIQ-caudate correlation shown in Figure 2.10 is naturally interpreted as reecting the
greater certainty of rewards for the high SIQ subjects. This shows a sensible link between actual
success at choosing and guessing in the games (experimental earnings) and the brain's internal sense
of reward in the striatum.
We also nd interesting negative correlations between strategic IQ and brain activity during the
26This is sometimes called a \mean matching" protocol. It smooths out the high variance which results from
matching each in-scanner subject with just one other subject outside the scanner.
27The identication problem here is familiar in labor economics, where there is unobserved skill. If you run a
regression on output (y) against time worked (t) across many workers, for example, it might be negative because
the most skilled workers are so much more productive per unit time that they can produce more total output in a
shorter time than slow workers, who take longer to produce less. Similarly, Chong, Ho, and Camerer [14] recorded
response times of subjects and then inferred the number of steps of thinking the subjects were doing from their choices.
Surprisingly, they found that the number of thinking steps was negatively correlated with response time. This puzzle
can be explained if the higher-step thinkers are much faster at doing each step of thinking. It might also mean, as
noted in footnote 14, that subjects classied as 0-step thinkers are actually doing something cognitively sophisticated
which the model cannot classify as higher-level thinking. (In some games, this even includes Nash equilibrium choices.)
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Figure 2.10: (top) Areas positively correlated with SIQ (p < .05): Precuneus (on left, 3,-66,24,
k=312, t=4.90), ; caudate (dorsal striatum) (12, 0, 15, k=11, t=2.52). (bottom) Cross-subject
correlation between relative caudate activity (y-axis) and relative SIQ (x-axis) (r=.56, p<.025; rank-
order correlation=.60)
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choice task. Figure 2.11 shows the strong negative correlation between SIQ and activity in the
left anterior insula (-39,6,-3, k=25) in the choice task, relative to a baseline of all other tasks, and
also shows the insula region of interest in a sagittal slice.28 Note that the low-SIQ players have an
increase in activation relative to baseline (i.e., the y-axis values for those with negative standardized
SIQ are positive), while the high-SIQ players have a decrease (negative y-axis values). This makes
it a little hard to interpret why SIQ and insula activity are correlated.
As noted above, the region of anterior insula in Figure 2.11 which is correlated with SIQ is also
dierentially active in the 2B task relative to the B task. We interpret this as evidence that subjects
are self-focused when forming self-referential iterated beliefs. The increase in insula activity might
be an indication that too much self-focus in making a choice is a mistake { subjects who are more
self-focused do not think enough about the other player and make poorer choices and less accurate
guesses. An alternative explanation is that subjects who are struggling with the tasks, and earn less,
feel a sense of unease, or even fatigue from thinking hard while lying in the scanner (remember that
the insula is activated by bodily discomfort). The higher insula activation for lower strategic IQ
players may be the body's way of expressing strategic uncertainty to the brain. The fact that there
is deactivation in the choice task for higher SIQ players suggests a dierent explanation for them {
e.g., by concentrating harder on the games they \lose themselves" or forget about body discomfort.
The fact that insula activity is negatively correlated with strategic IQ suggests that self-focus
may be harmful to playing games protably. A natural followup study to explore this phenomenon
is to compare self-referential iterated beliefs of the form \what does subject A think that B think I
(i.e., A) will do" with \what does someone else (C) think B thinks A will do" (a non-self-referential
2nd-order belief task). If self-focus harms the ability to guess accurately what B thinks you (A)
will do, a third party (C) may be more accurate about guessing B's beliefs about As move than
A is. This possibility is related to psychology experiments on \transparency illu[26] and \curse of
knowledge" [5, 41]. In these experiments, subjects nd it hard to imagine that other people do not
know what they the subjects themselves know.
At this point, we don't know empirically if non-self-referential 2nd-order beliefs are more accurate
than self-referential 2nd-order beliefs. The key point is that we would never have thought to ask this
question until the neuroeconomic method suggested a link between insula activity, self-reference, and
low strategic IQ. This is one illustration of the capacity of neural evidence to inspire new hypotheses.
28The y-axis is the regression coecient in normalized signal strength (%) for each subject from a boxcar regression
which has an independent dummy variable of +1 when the choice task stimulus is on the screen{from onset to the
time that the subject made a decision with a button press{and 0 otherwise. The activation is scaled for each subject
separately in percentage terms, so the results do not merely reect dierences in overall activation between subjects.
The rank-order correlation corresponding to the correlation in Figure 2.11 is -.81 (t=5.08) so it is not simply driven
by outliers.
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Figure 2.11: (top) Sagittal slice showing L insula (-42, 6,-3, k=12, t=5.34), p<.0005. (bottom)
Cross-subject correlation between L insula relative activity (y-axis) and relative SIQ (x-axis) (r=
-.82, p<.0001; rank-order correlation= -.81).
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2.3 Discussion and conclusion
Our discussion has two parts. We rst mention some earlier ndings on neuroscientic correlates of
strategic thinking. Then we will summarize our central ndings, and briey conclude about how to
proceed.
2.4 Other neuroscientic evidence on strategic thinking
An irony of neuroeconomics is that neuroscientists often nd the most basic principles of rationality
useful useful in explaining human choice, while neuroeconomists like ourselves hope to use neuro-
science to help us understand limits of rationality in complex decision making (usually by suggesting
how to weaken rationality axioms in biologically-realistic ways).29 As a result the simplest studies of
strategic thinking by neuroscientists focus on nding brain regions that are specially adapted to do
the simplest kind of strategic thinking{reacting dierently to humans compared to nonhuman com-
puterized algorithms. As noted earlier, when subjects played mixed-equilibrium and trust games,
respectively, against humans rather than computerized opponents, Gallagher et al found activation
in inferior frontal areas and paracingulate areas [24], and McCabe et al. found activity in the frontal
pole (BA10), parietal, middle frontal gyrus and thalamic areas [42].
A few other studies have focused on reward and emotional regions in games. Rilling et al. found
striatal activation in response to mutual cooperation in a PD, which they interpret as a rewarding
\warm glow" that sustains cooperation [48]. deQuervain et al nd nucleus accumbens activation
when third-party players sanction players who betrayed the trust of another player, showing a \sweet
taste of revenge" (which is also price-sensitive, revealed by prefrontal cortical activity) [18]. The
Sanfey et al. study on ultimatum games showed dierential insula, ACC, and dorsolateral prefrontal
activation for low oers [49]. Singer et al. found that merely seeing the faces of players who had
cooperated activated reward areas (striatum), as well as the insula [53]. The latter nding suggests
where game-theoretic concepts of a persons \reputation" are encoded in the brain and are linked to
expected reward. Tomlin et al (personal communication) nd that the most anterior and posterior
cingulate regions are active when players are processing what other players have done in a repeated
trust games.
29The same irony occurs in models of risky choice where strategic thinking plays no role. Glimcher (2003) shows
beautifully how simple expected value models claried whether parietal neurons encode attention, intention or{the
winner{ something else (expected reward) [29]. At the same time, decision theorists imagine that neural circuitry
might provide a foundation in human decision making for theories showing how choices violate simple rationality
axioms{viz., that evaluations are reference-dependent, probabilities are weighted nonlinearly, and emotional factors
like attention and optimism play a central role in risky decision making. A way to reconcile these views is to accept
that simple rationality principles guide highly-evolved pan-species systems necessary for survival (reward, food, sex,
violence) but that complex modern choices are made by a pastiche of previously-evolved systems and are unlikely to
have evolved to satisfy rationality axioms only discovered in recent decades. Understanding such modern decisions
forces us to become amateur neuroscientists and learn about the brain, and talk to those who know the most about
it.
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Many of these regions are also active in our study. The insula, active in evaluating low ultimatum
oers and upon presentation of cooperating partners, is also active in creating 2nd-order beliefs in
our study. The cingulate regions in Tomlin et al. are also prominent when players are choosing
strategies, compared to guessing what other players will do.
Special subject pools are particularly informative in game theory, where stylized models assume
players are both self-interested (almost sociopathic) and capable of great foresight and calculation.
Hill and Sally compared autistic children and adults playing ultimatum games. About a quarter of
their autistic adults oered nothing in the ultimatum game, which is consistent with an inability
to imagine why others would regard an oer of zero as unfair and reject it. Oers of those adult
autistics who oer more than zero cluster more strongly around 50% than the autistic childrens'
oers, which are sprinkled throughout the range of oers [36]. The child-adult dierence suggests
that socialization has given the adults a rule or \work around" which tells them how much to oer,
even if they cannot derive an oer from the more natural method of emotionally forecasting what
others are likely to accept and reject. Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe and Smith found that subjects high
on psychometric \Machiavellianism" (\sociopathy lite") were twice as likely to defect in one-shot
PD games than low-Mach subjects [34].
A sharp implication in games with mixed equilibria is that all strategies that are played with
positive probability should have equal expected reward. Platt and Glimcher found neurons in monkey
parietal cortex that have this property [46]. Their parietal neurons, and dorsolateral prefrontal
neurons in monkeys measured by Barraclough, Conroy and Lee [3], appear to track reinforcement
histories of choices, and have parametric properties that are consistent with Camerer and Ho's
dual-process EWA theory [7], which tracks learning in many dierent games with human subjects.30
Still other studies have focused on coarse biological variables rather than detailed brain processes.
In sequential trust games, Zak et al. nd a link between levels of oxytocin{a hormone which rises
during social bonding (such as intimate contact and breast-feeding) and trust [57]. Gonzales and
Loewenstein found that circadian rhythms (whether you're a night or morning person) aected
behavior in repeated trust (centipede) games{players who are \o peak" tended to cooperate less
[31].
30In the Camerer-Ho theory, learning depends on two processes: (1) A process of reinforcement of actual choices,
probably driven by activity in the limbic system (striatum), and (2) a potentially separate process of reinforcing
unchosen strategies according to what they would have paid (which probably involves a frontal process of counterfactual
simulation similar to that involved in regret). A parameter  represents the relative weight on the counterfactual
reinforcement relative to direct reinforcement. Estimates by Barraclough, Conroy and Lee [3] from activity in monkey
prefrontal cortex support the two-process theory. They estimate two reinforcements: When the monkeys choose
and win (reinforcement by ?1), and when they choose and lose (?2). In their two-strategy games, the model is
mathematically equivalent to one in which monkeys are not reinforced for losing, but the unchosen strategy is reinforced
by ?2. The fact that ?2 is usually less than ?1 in magnitude (see also Lee et al., in press) is equivalent to ?<1 in
the Camerer-Ho theory (less reinforcement in the second process from unchosen strategies), which corresponds to
parametric measures from many experimental games with humans [8].
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2.4.1 What we have learned
In this paper, we scanned subjects' brain activity using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs,
and expressed iterated \2nd-order" beliefs. There are three central empirical ndings from our study:
 A natural starting point for translating game theory into hypotheses about neural circuitry is
that most of the processes in making choices and forming beliefs should overlap when players
are in equilibrium. Indeed, in trials where choices and beliefs are in equilibrium, this hypothesis
is true{ the only region of dierential activation between choice and belief tasks is the striatum,
perhaps reecting the higher \internal expected reward" from making a choice compared to
guessing. In general, however, making a choice (rather than making a guess) dierentially
activates posterior and anterior cingulate regions, frontal insula, and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex. Some of these regions are part of \theory of mind" circuitry, used to guess what others
believe and intend to do. The cingulate activity suggests that brains are working harder to
resolve cognitive-emotional conicts in order to choose strategies.
 Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs{guessing what others think you will do{compared
to forming beliefs, activates the anterior insula. This area is also activated by a sense of
agency or self-causation (as well as by bodily sensations like disgust and pain). Combined
with behavioral data and study of the time courses of activation, this suggests that guessing
what others think you will do is a mixture of forming beliefs and making choices. For example,
this pattern of activity is consistent with people anchoring on their own likely choice and then
guessing whether other players will gure out what they will do, when forming a self-referential
2nd-order belief.
 Since subjects actually play other subjects, we can calculate how much they earn from their
choices and beliefs{their \strategic IQ". When they make choices, subjects with higher strate-
gic IQ have stronger activation in the caudate region (an internal signal of predicted reward
which correlates with actual earnings) and precuneus (an area thought to integrate emotion,
imagery and memory, suggesting that good strategic thinking may use circuitry adapted for
guessing how other people feel and what they might do). Strategic IQ is negatively correlated
with activity in insula, which suggests that too much self-focus harms good strategic thinking,
or that poor choices are neurally expressed by bodily discomfort.
It is too early to know how these data knit together into a picture of brain activity during
strategic thinking. However, activity in cingulate cortex (posterior, neighboring precuneus, anterior,
and paracingulate) all appear to be important in strategic thinking, as does activity in dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, the insula region and in reward areas in the striatum. The most novel nding
is that activity in creating self-referential 2nd-order beliefs activates insula regions implicated in a
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sense of self-causation. That interpretation, along with the fact that 2nd-order beliefs are highly
correlated with choices, is a clue that higher-order belief formation is not a simple iteration of belief
formation. Furthermore, the link between self-focus suggested by insula activity and its negative
correlation with low strategic IQ suggests that third-party 2nd-order beliefs (C guessing what B
thinks A will do) might be more accurate than self-referential 2nd-order beliefs (A guessing what
B thinks A will do). This novel prediction shows how neural evidence can inspire a fresh idea that
would not have emerged from standard theory.
Note that the study of brain activation is not really intended to conrm or refute the basic
predictions in game theory; that kind of evaluation can be done just by using choices [6]. Instead, our
results provide some suggestions about a neural basis for game theory which goes beyond standard
theories that are silent about neural mechanisms. Neural game theories will consist of specications
of decision rules and predictions about both the neural circuitry that produces those choices and
its biological correlates (e.g., pupil dilation, eye movements, etc.). These theories should also say
something about how behavior varies across players who dier in strategic IQ, expertise, autism,
Machiavellianism, and so forth. Linking brain activity to more careful measurements of steps of
strategic thinking is the next obvious step in the creation of neural game theory.
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Appendix B
B.1 Methods
Pairs of subjects were recruited on campus at Caltech through SSEL lab recruiting software.1 One
subject performed the tasks in the scanner, as the row player, while the other performed them in
an adjacent room, as the column player. These three tasks were given in a random order for each
game to control for order eects.
In the scanner each subject proceeds through a series of screens (like Figure 2.1) one at a time,
at their own pace. They press buttons on a box with 4 buttons to record their responses (choosing a
row strategy in C and 2B tasks, and a column strategy across the bottom of the screen in B tasks).
After each response is recorded, there is a random lag from 6-10 seconds with a \xation cross" to
hold their visual attention in the center of the screen. The entire set of tasks took from 7 to 15
minutes.
At the end of the experiment 1 of the 24 tasks was chosen at random and subjects were paid
according to their payos in the games at a rate of $0.30 a point, if a choice task was picked, or were
given $15 for a correct answer to the belief tasks. All payments were in addition to a $5 showup fee.
Subjects in the scanner were debriefed after the experiment to control for any diculties in the
scanner and to get self-descriptions as to their strategies. The most common strategy described
was a hybrid between cooperation and self-interest where they acted largely to maximize their own
payos, but would cooperate if a small loss to herself would result in a large gain to the other player.2
Some subjects seemed empirically more cooperative than others, but we treated all subjects similarly
in our analysis.
To do the scanning, we rst acquired a T1-weighted anatomical image from all row players. (This
is a sharper-resolution image than the functional images taken during behavior so that we can map
areas of activation onto a sharper image to see which brain areas are active.) Functional images
1Since Caltech students are selected by the admissions committee, for their unusual analytical skill, they are hardly
a random sample. Instead, their behavior is likely to overstate the average amount of strategic thinking in a random
population. This is useful, however, in establishing dierential activation of regions for higher-order strategic thinking
since the subjects are likely to be capable of higher-order thinking in games that demand it.
2Subjects reporting this strategy included some who had taken one or more classes in game theory and were
familiar with the concept of Nash equilibrium.
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were then acquired while subjects in the scanner played with subjects outside the scanner. They
were acquired with a Siemens 3T MRI scanner using a T2-weighted EPI (TR = 2000msec TE = 62
ms, 34 (32 for smaller heads) 3mm slices), 32-34 slices depending on brain size. The slice acquisition
order was (2, 4, 6, : : :, 1, 3, 4, : : :). Data was acquired with one functional run per subject.
Data were analyzed using SPM2. Data were rst corrected for time of acquisition, motion-
corrected, coregistered to the T1-weighted anatomical image, normalized to the MNI brain and
smoothed with an 8mm kernel. The data were then detrended using a high-pass lter of periods
greater that 128 seconds and an AR(1) correction.
For each analysis the general linear model was constructed by creating dummy variables that were
\on" from the stimulus onset time until the decision. When a subtraction is measured, the dierence
between activation in task A and task B, the dummy variable is +1 when the task A stimulus is
present and -1 when the task B stimulus is present. These dummy variables were convolved with
the standard hemodynamic response function. Standard t-tests were used to determine whether
coecient on one dummy variable is greater than that on another. Data from all the subjects
were combined using a random-eects model. The cross-subject regressions regress t-statistics of
treatment aects across voxels against behavioral measures of strategic IQ.
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B.2 Data Tables
The following tables summarize the order of games and tasks, raw choices of subjects and all regions
seen in the scans discussed in the main text.
Game CGCB transform Task Order Game Type
1 2A(-10, -5; AA-BB) C, B, 2B row player has dominant strategy
2 3A(-20, +10) 2B, C, B column player has dominant strategy
3 5A(+15, -13; A-C) 2B, B, C 3 2 game, 3 steps of dominance for row player
4 5B(-7, +11, B-C) B, 2B, C 3 2 game, 3 steps of dominance for row player
5 6A(-17, -3; AA-BB) C, 2B, B 2 3 game, 2 steps of dominance for row player
6 6B(+7, +0; AA-CC) B, C, 2B 2 3 game, 2 steps of dominance for row player
7 9A(+19, +19; A-C) C, B, 2B row player has a dominant strategy
8 9B(0, 0) B, C, 2B column player has a dominant strategy
Table B.1: Order of games, transformation from original CGCB games, and order of tasks for each
game. Note: In the \CGCB tranform" column, in notation Gx (r; c; Y   Z) Gx denotes name and
letter, r and c are constants added to original CGCB payos to transform them to experimental
currency payos we used, and Y   Z denotes original rows or columns that are switched to create
our matrices. Example: Our game 3 (see text, Figure 2.1) is CGCB game 5A with 15 added to all
row payos, 13 subtracted from all column payos, and rows A and C switched. In game 6 there
waws a math error in one cell: for (B, AA) in our game we added 6 instead of 7 to the corresponding
cell in CGCB, this did not change the strategic structure of the game.
A B C D AA BB CC DD
# New C New C New C New C New C New C New C New C
1 .25 .21 .75 .79 n/a n/a n/a n/a .61 .69 .39 .31 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2 .50 .86 .50 .14 n/a n/a n/a n/a .61 .92 .39 .08 n/a n/a n/a n/a
3 .31 .21 .56 .79 .13 .00 n/a n/a .39 .23 .61 .77 n/a n/a n/a n/a
4 .25 .14 .63 .71 .13 .14 n/a n/a .44 .46 .56 .54 n/a n/a n/a n/a
5 .44 .79 .56 .21 n/a n/a n/a n/a .22 .38 .17 .00 .61 .62 n/a n/a
6 .50 .36 .50 .64 n/a n/a n/a n/a .56 .77 .22 .08 .22 .15 n/a n/a
7 .38 .08 .00 .00 .06 .00 .56 .92 .56 .46 .44 .54 n/a n/a n/a n/a
8 .38 .07 .63 .93 n/a n/a n/a n/a .11 .08 .00 .00 .17 .00 .72 .92
Table B.2: Frequency of strategy choices A-D and AA-DD in our study vs. Costa-Gomes et al
(2001) data. (CGCB data denoted \C"; n/a. denotes strategies that did not exist in a particular
game)
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Choice (C) Belief 2nd Order Belief (2B)
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Game 1 11.4 20.4* 26.2 11.3 12.5 18.3 5.78 8.58 13.7
Game 2 8.87 11 20.9 6.58 7.75 13.5 14.5 22.3* 25.5
Game 3 8.58 10.7 16.3 9.61 11.2 20.2 16.8 25* 42.8
Game 4 2.91 7.83 15 11.4 16.6* 32.9 6.08 10.8 23.9
Game 5 18.6 24.9* 37.3 6.55 11.6 16.7 7.92 10.1 23.9
Game 6 8.1 9.5 13.4 19.6 25.2* 42.8 4.61 6.54 15.1
Game 7 17.6 25.5* 42 6.08 9.23 14.1 6.58 10 17.3
Game 8 6.17 8.05 12.2 15.8 20.9* 26 5.67 11.1 13.8
Table B.3: Distributions of free response times (25th, 50th { median{ and 75th percentiles) in seconds
across tasks and games. Note: * Denotes task which was presented rst (e.g., the 2B task was rst
in game 3). Response times are typically about twice as long for the rst task presented.
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Comparison Signicance
Threshold
Area x y z cluster
size
t-stat
Choice > Belief (all games, all
subjects)
p = :001
R Occipital Lobe 9 -78 9 202 6.77
Cingulate Gyrus -3 -12 33 24 5.12
L Dorsolateral -27 48 9 14 4.74
ACC 6 42 0 33 4.62
Frontal Insula -42 12 -18 31 4.60
R Cerebellum 9 -42 -27 17 4.49
R Insula 36 12 -3 6 4.10
2nd Order Belief > Belief (Out
of Equilibrium Games Only)
p = :001
L Insula -42 0 0 3 4.44
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 33 0 8 4.85
p = :002
L Insula -42 0 0 9 4.44
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 33 0 13 4.85
Choice-task activity nagatively
correlated with SIQ (games w/
dominant strategies excluded)
p = :0005
L Insula -42 6 -3 12 5.34
BA 11 -24 45 -15 6 5.47
R Cerebellum 9 -78 -18 6 5.28
Choice-task activity positively
correlated with SIQ (games w/
dominant strategies excluded)
p = :001 Precuneus 3 -66 24 13 4.90
p = :05
Caudate 12 0 15 11 2.52
Precuneus 3 -66 24 312 4.90
R Occipital/Cerebellum 18 -87 -21 33 3.61
Precentral Gyrus -42 -18 42 45 2.90
Occipital Gyrus -27 -63 -12 12 2.35
L Occipital -36 -84 -15 6 2.28
R Occipital 48 -69 36 13 2.24
Choice > Belief (in equil.) p = :001 Ventral Striatum -3 21 -3 20 5.80
Choice > Belief (out of equil.)
p = :005
ACC 6 42 0 13 3.17
ACC 15 42 0 13 3.33
p = :001
Paracingulate 15 36 33 39 5.93
L Dorsolateral -30 30 6 14 4.85
R Occipital 12 -75 -6 19 4.84
R Occipital 30 -60 9 12 4.73
Table B.4: Coordinates (x; y; z), cluster sizes (k), and t-statistics for subtractions and activity-
behavior correlations reported in the text. R and L denote right and left hemispheres, respectively.
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B.3 Instructions to Subjects
This is an experiment on decision-making. The decisions you make will determine a sum of money
you will receive at the end of this experiment. If you read these instructions carefully, you stand to
earn a substantial sum of money.
The questions in this experiment will all involve playing \matrix games" . For the duration of
the experiment Player 1 will be the \row player" and Player 2 will be the \column player". You will
be shown a series of game that look something like this:
Player 1's payo Player 2's payos
AA BB CC AA BB CC
A 15 16 35 6 20 7
B 10 20 30 7 23 10
C 20 17 36 0 7 3
In these games the row player chooses a row and the column player chooses a column. Above,
the row player would choose A, B or C and the column player would choose AA, BB, or CC. You will
both make these decisions simultaneously and the cell that is determined by your choices determines
your payo. For example: If in the above example the row player had chosen B and the column
player had chosen CC The row player: Player 1, would receive 30 points and the column player:
Player 2, would receive 10 points. If on the other hand Player 1 had selected C and Player 2 had
selected BB the payos would be 17 for Player 1 and 7 for Player 2.
In addition to playing the games you will be asked some questions about the games during the
course of the experiment. You will be asked what you think the other player will choose, and what
you think the other player believes you will choose. These questions will be mixed in with the games
in a random order so pay close attention to the question at the top of the screen. If you are player
2 (outside the scanner) you may not go back and forth among the questions.
Payment
In addition to playing the games you will be asked some questions about the games during the
course of the experiment. At the end of the experiment we will select one game or question and
award you for your performance on that game or question. You will earn $15 15 for a correct answer
to a question, or $0.30 a point for points earned in the game. In addition you be given a $5.00
show-up fee.
Questions:
1. What is your age?
2. What is your sex? (F/M)
3. Are you left handed or right handed?
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4. Have you taken any courses in Economics of Game Theory. If so please list these below.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
5. In game (a) below, if the row player chooses C and the column player chooses AA, what are
both players' payofs?
6. Practice games - If you're player 1 choose a row. If you're player 2 choose a column.
(a)
Player 1's Payos Player 2's Payos
AA BB CC AA BB CC
A 10 12 48 20 19 12
B 5 30 25 78 42 60
C 20 13 0 50 7 9
D 43 16 27 15 10 13
(b)
Player 1's Payos Player 2's Payos
AA BB CC AA BB CC
A 0 -1 1 0 1 -1
B 1 0 -1 -1 0 1
C -1 1 0 1 -1 0
Chapter 3
Neural activity during bargaining
with private information
with Terry Lohrenz, Read Montague, and Colin F. Camerer
3.1 Introduction
Strategic interaction lies at the heart of social science. Game theory provides a precise language to
study strategic interaction and provides analytical tools for predicting what will happen when people
interact. In a game, players choose strategies given information about the strategies and private
information about other players. Strategy choices create outcomes which players are assumed to
value, in a way that can be expressed by numerical utility.
The central complication in analysis of a game is what players believe other players will do.
Beliefs, and the sensible strategy choices that result given dierent beliefs will lead to dierent out-
comes. The key questions in predicting outcomes are rst, what characterizes a \sensible" strategy
choice, and second, what determines our beliefs.
Economists have traditionally gotten around these questions using equilibrium concepts. A
sensible strategy is simply a best response, i.e., expected utility maximizing response, given beliefs.
The question of belief is replaced by that of mutual best response. However equilibrium concepts
like Nash equilibrium give mixed results as predictors of human behavior [4, 3].
An important canonical game in economics, political science, biology, and other elds is bargain-
ing. The exchange of goods, either for other goods or for currency, is a basic activity that occurs in
any human culture. However this sort of game requires both parties to have a good understanding
of the desires of the other.
In this paper we study a simple version of this game with \cheap-talki," a limited round of
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communication with no direct eect on the outcome of the game. A buyer and seller bargain briey
over the price at which the seller will trade an object with zero cost in one period of bargaining.
Since the seller's cost is zero, she could sell at any price. The complication is that the buyer's value
for the object, v, is drawn from a uniform distribution of integers from 1 to 10. The buyer knows
her value but the seller only knows that the value is uniformly distributed.
The rst step in the game is that the buyer \suggests" a price s. This suggestion is costless and
has no direct payo consequences. The seller hears the suggestion s and names a take-it-or-leave-it
price p. If the price p is below or equal to the value v (p  v) the trade takes place at the price p.
The seller then earns p  0 = p and the buyer earns the surplus v   p. Notice that the suggestion s
does not enter directly into what the buyer and seller earn; it just serves as a communication device
which might inuence the price the seller demands.
Despite its simplicity, this game is interesting from both an economic view and from the viewpoint
of social neuroscience. In the standard analysis (which assumes self-interest and no computational
costs), the seller realizes the buyer's suggestion is always designed to get her (the seller) to name a
lower price. The seller should therefore ignore s, and name the price which maximizes her expected
prot, either 5 or 6 (both prices are equally protable). Anticipating the fact that the seller ignores
s, the buyer should \babble," in game theory jargon, and choose a value of s which is unrelated
to v. However, since the buyer's value is always above the seller's cost (zero), a failure to trade is
socially inecient. This game therefore features a conict between the social desire to always trade,
and the individual desires to get the best price.
In experiments of this general type, buyers generally \over-communicate" (there is a measurable
correlation between the true state and the signal sent) and sellers are sensitive to the buyers' sug-
gestions, contrary to the prediction of theory. The gains from exchange that result from this pattern
are higher for the two players together than if there was babbling by the buyer and ignorance of the
suggested price by the seller [14, 17, 3, 2].
Our bargaining game is of interest in social neuroscience too. Compared to other species, humans
are highly social and have created complex social architectures for trade, transmission of cultural
practices and information, and institutional rules such as laws and social norms. These practices are
presumably supported by neural architecture for decoding and creating facial expressions, process-
ing abstract signals of who can be trusted, and creating reasonable \models" of others' behavior:
understanding both their desires and how those desires are linked to their actions. While there are
some fMRI studies of social exchange in games involving trust [10, 16] and randomization [8], there
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are no studies of the sort of strategic communication that results from bargaining.
An important open question is why and when over-communication occurs: Are one or both sides
making a strategic mistake? Are they being pro-social and cooperative, knowing that choosing an
informative value of s and responding to it will increase how much they make together? Or is there
something even more basic going on, involving how our brains are wired to process communication
from another person.
3.2 Background
We chose to study bargaining because it provides a natural strategic environment for subjects, bar-
gaining over an object is a familiar situation to many adults; and because the incomplete information
in the problem, namely the private values for the buyer and sellers, provide a rich environment to
explore belief formation. In addition bargaining is a well-understood problem theoretically. Myer-
son and Satterthwaite discussed the inherent ineciency of bilateral bargaining using any incentive
compatible mechanism [12].
We chose to study cheap talk in these games for several reasons. First, experiments show that
cheap talk will increase the average eciency of bilateral bargaining games [17]. Second, the core
purpose of cheap talk is to manipulate another player's beliefs. Crawford and Sobel [6] characterized
the Bayes-Nash equilibria of a general class of sender-receiver games. In these games there is some
randomly chosen state of the world that is revealed to the \sender," the sender is then allowed to
send some signal s to a \receiver." After seeing this signal the receiver takes an action a 2 A that
determines the outcome of the game.
They predict that the level of information transmission is proportional to how well aligned the
player's preferences are in games similar to the task we study here [6], but as mentioned above, in
bargaining games the buyer's interests are almost directly opposed to the seller. In addition they
show that any equilibrium is equivalent to one of the class described below:
 Let R be the possible states of the world and S be the set of possible signals. There exists
some signaling function  R ! S such that the sets  1(s) create a partition over R.
 The receiver has some response function  S ! A such that (s) maximizes the receiver's
expected payo conditional on the fact that the state of the world is an element of  1(s).
The allows us to use the number of sets in the partition induced by  1 as a measure of how infor-
mative the equilibrium is. For example if there is only one element in this partition the equilibrium
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is completely uninformative, while if elements of the partition each contain exactly one element the
equilibrium is completely informative, i.e. the sender communicates the true state perfectly.
3.2.1 Neuroscience
From the neuroscience perspective, we chose this problem because it allows us to explore the basis
of deviations from \rational" behavior in social situations away from a moral context. In the past
few years there have been a number of imaging studies examining the neural correlates of social
emotions such as trust and resentment [16, 7, 15]. These have focused largely on the emotional
factors of decision making. This paper focuses more on the constraints neural function may place
on social reasoning divorced from moral implications. Cheap talk is a form of strategic information
transmission, which means that it may include strategic deception. The ability to deceive is non-
trivial from a neural perspective since it requires the deceiver to understand that another person
may have a dierent perception of the world than their own. Children do not usually develop this
ability until they are about 4 years old. From the perspective of the person receiving information,
responding to possible deception may be dicult since it requires a decision maker to ignore some or
all of the information given. Economists almost implicitly assume that all information from another
decision maker is suspect until proven otherwise (i.e., through reputation building or shared goals),
taking this sort of neural perspective may indicate that the brain's default is to trust information.
One well-known task in both psychology and neuroscience is the \Stroop Task." In this task
subjects are shown the names of colors in dierent colored ink. At the beginning of each trial
the subjects are told to either read the word or name the color of the ink. There are essentially
two types of stimuli: congruent stimuli where the word and color match, e.g., red in red ink; and
incongruent stimuli where the word and color as mismatched, e.g., blue in green ink. MacDonald
et al. found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was dierentially activated by the
color-naming task, the more cognitively dicult task, than the word-reading task implying that this
area may be instrumental in implementing cognitive control, whereas they found that the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) was dierentially activated by incongruent versus congruent stimuli. We
nd signicant correlations to both of these areas during our task, supporting the hypothesis that
departures from rational behavior may be the result of automated information processing in the
brain.
The DLPFC has also been implicated in cognitive control in the ultimatum game. Sanfey et
al. found that low oers elicited activity in the DLPFC, and Knoch et al. found that disrupting
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activity in the right DLPFC (but not the left DLPFC) reduces a subjects' rate of rejection for unfair
oers [15, 11]. These results suggest acceptance of the oer may be the more basic or automatic
response to ultimatum oer and subjects need to exert cognitive control to reject oers as a means
of punishing the proposer1.
Other neural regions that seem consistently active over many types of decision-making tasks
are the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala. Hsu et al. found that risky or ambiguous
situations elicit activity in both of these areas, the the activity increasing as the level of information
decreased. In addition, patients with damage to the orbitofrontal area showed signicantly less risk
and ambiguity aversion than patients with comparable damage to other areas.
For the purposes of this study we will be particularly interested in two systems. The rst one
involves the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and the DLPFC, and is instrumental for implementing
cognitive control and resolving conicting response impulses. The second is a system that includes
various parts of the basal ganglia (sub-cortical areas of the brain, these are some of the oldest regions
of the brain from an evolutionary perspective) and the OFC. This second system is thought to be
necessary for assigning reward values to objects or decisions.
3.3 The Bargaining Task
Subjects are recruited in pairs and read detailed instructions. Following experimental economics
conventions, all the details of the protocol (except the specic values of the buyer in each stage) are
known by both players. This convention means that it is possible for players to arrive at an economic
equilibrium, in theory, simply by reasoning and introspection (so if they deviate from equilibrium,
it is not because they were confused or misled). It also means that noise from perceptions about the
nature of the experiment and the information of the other player are minimized, so we can study
neural activity that arises solely from perceptions of the other players' hidden value and strategy.
At the beginning of each round the players were told whether they were the \buyer" or the \seller"
in that round. Buyers were told their random private value for a hypothetical good, distributed
identically and independently across trials over integers 1 through 10. Sellers never had any intrinsic
value for the good (as if they were producing perishable goods at zero marginal cost), to simplify
the game. In this simple structure, trades should always take place since the buyer's value is always
above the seller's cost of zero (i.e., trade is always ecient). Subjects switched roles every ve
1This interpretation is more congruent with anthropological studies showing that societies where people have less
social interaction are less likely to reject low oers in the ultimatum game [9].
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rounds.
The task had two stages at which subjects make choices aecting the game:
 Stage 1: The buyer is informed of her private value, v and asked to \suggest a price." We call
the buyer's suggested price s.
 Stage 2: The seller sees s and is asked to choose a price p. If p  v the trade occurred in
that round; the buyer receives the dierence between the value and the price (the surplus in
economic terms) v   p and the seller receives the net prot p.
In addition we asked subjects directly about their beliefs. For the seller this was always a
rst-order belief: What do you think the buyer's value is? However for the buyer this is always a
second-order belief, i.e., a belief about someone else's beliefs: What does the seller think your value
is? Subjects were rewarded for their answers to these questions according to their accuracy, getting
one point for the correct answer and a decreasing payo as their answers diverged from the correct
answer. This way, we incentivized honest reporting, but the payos for belief elicitation were far
outweighed by the payos to the game itself.
Because we wanted to image brain activity of both the buyer and seller in a pair simultaneously,
we used a partner protocol in which two subjects play each other repeatedly. Games like this
are sensitive, in theory, to what two partners know about the history. This reputational history-
dependence is a huge source of complication in analyzing brain activity since the signal-to-noise ratio
is so low in fMRI. It is therefore usually necessary to pool many trials which are informationally
similar, making feedback impractical. Therefore neither player received any direct feedback about
the outcome of each trial. Subjects were not even told whether a trade had taken place. This
allows us to treat each trial as approximately independent, and to analyze behavior as if they are
participating in a one-shot game.
Each subject performed this task 60 times, 30 as a buyer and 30 as a seller, switching roles every
5 rounds. The role switching allows us to compare behavior as buyer and seller within each subject,
which is statistically advantageous. They were not informed of their total earnings until the very end
of the experiment. Since the sellers never received information about the buyer value, subjects never
learned directly about their opponent's suggested pricing strategy. Similarly, since the buyers never
learned whether a trade occurred, they could not learn directly about the seller's pricing strategy.
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Figure 3.1: Screens seen by the buyer and seller during one trial
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However, sellers could conceivably make inferences based on the range of suggestions they received
over course of the experiment, a possibility we investigate below.
3.3.1 Predictions
A theoretical analysis of the one shot game shows that if a seller's strategy is at all sensitive to
suggested prices, high-value buyers will all pool with the low-value buyers, transmiting minimal
information and making the seller's strategy non-optimal (see appendix for formal details). So the
equilibrium prediction is that suggested price should be completely unrelated to value (Prob(vjs) =
:1 for all v; s), and the seller will choose p maximize u(p)(11   p)=10, for a risk-neutral seller this
implies that he should always choose p = 5 or p = 6.
Keep in mind that in the theory above, subjects are forming correct beliefs about what other
players will do and maximizing their own personal gains given their beliefs. As a useful benchmark
contrast, suppose both players were trying hard to cooperate and earn the most money together
from the task (e.g., suppose they had planned beforehand to split their earnings equally, so they
want to maximize the total gain). Since the seller always wants to sell the good to maximize their
joint gains, the seller should try to always name a price the buyer can aord. One way to do this
is to always name a price of 1. Another way to do this is for the buyer to make a suggestion which
is communicates the value perfectly, i.e., the suggestion correspondence has a functional inverse
f(s) = v, and for the seller to choose p  f(s). Such patterns could emerge, in theory, but neither
emerged in this experiment, instead we observe partial information revelation of the sort you might
expect if the buyer and seller incentives were somewhat aligned.
While subjects were not given any feedback about the outcome of each trial, both the buyer
and seller are aware of the buyer's history of suggestions over the course of the experiment. This
raises the question, do sellers pay attention to the buyer's \reputation" and, if they do, do buyers
anticipate this by revealing information. We consider two ways in which the history of suggestions
might create repeated game eects. First, we consider purely strategic models where sellers attempt
to glean information from not only the current suggestion, but the entire history of suggestion.
Second, we will look at non-standard preferences that include a taste for retaliation or fairness.
One simple way to model information extraction from a buyer's history is to look at an extension
of the cognitive hierarchy model [4]. Assume that level-0 buyers use a strategy of the form s =
max(1; bvc), with  drawn randomly from [0; 1]. Higher-level sellers assume that any given level-0
player uses the same  throughout the experiment, so they can infer their opponents type from
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the suggestions they send. Level-n buyers choose signals to maximize their sum payments for the
current period and the n following period (sellers do not consider future payos since their actions,
unlike buyer actions, will not aect buyer beliefs in the future).
First let us consider the level-1 sellers. Before the rst round they have a uniform prior on the
value  that their opponent uses to generate suggestions. At the beginning of the rst round they
will receive a signal from the buyer, s. The seller can update their prior on the value of  using
this signal and Bayes Law. For example, if s = 8, the seller will update their perceived probability
distribution on  so that they believe that P ( < :8) = 0. Sellers then best respond to s given their
new updated prior. In each subsequent round the seller will update their prior again based on the
new signal. Here we can make two dierent assumptions. First, the sellers may use the entire history
of signals to generate a new prior. In this case if the seller ever sees a particularly high signal, like
s = 1, beliefs will always be such that  must be high and sellers will always be credulous. Second,
sellers may have a limited memory, and thus only update the original uniform prior on the value of
 using the current signal s0 and the signal from the previous round s 1. Here, the eects of a high
signal are transient.
Level-1 buyer behavior is uninteresting. Since they believe that the sellers are credulous, they will
always choose a signal s = 1. However, Level-2 buyers will anticipate the fact that their cheap talk
signal s will aect the seller's behavior. When the buyer believes that seller memory is unlimited,
they can build up their credibility, i.e., manipulate the sellers to believe that  = 1, but signaling
10 just once. They will signal s = 1 in all subsequent rounds. If, on the other hand, buyers believe
that sellers have a limited memory, there will be an inverse relationship between the buyer's value v
and the signal chosen s. In essence, buyers build credibility when they have low values by sending
high signals in order to gain more surplus when they have high values. The average best response
by a buyer given their previous signal s 1 and current value v-are shown in Figure 2 below.
A model where sellers have retaliatory preferences, i.e., they enjoy punishing buyers who send
low signals, yields buyer behavior similar to CH level-2 buyers since sellers never know if their
punishment is justied. Buyers will still use rounds where they have low values, and therefore little
potential payo, to raise their average signal and fend o retaliation by the seller. When they have
higher values, they will send low signals to get better prices.
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Figure 3.2: The average best cheap talk signal (sometimes the best response set has multiple values)
for a level-2 buyer given  = 1:5 over all possible values v, and previous signals, s 1, when the seller
has a limited memory
Model Predicted Buyer
Behavior
Predicted Seller Behavior
Nash Babbling p = 5 or 6
Cognitive Hierarchy with full memory
level-0 s = max(1; bvc) p = s
level-1 s = 1 for all v argmaxp(p Pr(v  pjfstg)) where fstg is the series of signals
until the current time
level-2 s = 10 early in the
experiment, s = 1
from there on
argmaxp
 
p 
 
Pr(l = 1jfstg)
11 p
10 + Pr(l = 0)Pr(v  pjfstg)

Cognitive Hierarchy with limited memory
level-1 s = 1 argmaxp(p  Pr(v  pjs0; s 1))
level-2 s = 10 for low v,
s = 1 otherwise
Similar to above but priors depend only on recent information.
Table 3.1: Predicted buyer and seller behavior using a cognitive hierarchy model
148
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
S
ig
na
l
Signaling Data and regression for AI-2, slope = .6, intercept = .4, R2 = .84
Value
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
Signal
P
ric
e
Pricing Data and regression for AI-2, slope = .92, intercept = 2.75, R2 = .61
Figure 3.3: Suggested prices sent by a single subject as buyer, and prices set as seller. (Points are
jittered by adding random noise so that identical points are plotted separately).
3.4 Behavioral Results
In a study like this which is aimed at two audiences, it is always helpful if the behavioral patterns
themselves are surprising and of interest to readers who are not interested in neural activity. Roughly
speaking, buyers' suggested prices are often remarkably revealing of their values. Buyers not only
sent suggestions which are statistically informative (in the sense that s is realted to v), but they
seemed to use linear strategies resulting in bins similar to those predicted by Crawford and Sobel
for games where player's incentives are partially aligned. Furthermore, sellers seem to anticipate
informativeness of price suggestsions and set their prices p based on the suggestions s also using
roughly linear strategies. Interestingly, however, a single player's strategies in their role as buyer
were not generally best responses to their own strategies as a seller (and vice versa).
Figure 1 reports all the data from a single subject. The top graph shows the subject's suggested
prices s against her valuations v. The bottom graph shows the prices chosen by that same subject,
p against the suggested prices she saw s. Both look roughly linear and have much more statistical
association than predicted by equiliibrium theory. As a buyer, she seems to \shave" prices by
suggesting a fraction of the value. As a seller, she seems to follow a markup strategy of adding a
small constant to the buyer's suggestion.
Looking at these behavioral data for each subject suggests that they can be characterized by
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three parameters in each role: The slope and intercept of the regression line of suggested prices s on
values v (as buyer) or prices p on suggestions s (as seller), and the associated R2 of each regression.
The buyer-regression slope is a measure of information revelation while the seller-regression slope is
a measure of information-sensitivity.
We can express all three parameters compactly for both roles by plotting each subject's buyer
and seller regression parameters in a two-dimensional \intercept-slope" space, in the gure below,
with intercepts on the x-axis and slopes on the y-axis. Since each subject has two sets of parameters
(because they played both buyer and seller roles) their parameters are connected by a chord. Red
circles represent seller regressions (p on s) and blue circles represent buyer regressions (s on v). The
sizes of the circles for each subject role are proportional to the R2 statistic for the regression. The
particular subject whose full suggested price and price regressions are graphed in Figure 3.1 is the
one with the lled circles.
To make the graphs more readable, subjects were divided into four groups based on the R2
statistics for the two regressions, which represent the behavioral predictability of their strategies.
The majority of subjects have substantial predictability in both s and p (R2>.30 for both regressions).
The most common pattern is like that shown in Figure 1, the red (seller) circle has a positive intercept
and slope around 1, which indicates the sellers are marking up the suggested price by a xed constant,
while as buyers, the blue circles typically have slopes around .5 and small intercepts. Note that the
presence of a signicant markup by the seller indicates that these subjects are not trying to be \fair"
by suggesting s = v2 , since that would imply that they should also price fairly by choosing p = s.
The four subjects shown in the graph on the lower right show little information revelation as
buyers (the theorized \babblers"), but as sellers, they still seem to mark up suggested prices. For
the 5 subjects in the upper and lower left graphs, nothing systematic is happening.2 Recall that the
simple theory prediction, babbling and ignoring the suggested price, predicts that players' parameter
estimates will be centered around slopes of zero, i.e. no information revelation or information
sensitivity. In addition it predicts that the seller R2 statistics should be close to one, since they
should employ a constant strategy. The theory clearly does not t well in general; although there
are many cases where slopes are low, we see nothing corresponding to the predicted seller strategies,
since these all have very low R2 statistics. Furthermore, there is striking cross-subject variation
which might be explained by imaging. Notice that only one subject shows the inverse correlation
between v and s predicted by the CH-model or retaliatory seller preferences.
2However, as one might expect, the 3 subjects got some of the lowest payos.
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Figure 3.4: Behavioral data for all 20 subjects separated into quadrants according the R2 statistics
for the p on s, R2p, and s on v, R
2
s , regressions
The extra information transfer by the subjects resulted in an increased level of eciency. Equi-
librium predicts that 50    60% of the feasable trades should take place. We found that 68% of
trades took place over all the 20 buyer-seller pairs; in eight of the 20 pairs at least 75% of the fea-
sible trades were made. One pair traded in every round, extracting all of the possible surplus. The
eciency of pairs was weakly correlated with the information revelation and information sensitivity
of the buyer/seller pair.
3.5 fMRI results
The central brain imaging dependent variable is the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal.
This is a coarse measure of brain activity based on how much oxygenated blood ows through a
brain area with a short time lag (2{4 seconds). The generic analysis correlates the time series of the
BOLD signal in each articially dened voxel (a 3.4x3.4x4 mm cube) with a matched time series of
some sort of regressor. Generally we look for clusters of k  5 contiguous voxels which each have
BOLD activity correlated with the regressor at a low p-value (typically p < :001). There are several
types of analyses one can do with BOLD-signal data. We will present only our results derived so
far which illustrate how these analyses work and what we have learned and might be learned with
further analysis.
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There are two interesting behaviors in this paradigm. The rst is suspicion in Sellers: how
sensitive are sellers to the cheap talk signals that they see? The second is deception in the buyers:
How closely do the cheap talk signals they send resemble their private values? For both of these
behaviors we can observe both within subject parameters: the distance between the information
they receive and their choice, p   s for the sellers and v   s for the buyers; and between subject
parameters: the regression slopes and intercept parameters estimated in the previous section. We
found areas correlating both of these measures.
3.5.1 Correlates to Suspicion
A between-individual analysis takes some behaviorally derived parameter for each person (or, per-
haps each pair) and regresses the brain activity linked to some task, such as the onset of a stimulus,
on this parameter. Any such correlation permits a statement of the form \higher activity in area A
is linked to the propensity to exhibit behavior B." These analyses are quite dicult because brain
activity is measured with a time lag and error, and individual-level behavioral parameters are often
measured with error as well.
There are two interesting brain areas whose activity at the time of price choice is correlated with
the seller's information sensitivity (the slope in Figure 1) in a between-individual analysis. Activity
in the anterior cingulate (ACC) is decreasing in slope and activity in the right temporal pole is
increasing in slope (Figures 4 and 5 show sections and scatterplot).
The cingulate is typically active during cognitive conict or \executive function." A class of tasks
which reliably produce cingulate activity are called \Stroop tasks" (after the pioneering psychologist
Colin Stroop). Stroop gave subjects words printed in ink colors which sometimes matched the word
and sometimes did not. The task is then to rapidly name the ink color, but not the word. When
subjects see the word they often mistakenly say the word rather than name the ink color. The child's
game \Simon says" is also a Stroop task; for an American in England, looking to the right side for
oncoming trac (rather than the familiar left side) is a Stroop task too. More generally, a Stroop
task requires a decision maker to override a rapid, highly practiced, automatic response. The fact
that ACC activity is higher when sellers are less sensitive to the buyer's price suggestions hints that
ignoring a suggested price is like overriding an automatic response in a Stroop task.
The temporal pole region, whose activity is positively correlated with seller's information sen-
sitivity, is known to be active in \theory of mind" tasks, in which people must form judgments
about what others intend, it is particularly associated with detecting biological motion, or listening
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Figure 3.5: Activity in the anterior cingulate cortex at the point of price choice is negatively cor-
related with a subject's information sensitivity. Activation is shown overlain on the MNI average
brain on the left, the plot of relative activation against information sensitivity is shown on the right.
Figure 3.6: Activity in the right temporal pole is positively correlated with subject information
sensitivity. Activation is shown on the left, parameters are plotted on the right.
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to meaningful speech [5]. The temporal pole and ACC activity together suggest two patterns of
behavior dierent subjects adopt: In one pattern, sellers with high information sensitivity do not
perceive a conict between the suggested price s and the optimal price p (since parametrically, the
relation between those two variables is high), so ACC is relatively inactive; instead, the temporal
pole is active since these sellers are attributing meaning to these suggested prices. Conversely sellers
with low information sensitivity exhibit little temporal pole activity because they are not attributing
a lot of meaning to the suggested price. However, because the price they choose and the suggested
price are not correlated, the ACC is busy trying to resolve the conict between the \automatic"
response to the suggested price and the \override" of choosing a dierent price.
We also found interesting activations correlating to the within subject, trial-by-trial parameter,
of price market, i.e., the dierence p s between a seller's chosen price and and the cheap talk signal
they receive from the buyer. This price \mark up" is correlated with activity in right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (RDLPFC). This area, like the ACC, is involved in cognitive control and working
memory. In fact, as noted above, the RDLPFC is activated when responders in ultimatum games
receive low oers compared to high oers [15], and when activity in the region is inhibited using
transcranial magnetic stimulation, subjects are far less likely to reject low oers in the ultimatum
game [11]. These results from the ultimatum game both supprt the hypothesis that the RDLPFC is
a necessary component of a circuit used to inhibit automatic, or prepotent, responses. This, paired
with the between subject activation observed in the ACC, suggests that when sellers choose larger
markups and ignore the cheap talk signals they receive, they are exerting more cognitive control to
override the impulse to use this information as is.
3.5.2 Correlates to Deception
A between-subjects analysis of brain activity correlating to \buyer honesty" as indicated by the
slope of the regression of s on v revealed signicant negative correlation with the dorsal striatum
bilaterally. This is an area that has been implicated in goal-directed behavior in both humans [13]
and animals. A recent study by Atallah found that, in rats, this area was crucial to choosing the
correct option in an instrumental conditioning task even when learning was intact [1]. When this
region of the brain was pharmacologically blocked during a conditioning task, rats were unable to
consistently choose a rewarding option. However, when the block was removed, these same rats were
able to immediately perform the task correctly. This implies that although they were not choosing
the correct target, the rats were actually learning the correct choice and the dorsal striatum is crucial
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Figure 3.7: The right DLPFC is correlated within subject to the seller's chosen markup and the
price decision point. Once again, the cluster is shown on the left on the MNI average brain with
peristimulus activation plots for trials divided into the top (red), middle (green), and low (blue)
thirds of each subjects range.
to their ability to actually use this information.
The negative correlation of this area with buyer honesty suggests that subjects who revealed less
information via cheap talk were somehow more engaged in goal-seeking behavior than those who
didn't. Once again this suggests that honesty is a somehow more habitual or automated response
requiring less cognitive eort.
All these results support the view that both deception and suspicion are somehow more cogni-
tively eortful that credulity and honesty. In both cases, regions of the brain necessary for eortful
behavior, inhibition of a prepotent responses in the RDLPFC for sellers and engaging in goal-directed
behavior for buyers, are negatively correlated with credulity and honesty (i.e., they are correlated
with suspicion and deception).
3.6 Predicting behavior from neural activity and future ex-
periments
One way neural measures might be especially useful for economics is if they can add predictive
power to other types of variables. In our study, a candidate prediction of a causal change comes
from the well-studied ACC. It is known that scarce cingulate resources can be tied up if subjects
have to perform a parallel activity which requires attention or working memory (e.g., remembering
a several-digit number). Suppose sellers also have to remember a number while they are deciding
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Figure 3.8: Both the left and right dorsal striatum are negatively correlated with subject level
\Information Revelation" coecient (the slope of the regression of s on v), which we use as a proxy
for buyer honesty.
what price to choose. If ACC resources are substituted away from the pricing decision and toward
number-memory, then the negative correlation between ACC activity and information sensitivity
suggests sellers will become more information sensitive (i.e., they will respond with prices more
closely linked to s). That is, adding a number-memory treatment could change the outcome of the
bargaining.
Another candidate prediction comes from the positive correlation between right DLPFC activity
and higher price markups (seller prices above buyer-suggested prices). As described above, Knoch
et al. (2006) [11] successfully used TMS to disrupt brain activity in right DLPFC and induce players
in ultimatum games to accept low oers more frequently. Their interpretation is that the DLPFC
is activated by a conict between the desire to accept money and the desire to enforce social norms
by rejecting a low oer. TMS disruption disables this region so behavior reverts to the simpler,
more automatic reaction of acceptance. Similarly, one prediction from the DLPFC-markup link we
see is that if TMS was used to disrupt activity in the right DLPFC in our task, markups would be
reduced.
We don't know if either of these experiments would have the predicted eect, or whether they
are worth doing at all. We oer these suggestions, at this exploratory point, mostly as illustrations
of the recipe of using the fMRI to identify regions of activity which can then be inuenced by other
treatments in a way that potentially changes behavior.
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3.7 Conclusion
The behavioral data from this experiment show that subjects have a strong tendency toward both
information revelation and information sensitivity, even in situations where economic theory predicts
there should be none. The neural data linked to these behaviors suggest that rather than a social or
emotional explanation (subjects want to be fair), this information transfer may be the result of a far
more basic automated response to information. In fact, some activations seen in this study are very
close to those seen in the classical information processing experiment, the Stroop task. These sorts
of data suggest that we should reconsider what the \default" response of a decision maker might be
to any piece of information.
157
Bibliography
[1] H. Atallah, D. Lopex-Paniagua, J. Rudy, and R. c. O'Reilly. Separate neural substrates for skill
learning and performance in the ventral and dorsal striatum. Nature Neuroscience, 10:126{131,
2007.
[2] H. Cai and J. Wang. Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games
and Economic Behavior, 56(1):7{36, 2006.
[3] C. F. Camerer. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 2003.
[4] C. F. Camerer, T.-H. Ho, and J. K. Chong. A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119:861{898, 2004.
[5] F. Castelli, C. Frith, F. Happe, and U. Frith. Autism, asperger syndrom and brain mechanisms
for the attribution of mental states to animated shapes. Brain, 125:1939{1849, 2002.
[6] V. P. Crawford and J. Sobel. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50(6):1431{
1451, 1982.
[7] D. J.-F. de Quervain, U. Fischbacher, V. Treyer, M. Schellhammer, U. Schnyder, A. Buck, and
E. Fehr. The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science, 305:1254{1258, 2004.
[8] H. L. Gallagher, A. I. Jack, A. Roepstor, and C. D. Frith. Imaging the intentional stance in
a competitive game. NeuroImage, 16:814{821, 2002.
[9] J. Henrich, R. Bayd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath, M. Alvard,
A. Barr, J. Ensminger, N. S. Henrich, K. Hill, F. Gil-White, M. Gurven, F. W. Marlowe, J. Q.
Patton, and D. Tracer. \economic man" in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments
in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28:795{855, 2005.
158
[10] B. King-Casas, D. Tomlin, C. Anen, C. Camerer, S. Quartz, and R. Montague. Getting to know
you: Reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange. Science, 309(5718):78{83, 2005.
[11] D. Knock, A. Pascual-Leone, K. Meyer, V. Treyer, and E. Fehr. Diminishing reciprocal fairness
by disrupting the right prefrontal cortex. Science, 314(5800):829{932, 2006.
[12] R. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite. Ecient mechanisms for bilateral trade. Journal of
Economic Theory, 29(2):265, 1983.
[13] J. O'Doherty, P. Dayan, J. Schults, R. Deichmann, K. Friston, and R. Dolan. Dissociable roles
of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning. Science, 304:452{454, 2004.
[14] R. Radner and A. Schotter. The seeled-bib mechanism: An experimental study. Journal of
Economic Theory, 48(1):179{220, 1989.
[15] A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen. The neural basis
of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300:1755{1758, 2003.
[16] D. Tomlin, M. A. Kayali, B. King-Casas, C. Anen, C. Camerer, S. Quartz, and R. Mon-
tague. Agent-specic responses in the cingulate cortex during economic exchanges. Science,
312(5776):1047{1050, 2006.
[17] K. Valley, L. Thompson, R. Gibbons, and M. H. Bazerman. How communication improves
eciency in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 38:127{155, 2002.
159
Appendix C
Bayes-Nash equilibria of the
one-shot game
Claim C.0.1 The only Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is one where the buyer's sug-
gestion is uninformative.
Intuitively this follows from the fact that in this game the buyer and seller's incentives are almost
exactly opposed. They both prefer that a trade take place, but given that a trade does take place
the game is constant sum. To prove this formally we rst need to dene a few functions.
The probability mass functions for both player's strategy based on the information they re-
ceive. For buyers this is the perfect information v, while for sellers this is the noisy and possibly
uninformative suggestion s.
s(xjv) = Prfsuggestion = xjvg
p(xjs) = Prfprice = xjsg
q(vjx) =
s(xjv)P
y s(xjy)
The utility functions for the buyer and seller respectively are:
UB(s; v) =
X
x<v
p(x; s)ub(v   x)
US(p; s) = us(p)
X
vp
q(vjs)
where us; ub and increasing, weakly concave functions on R such that ub(0) = us(0) = 0.
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Let n be the lowest price chosen by the seller with positive probability over all suggestions and
choose s such that p(njs) > 0. Let S0 be the set of suggestions such that p(njs) > 0. We will
show that any buyer with value v > n will always choose a suggested price in S0 by induction. First
note that since n is the lowest price charged given any suggested price, suggestions in S0 strictly
dominate other strategies for buyers with value n + 1 since any other price yields a payo of 0.
Assume that all buyers with values in [n + 1; m   1] all only choose suggested prices in S0.
So any s0 62 S0 q(vjs
0) = 0 for all values between n + 1 and m   1, which in turn implies that
Pr(v  pjs0) = Pr(v  m) for all v 2 [n+1; m  1]. In other words, given s0, m dominates all prices
in [n + 1; m   1]. By assumption p(x; s0) = 0 for all x  n so we have p(x; s0) = 0 for all x < m.
Therefore UB(s0; m) = 0 for any s0 62 S0 and buyers with value m will always choose s 2 S0. Note
that this means that all buyers with value v < n must always choose s 2 S0 as well since otherwise
there would be some s 62 S0 such that Pr(v < njs) = 1 implying that y(pjs) > 0 for some p < n.
Lemma C.0.1 In equilibrium sellers choose prices according to some xed distribution p(x) re-
gardless of the suggested price received.
We show this using an induction argument like the one above. We need to show that p(xjs1) =
p(xjs2) = p
(x) for all s1; s2 2 S0 that are sent with positive probability. To see this note that it
must be true for x = n since if there is any s1; s2 such that p(njs1) > p(njs2) s1 dominates s2 for
buyers with value n + 1. Once again, this implies that s(s2jn + 1) = 0 ) p(n + 1js2) = 0 and s1
dominates s2 for buyers with value n + 2. Itterating up we see that s1 must dominate s2 for all
buyers and s(s2jv) = 0 for all v. Once again, using induction we see that p(xjs1) = p(xjs2) for all
s1 s2 sent with positive probability. In other words, any suggested price actually sent by the buyer
in equilibrium has no eect on the seller's pricing strategy. Let S1 be the set of suggestions sent in
equilibrium.
Let x be some price sucht that p(x) > 0. This means that x is a best response to s 2 S1,
specically it must be at least as good as x + 1, and x  1 so
us(x)
X
vx
q(vjs)  us(x + 1)
X
vx+1
q(vjs) )
us(x)q(xjs
)  (us(x + 1)  us(x))
X
vx+1
q(vjs) )
us(x)s(s
jx)  (us(x + 1)  us(x))
X
vx+1
s(sjv)
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Since p(x) is the same for all s 2 S1 we can sum over all the s in S1 and get
us(x)
X
s2S1
s(sjx)  (us(x + 1)  us(x))
X
vx+1
X
s2S1
s(sjx):
We know that buyers will always choose s 2 S1, so this is simplied to
us(x)
us(x + 1)  us(x)
 10  x:
Since u2 in increasing and concave the left side of this inequality is strictly increasing while the right
side is strictly decreasing. Also notice that if the inequality is strict p(x + 1) = 0, so the seller will
mix between at most 2 prices x and x + 1 (this occuring only when the intersection point x, such
that 10  x = us(x
)
us(x+1) us(x)
is an integer). This in turn implies that the seller simply chooses x
to maximize (11  x)us(x) the expected utility when the seller has no information.
